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Abstract
This thesis consists of three substantial chapters on topics related to occupa-
tional and industrial mobility.
Using quarterly data of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 1992 to 2013,
Chapter 2 documents the mobility across occupations and industries (referred to
as career change). The findings suggest that occupational and industrial mobility
are surprisingly high. Both occupational and industrial mobility are procyclical.
The majority of instances of career change are associated with wage growth. During
an expansion, a career changer’s wage grows more than someone who stays in their
career. However, this does not apply if the career changer was unemployed and
then hired during a recession. The evidence suggests that career mobility during
a business cycle is important for understanding the labour market flows and wage
growth.
The use of interviewing method may affect the accuracy of the data. The de-
pendent interviewing is introduced in the survey, and is helpful in reducing the
measurement errors. Chapter 3 uses data from British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) and UK Household Longitudinal Survey (UKHLS) to examine the ro-
bustness of the results obtained by using LFS. The procyclicality of occupational
and industrial mobility are reassured when the change of interviewing method is
controlled for. The further detailed occupational and industrial classification is
applied, and the pro-cyclicality of occupational and industrial mobility is found in
the further detailing of classifications.
Given the solid evidence found in Chaper 2 and 3, Chapter 4 develops a the-
oretical model to understand the mechanism of workers’ reallocation. Aggregate
productivity shock, sectoral productivity shock and preference shock are included
in order to investigate reallocation through business cycle, net mobility and gross
mobility respectively. This model shows the procyclicality of gross mobility be-
tween sectors, which is consistent with the findings in Chapter 2 and 3. This
chapter also explains the higher level of unemployment during recession.
This thesis undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the occupational and indus-
trial mobility in the UK using both empirical and theoretical methods. Limitations
of this thesis and suggestions for future research are provided.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The nature of economy is that it changes all the time. This leads people to consider
two questions: how to keep their job and when to change to another job. Regarding
the first question, people can essentially improve their skills and capabilities to
reduce the risk of getting fired. However, regarding the second question, it is
important for people to observe the performance of the economy in order to get a
good job since economic expansion always accompanies better job opportunities.
People have to consider whether or not to stay in their profession - their occu-
pation or industry - when they are seeking a job. The possibility of them being
hired in another profession during a boom period is increased because the labour
market demand is so strong. However, the incentive to change profession decreases
during the boom period because jobs in their current profession may be easier to
secure.
People change their profess due to different reasons, and these reasons can
be simply categorised into two types. The first type concerns the individual’s
character, for example, a better fit with the individual’s skill, a better location,
or the individuals’ preference. The second type stems mainly from the economic
situation, such as aggregate productivity and technology improvement.
Another interesting question is whether workers receive lower wages after they
change their profess. Workers are normally paid more because of greater experience
and accumulation of human capital. However, once workers change their profess,
are they still paid as well as the previous job?
According to the description above, we know that the economic situation affects
the worker’s decision regarding their career choices. but we do not know how
it affects their decision. Does a better economy encourage workers to be more
adventurous in their career choices?
The individual’s profess can be widely defined from different aspects, but in
this thesis, I mainly use the occupation and the industry of the worker job as
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a measurement to identify worker’s reallocation behavior. The occupational and
industrial reallocation in this thesis are hereafter referred to as a career change..
The research of reallocation across occupation and industries in the US has been
documented in the existing literature, but a comprehensive research of reallocation
in the UK is urgently needed. This thesis focuses on the occupational and industrial
reallocation in the UK, and contributes to fill the gap of the existing literature.
In economic theory, labour and capital are the most common resources in the
process of production, and this also emphasizes the importance of labour. The
demand and supply of labour involve complex factors and has attracted many re-
searchers into this area. Labour economics is an area that uses economic analysis to
understand the interaction between firms, workers and the government. It involves
microeconomic and macroeconomic techniques. There are diversified subjects in
this area, and unemployment is a crucial one. The other subjects include wages,
labor force participation and human capital, etc.
Empirical analysis and theoretical analysis are applied in this thesis. From the
empirical aspect, this thesis applies three core datasets to capture a comprehensive
view of the labour market in the UK. The Labour force Survey (LFS) is a quarterly
dataset providing individuals’ employment circumstances, and it is available from
1992. The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a multi-purpose study and
is helpful to track workers’ long term behavior. The BHPS contains individuals’
employment histories and is published every year from 1992 to 2008. The United
Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) is a successor of the BHPS and
began in 2009. The UKHLS includes a wider sample than the BHPS. The empirical
analysis provides robust features, which motivate me to explore the mechanism
behind the features with a theoretical model.
Given the background, the availability of data allows me to examine workers’
behaviour regarding changing career. The substantive chapters in this thesis focus
on the above research aspects and aim to answer the following research questions:
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What is the level of career mobility in the UK, and what is the relationship between
career mobility and business cycle? Do wages grow after switching occupation
or industry? What is the reason for workers wanting to switch occupation and
industry? Who changes careers and where is the destination for career changing?
1.2 Chapter Overview
Chapter 2 is a paper published with Carlos Carrillo-Tudela, Ludo Visschers and
Bart Hobijn. All authors have extensively contributed to the paper presented in
this chapter. Initially, this published paper was only one chapter of my thesis. We
modified and extended this chapter in the form of a journal article and have been
published by the European Economic Review. I contributed to the conception and
design of the work and acquired, analysed and interpreted the data. I also critically
revised the paper for important rational content. My contribution to this paper is
therefore substantial and recognised.
Using quarterly data of the UK from 1993 to 2012, Chapter 2 documents how the
extent of worker reallocation across occupations or industries (a career change, in
the parlance of this paper) is high and procyclical. This holds true after controlling
for workers’ previous labour market status and for changes in the composition of
who gets hired over the business cycle. Our evidence suggests that a large part
of this reallocation reflects excess churn in the labour market. We also find that
the majority of career changes come with wage increases. During the economic
expansion, wage increases were typically larger for those who changed careers than
for those who did not. During the recession, this was not true for career changers
who were hired from unemployment. Our evidence suggests that understanding
career changes over the business cycle is important for explaining labour market
flows and the cyclicality of wage growth.
The method of survey interviewing may overestimate the measure of occupa-
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tional mobility. The independent interviewing involves asking the participants ev-
ery time they join the survey, whether or not their employment status has changed.
However, the dependent interviewing only updates the participants’ status if they
change their employment status. If the participants’ status does not change at all,
their employment status will be transferred from last survey. The errors may occur
because of the inconsistency of the participants’ responses and the typos of the
survey interviewer. The datasets that applied in Chapter 3 consist of independent
interviewing from 1992 to 2005 and dependent interviewing from 2006 to 2012.
Cheaper 3 confirms the robustness of the results found in Chapter 2, and reaffirm
the procyclical feature of occupational and industrial mobility.
After I find and reaffirm the procyclical feature of occupational and indus-
trial mobility, Chapter 4 develops a theoretical model to explore and understand
the mechanism behind these findings. A direct search method with Mortensen-
Pissaride search and matching framework are applied to investigate the cyclicality
of individuals’ moving decisions between sectors. A job separation cut-off and a
sector reallocation cut-off are used to determine whether workers became unem-
ployed within sector or across the sectors. Aggregate productivity shock, sector
productivity shock and preference shock are used to understand the force of mo-
bility. I find that the job separation and sectoral reallocation cut-off are affected
by the aggregate productivity, and this may conclude that the sectoral mobility
is procyclical under some circumstances. This is helpful for understanding the
findings in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Finally, Chapter 5 briefly summarises the
main findings of each chapter, and and provides the limitations of the thesis and
suggestions for future research.
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2.1 Introduction
One of the most important functions of the labour market is to pair the right set
of workers with the right set of jobs. This assignment process, however, is slowed
down by frictions that impede the reallocation of labour resources. For example,
moving costs, re-training, learning about one’s ability, information frictions about
the location of workers or jobs, among others, can be important barriers for effi-
cient resource reallocation. The result of these frictions is that we observe large
concurrent flows of workers changing jobs directly from employer-to-employer as
well as through spells of unemployment. As documented by Davis (1987) and Jo-
livet et. al (2006), among others, this excess churning is a common feature of all
labour markets in OECD countries.
The extent of reallocation is not necessarily constant over the business cycle.
In one view, recessions are times in which the labour market is “cleansed” by
speeding up the reallocation of workers, something that was prevented from occur-
ring by frictions during the proceeding expansions (See, for example, Lilien, 1982,
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994, Caballero and Hammour, 1994, Groshen and Pot-
ter, 2003, and Jaimovich and Siu, 2014). This view is appealing because it provides
a possible explanation for why unemployment is persistently high in recessions. It
simply takes workers time to switch, e.g., from jobs in industries and occupations
for which demand is in secular decline to jobs in growing segments of the labour
market.
However, this is not the only view of the reallocative effects of recessions. Bar-
levy (2002) argues that, since employment-to-employment transitions are large and
procyclical, economic expansions, rather than recessions, are times in which labour
resources tend to reallocate to better uses. In his view recessions have a “sullying”
rather than “cleansing” effect on reallocation.
In this paper, we study two specific dimensions of reallocation: occupational and
sectoral mobility of workers. If recessions have an important reallocative impact
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then occupational and sectoral mobility of workers are likely to be two important
channels through which this reallocation occurs.1 In this context we interpret a
career as a sequence of jobs a worker has in the same industry and occupation. A
career change is a case in which a worker changes employer and starts a new job
in either a different industry or occupation from the one he or she was previously
employed in.
We focus on career changes in the U.K labour market over the period from 1993
to 2012. The U.K. is an interesting country to look at for our purposes because
it has one of the most flexible labour markets in Europe and exhibits one of the
highest levels of worker turnover in the OECD (see Jolivet et. al, 2006). This high
level of turnover suggests that the U.K. labour market facilitates reallocation at a
higher rate than those in other European countries.
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of the U.K. unemployment rate during the period
that we study, from 1993 through 2013. It shows that this period can be split up
into four distinct episodes. The first episode is a period of economic expansion
until 2001, during which the unemployment rate declined by about 4 percentage
points.2 The second is a period of slow growth following 2001, when the U.K.
economy skirted a recession and the unemployment rate blipped up marginally.
The third episode is the economic expansion from 2002 until the start of the Great
Recession in 2008, in which the unemployment rate remained centered around 5%.
Lastly, the Great Recession and its aftermath make up the final episode. Figure
2.1 shows that the unemployment rate increased by 3 percentage points during that
period. It is the number and rate of industry and occupation changes, as well as
the associated wage changes, in this final episode that we compare with the earlier
parts of our sample. For this, we use individual-level data from the U.K. Quarterly
Labour Force Survey.
1For example, Pissarides (2003) partly ascribes the persistent outward shift of the U.K. Bev-
eridge curve in the early 1980’s to delayed sectoral reallocation in the wake of the fast decline of
manufacturing that happened during the deep recession at the beginning of the decade.
2Recession dates are taken from Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI, 2014).
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Figure 2.1: Unemployment rate in the United Kingdom.
We present our evidence at two levels of detail. In the first part of our analysis
we focus on aggregate patterns and uncover facts on (i) the extent of career changes
in the labour market and (ii) how they fluctuate over the business cycle. In the
second part we look closer at individual-level patterns that can shine a light on what
drives these career changes. In this part we document (i) who change careers, (ii)
which industries and occupations they come from and go to, and (iii) whether they
do so at higher or lower wage gains than those who switch employers but stay in
the same career. Five main findings emerge from our analysis of the U.K. Labour
Force Survey.
The extent of career changes is high. A worker who changes employers has
around a 50% chance of switching to another occupation or industry. The rates
of career changes are remarkably similar for those that change employers with or
10
without an intervening spell of non-employment. Career changes in large part re-
flect excess churning in the labour market: the actual net mobility across industries
and occupations due to career switches only amounts to 10% and 15% of the over-
all flows between occupations and industries respectively. This evidence on career
mobility is in line with Longhi and Taylor (2011) who, using the same data source
as us, find that the extent of occupational mobility in the U.K. is high.3 The U.K.
is not an exception. Industry and occupational mobility rates are also high in
the United States (see Moscarini and Thomsson, 2007, Moscarini and Vella, 2008,
Kambourov and Manovskii, 2008, and Hobijn, 2012, for example.)
Career changes decrease in recessions: The total number of workers that
change careers and the probability of a career change are procyclical. Moreover,
for a worker, the probability of a career change is also procyclical, whether con-
ditioning on changing employers directly, or on experiencing an intervening spell
of non-participation, or a spell of unemployment. In this sense the cyclicality of
career changes in the U.K. is similar to that in the U.S. For the U.S. Murphy and
Topel (1987), Carrillo-Tudela, Hobijn and Visschers (2014), and Carrillo-Tudela
and Visschers (2014) have all documented that the occupational and industry mo-
bility is procyclical.4 Moreover, just like in the U.S., excess churning in the U.K.
is the main driver of the cyclicality of overall mobility across occupations or indus-
tries. This is because employer-to-employer transitions, that account for the bulk
of this churning, are procyclical. Moscarini and Thomsson (2007), Moscarini and
Vella (2008) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2008), document these dynamics for
the U.S. labour market.
Characteristics of career changers: Career changes are more likely for (i) those
workers actively searching for a job, (ii) those that made voluntary transitions
3We build on Longhi and Taylor (2011) by considering worker mobility across occupations and
industries and their associated wage changes, taking into account three different labour market
statuses and business cycle fluctuations.
4The present paper builds on our previous work by providing a more comprehensive evaluation
of career changes and their implications for wage changes.
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(i.e. those who ‘resigned’ from jobs, or gave up for ‘family or personal reasons’, as
opposed to those that were made ‘redundant’ or ‘dismissed’) and (iii) those workers
that work part-time or as temps. Though models of on-the-job search with multiple
job types (as in Pissarides, 1994, Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen, 1988, Barlevy, 2002,
Menzio and Shi, 2011, Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2013, and Moscarini and Postel-
Vinay, 2013, among others) do not specifically focus on career changes, and do
not include a formal occupational or industry choice, they do imply that quits are
procyclical. Our evidence suggests that many of these quits in the U.K. result in
career switches. This is, however, not only the case for employment-to-employment
transitions. Career changes are also very common for hires out of non-employment.
In terms of underlying demographics, young workers and women are more prone
to change careers than their older and male counterparts. Even after accounting
for these characteristics, the propensity to change careers for workers that start
a new job remains procyclical. Thus, our results are not due to changes in the
composition of who gets hired over the business cycle.
Career Paths: Across occupations, career changes that involve an upgrade in
the skill level are more likely through direct employer-to-employer transitions. On
the contrary, career changes that involve a step down in skill level are more likely
after spells of non-employment. Further, career changes tend to move workers from
routine to non-routine employment. Our results also show that these movements
did not accelerate during the Great Recession.
Wage changes upon career changes: The majority of career changes come with
wage increases and these wage increases tend to be bigger than for those workers
that change jobs but remain in the same career. The wage gains for those who
got hired out of unemployment and changed occupations fell during the recession
and became smaller than the wage gains of those who did not change occupations.
Several studies have linked wage gains to employer-to-employer transitions (Akerlof,
Rose, and Yellen, 1998, and Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2013). Our evidence here
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suggests that such wage gains disproportionately get realized by workers changing
careers rather than continuing in the same one.
These findings provide evidence as to which theories would be able to best explain
labour market reallocation through occupational and industry mobility of workers.
Our evidence shows that outcomes for career changers are different from those
who remain in the same career when changing jobs. This suggests that understand-
ing career changes over the business cycle is important for explaining the cyclicality
labour turnover and wage growth. Most current models of labour turnover, like
those that allow for on-the-job search mentioned above, provide theories of why
turnover is highly procyclical. Though these theories have heterogenous jobs, none
of them explicitly considers a career change decision. Recent models, like Carrillo-
Tudela and Visschers (2014) and Groes, Kircher, and Manovskii (2015), do contain
a career change margin and help us better understand the incidence of career
changes over the business cycle and across the income distribution, respectively.
Taken together, the facts we document are consistent with the view that the
Great Recession and its aftermath has affected workers across a large set of indus-
tries and occupations, with a broad-based shortfall in economic activity preventing
workers from pursuing alternate careers at substantial wage gains. In this sense,
our results are consistent with the “sullying” effect of recessions put forward by
Barlevy (2002). Of course, career changes are only one form of reallocation of
labour and other resources. Thus, our results do not imply that recessions have no
cleansing effect at all but rather that such a cleansing is not happening through
worker reallocation across occupations and industries. This is important, because it
means we find little support in the U.K. data for recent theories of job polarization
(Jaimovich and Siu, 2014) that point to occupational mobility between routine and
non-routine jobs during recessions as the major driving force of the secular decline
in routine jobs.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the
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Quarterly U.K. Labour Force Survey, the definitions of the main variables, as well
as the level of aggregation of the industry and occupational classifications that we
use. In Section 2.3 we present the aggregate evidence and focus on broad patterns
in the level and cyclicality of career changes in the U.K. In Section 2.4 we present
individual-level evidence and discuss what it suggests about the reasons for career
switches. Finally, we end with a brief discussion of the theoretical implications of
the facts we document in Section 2.5.
2.2 Data
The data we use are from the U.K. Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS) and cover
the period 1993Q1-2012Q3. The LFS has a rotating panel structure, depicted in
Figure 2.2, in which individuals that live on the sampled address are followed for
a maximum of 5 quarters, also referred to as waves. Each quarter, one-fifth of the
sample of addresses is replaced by an incoming rotation group, or cohort. From
this sample, we consider all male workers between 16 and 65 years of age and all
female workers between 16 and 60 years of age with an ongoing career.5
In each wave, the respondents provide information about, among other things,
their labour market status as well as their occupation and the industry they work
in if they are employed. If non-employed, they provide the occupation and industry
of their previous job.6 Because we are interested in those workers who switch em-
ployers and potentially change careers, and because non-employed workers provide
information on previous employment, we need observations on workers only for two
consecutive quarters. Thus, we use the two-quarter (2Q) longitudinal sample of the
LFS. Figure 2.2 depicts two quarters of this sample as long-dashed rectangles, la-
beled “2Q”. As can be seen from the figure, because of the rotating panel structure
5We only include workers that provide information on occupation or industry.
6Note that around 10% of workers that start jobs with a new employer do not report infor-
mation on occupation or industry. These are mainly young workers for whom this is, presumably,
their first job.
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Figure 2.2: Rotating panel structure of U.K. Quarterly Labour Force Survey.
and sample attrition, the 2Q sample is smaller than the quarterly cross-section. It
consists of about 60,000 individuals each quarter.7
Occupation and Industrial Classifications To code occupations, the U.K.
LFS uses the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). The occupational coding
system was redefined in 2001, from the SOC 1990 to the SOC 2000, which was used
until the end of 2010. A drawback of this revision is that the SOC 1990 and SOC
2000 are not fully compatible. To reduce potential incompatibility errors we focus
on mobility across 1-digit or major occupational groups. These groups are listed
in Table 2.1 for both the SOC 1990 and SOC 2000. At this level of aggregation,
the disagreement between the two SOC is of 26.5 percent.
The disagreement between the two classifications introduces a level shift in some
7More information about the U.K. Quarterly Labour Force Survey can be found in Office for
National Statistics (2011a, 2011b).
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Table 2.1: One-digit Occupational Codes
SOC 1990 SOC 2000
1. Managers and administrators 1. Managers and senior officialsn
2. Professional occupations 2. Professional occupationsn
3. Associate professional occ. 3. Associate professional and technical occ.n
4. Clerical and secretarial occ. 4. Administrative and secretarial occ.r
5. Craft and related occupations 5. Skilled trades occupationsr
6. Personal and protective service occ. 6. Personal service occupationsr
7. Sales occupations 7. Sales and customer service occupationsr
8. Plant and machine operatives 8. Process, plant and machine operativesr
9. Other occupations 9. Elementary occupationsr
Note: n are non-routine occupations and r are routine occupations.
of the occupational series at the time of the switch from SOC 1990 to SOC 2000.
To correct for this shift, we adjust all 5-quarter centered moving average series by
running an OLS regression on the log of the corresponding series with respect to a
linear time trend, the log of output per worker and a dummy which takes a value
of zero before 2000Q4, and one after. We then use the coefficient estimate of the
dummy variable (irrespectively if it was significant or not) to adjust the series up
to 2000Q4.8
To code industries, the U.K. LFS uses the Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC). In this case the U.K. LFS does provide homogenised industry information
for workers for the entire sample period based on the SIC 1992.9 We focus on
industrial mobility on broad industrial sectors, which roughly corresponds to a
one-digit aggregation level, with 17 categories displayed in Table 2.2.
Wage Analysis For the last part of our analysis, we also consider the change in
wages when workers switch occupations or industries. The wage measure we use
is the self-reported gross weekly earnings, deflated using the CPI. Individuals in
the LFS only report their wages in the first and fifth waves. These are depicted
8There is no occupational information for 2001Q1. Moreover, because our sample is very short
after 2010, such splicing is not possible for the latter period when the occupational definitions
shifted to the SOC 2010. Consequently, we end the sample used to calculate results for occupations
in 2010Q4.
9The U.K. LFS did not ask respondents about their industry of employment before 1994, and
therefore our results for industries cover 1994-2012.
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Table 2.2: Industry Classification
Homogenised SIC
1. Agriculture, forestry 10. Financial intermediation
2. Fishing 11. Real estate, renting
3. Mining and quarrying 12. Public administration
4. Manufacturing 13. Education
5. Electricity, gas and water 14. Health and social work
6. Construction 15. Other community service activities
7. Wholesale and retail trade 16. Private households
8. Hotels and restaurants 17. Extra-territorial organisations and bodies
9. Transport, distribution
by the circles labeled “W” in Figure 2.2. Because they report their wages one year
apart, we can calculate annual wage growth for these workers. However, to do so
requires us to follow these workers for the full five quarters that they are in the
LFS. This sample is known as the five-quarter longitudinal sample and is depicted
by the short-dashed rectangle labeled “5Q” in the figure. This sample contains,
on average, about 11,000 individuals. Using this sample we condition the wage
analysis on employer changes through employment, unemployment or inactivity
based only on uninterrupted spells.10 We aggregate all these transitions to analyse
the wage changes among all workers.
2.2.1 Level and probability of career changes
We record a career change when a worker changed employer and reported an occu-
pation or industry in the new job that is different from the occupation or industry
reported in the last job held. Then, what is flagged as a career change depends
on the level of aggregation of the occupation and industry classifications used. Be-
cause we use the major occupation and industry classifications discussed above,
10That is, for employer-to-employer (EE) transitions, we consider workers with employment
histories (within the 5-quarters) of E1E2E2E2E2, E1E1E2E2E2, E1E1E1E2E2, or E1E1E1E1E2,
where E1 denotes the first employer and E2 the second employer. For employment to unem-
ployment to employment (EUE) transition, we consider workers with employment histories of
E1UE2E2E2, E1E1UE2E2, E1E1E1UE2, E1UUE2E2, E1UUUE2, or E1E1UUE2. For employ-
ment to non-participation to employment (EIE) transitions we consider employment histories
with the same structure as for EUE transitions.
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the career changes we flag capture a substantial change in the nature of a worker’s
job.11
Since mobility across employers and careers can occur with or without inter-
vening spells of non-employment, we analyse mobility across jobs by considering
employment to employment (EE) transitions, unemployment to employment (UE)
transitions, and inactivity (non-participant in the labour force) to employment (IE)
transitions. We denote the labour market status of a worker in the quarter before
he or she starts a new job as S ∈ {E,U, I}. Conditioning on labour market sta-
tus history is informative, because it is a signal of the reason why a worker might
decide to pursue a different career.
Throughout, we split the three types of flows, EE, UE, and IE, up by career
movers, denoted by m, and career stayers, denoted by s. Career movers are those
workers that work for a new employer in either a different occupation or industry
as they worked in before. Career stayers are workers that start a new job in the
same occupation and industry they worked in previously. In terms of this notation,
EEt+1 is the total number of workers that move from one employer in quarter t
to another in quarter t + 1, EE
(m)
t+1 is the number of those workers who are career
movers, and EE
(s)
t+1 is the number of career stayers.
12
These definitions allow us to consider the quarterly proportion of all new hires
that experienced a change in occupation or industry in period t+ 1, given that in
period t their labour market state was S ∈ {E,U, I}. Namely,
HS
(m)
t =
SE
(m)
t+1
SEt+1
. (2.1)
Aggregating over all three labour market statuses, S ∈ {E,U, I}, we obtain that
11Because of the address being the sampling unit of the LFS, we do not capture career changes
in which people move to a different address. In that case they drop out of the sample. Moreover,
given the quarterly nature of the data in the LFS, we are unable to record a worker’s transitions
within any given quarter and hence our estimates e.g. could miss jobs that begin and end within
a quarter.
12We similarly define UEt, UE
(m)
t , UE
(s)
t , IEt, IE
(m)
t , and IE
(s)
t .
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the proportion of total hires that are career movers is given by
H
(m)
t =
UE
(m)
t+1 + IE
(m)
t+1 + EE
(m)
t+1
UEt+1 + IEt+1 + EEt+1
. (2.2)
We use these measures as estimates of the probability of a career change conditional
on starting a new job, the previous labour market status, and being in an ongoing
career. The levels of the flows and these estimated career change probabilities are
the main statistics we focus on in our analysis. That is, we focus on two measures
of the incidence of career changes. The levels, SE
(m)
t for S ∈ {E,U, I}, inform us
about the extent of reallocation going on in the economy, while the rates, HS
(m)
t for
S ∈ {E,U, I}, approximate the probabilities that individual workers switch careers
conditional on getting hired out of a particular labor market status.
2.2.2 Net mobility
Theories that emphasize the cleansing effect of recessions on the labour market
emphasize how downturns accelerate the shift in labour market resources from seg-
ments that are in structural decline to those that are on a positive long-run trend.
These are theories that focus on the net mobility of workers across professions and
sectors.
Net mobility is given by
NMt =
K∑
i=1
|Ii,t −Oi,t|, (2.3)
where Ii,t is the number of career movers that start a new career in sector (or occu-
pation), i. Similarly, Oi,t is the number of workers that leave sector (or occupation)
i to pursue a different career.
To put this net mobility in the context of the magnitude of overall flows in the
labour market, we follow Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and analyze excess reallo-
cation. That is, we quantify by how much the total gross reallocation measured by
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the flows introduced in the previous subsection exceeds the minimum flows needed
to achieve the net shift in the observed allocation of workers across occupations
and industries.
In particular, we use the following proxy of the fraction of gross reallocation
needed to achieve the net reallocation in the data. This net mobility rate, nmt, is
defined as
nmt =
K∑
i=1
[ |Ii,t −Oi,t|
Ii,t +Oi,t
]
ωi,t, (2.4)
where we weigh the sector (or occupation) specific flows by the employment share of
the respective industry or occupation at time t, ωi,t. Our data allow us to compute
separate quarterly series, NMt and nmt, for occupations and industries.
2.3 The Extent and Cyclicality of Career Changes
In this section we investigate both the level as well as the cyclical fluctuations of
the incidence of career changes in the U.K. labour market. In the first subsection
we focus on the level and report long-run averages over our whole sample period.
In the second subsection we shift our focus to how the prevalence of career changes
moves over the business cycle.
2.3.1 Long-run averages
The U.K. labour market displays a surprising degree of churning. Over our sample
period, the sum of career movers and stayers is on average 1.3 million per quarter.
This amounts to 4.5% of the U.K.’s working age population. Of those who get
hired and have a previous career, 43% come directly from a previous employer,
29% are hired out of unemployment, and 29% were out of the labour force. These
numbers are in line with Gomes (2012).
What is even more striking is the high share of these hires that involve a career
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Table 2.3: Probability of career change, HS(m).
Occupation Industry
1. All workers 0.49 0.53
2. Employed Workers, HE(m) 0.47 0.52
3. Voluntary mobility 0.48 0.52
4. Involuntary mobility 0.44 0.51
5. Active search 0.53 0.59
6. Non active search 0.46 0.49
7. Unemployed Workers, HU (m) 0.51 0.56
8. Unemp duration < 2Q 0.50 0.54
9. Unemp duration ≥ 2Q 0.56 0.61
10. Inactive Workers, HI(m) 0.49 0.50
11. Want a job 0.50 0.52
12. Don’t want a job 0.47 0.48
Note: Shares reported are averages over all quarters in 1993Q1-2012Q3 sample for which data
are available.
change. Table 2.3 shows the average fraction of these hires that we classify as a
career change. As can be seen from the top row of the table, 49% of those workers
with a previous career who start a new job do so in a different (major) occupation
from which they worked in before. This fraction is even higher for industries, for
which the majority, 53%, of such hires involve a switch in major industry.
The similarities in the extent of career changes across occupations or industries
arises mostly because the majority of career movers change occupations and in-
dustries at the same time. For example, on average 75% of workers who changed
occupations also changed industries and 70% of workers who changed industries
also changed occupations.
Though high, these numbers are in line with evidence for the United States.
For example, Carrillo-Tudela, Hobijn and Visschers (2014), using data from the
Current Population Survey, and Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2014), who rely on
the Survey of Income and Program Participation, both find that about half of the
hires in the United States involve a career change as well.
One caveat is important to note. Reporting errors, more so for occupations
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than for industries, are common in surveys like the U.K. LFS. If estimates from
other datasets are applied to our results for the U.K. LFS, then, maybe even as
much as a quarter, of the career moves that we measure could be due to workers
misreporting their occupation and/or industry in the survey.13 However, even if
this is true, this would still mean that about a third of all hires of persons with
previous work experience involves them changing either the industry or profession
that they work in. Even after such a drastic downward adjustment, this would
imply that more than one percent of the U.K. working age population switches
careers every quarter.
Rows 2 and up of Table 2.3 list the probability of a career change conditional
on the labour market status of the worker in the quarter before she or he starts a
new job. As can be seen from the table, the average probability of a career change
is around 50% for each of these types of hires.
Two groups of workers stand out as having a higher probability of switching
careers than others. The first consists of workers who make an EE transition
and who actively searched for the new position in the old job. These are more
likely workers who actively pursue a voluntary change in their career path. To be
specific, career or job changes are categorised as voluntary when workers report in
the LFS that they left their previous employer because they “resigned”, went to
“education or training” or “gave up for family or personal reasons”. Involuntary
career or job changes are made by those workers who left their last job because they
were “dismissed”, “made redundant/took voluntary redundancy”, “temporary job
finished” and “gave up work for health reasons”. Finally, workers in the other group
are those who left their last job because they “took early retirement”, “retired”
and due to “other reasons”.14 Active search encompasses all activities that involve
13Mellow and Sider (1993) estimate a misreporting rate of about 20% for major occupations
and 8% for major industry sector in the Current Population Survey for the U.S. Lynn and Sala
(2006) find similar misreporting rates for the BHPS in the U.K.
14Overall, voluntary employer changes account for 48% of total EE transitions, while invol-
untary employer changes account for 24% and the remainder by the ‘other’ category. From those
employed workers that experienced a voluntary or involuntary separation, over 85% found another
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the worker to contact or actively pursue job opportunities rather than browse job
opportunities that are available. This is the definition of job search that defines a
person without a job as being unemployed. The specific LFS answers that result
in a person being classified as an active searcher are listed in the Appendix.
The second group of workers with a higher probability of moving to a different
career are those who were unemployed for two quarters or more in the quarter before
they started their new jobs. These transitions most likely reflect involuntary career
decisions that occur in long spells of unemployment. Such career changes are often
emphasized as driving up the natural rate of unemployment in the short-run in
the wake of a recession due to mismatch in the labour market. Recent studies
show that mismatch can only account for a small part of overall fluctuations in the
unemployment rate.15
Most studies of mismatch in the labour market compare the composition of job
openings by industry and occupation with the composition of the pool of unem-
ployed workers. This assumes that it is the pool of unemployed workers that are
required to make all the adjustments to make the skill composition of the labour
supply adjust to the composition of skills demanded. It turns out that more than
half of the workers that get hired out of unemployment end up making such an
adjustment. Moreover, our results suggest that the large number of EE career
switchers helps to accelerate this adjustment process.
By providing a measure of the gap between the skill requirements needed to
fill the stock of job openings and the skill composition of the pool of unemployed,
measures of mismatch are a proxy for the net amount of reallocation needed in the
labour market to equilibrate the supply of and demand for skills. However, gross
mobility between careers far exceeds net mobility. The average net mobility rates,
nmt, over our sample period are 10% for occupations and 13% across industries.
16
job without an intervening spell of non-employment.
15See, for example, Smith (2012) and Patterson, S¸ahin, Topa, and Violante (2013) for a quan-
titative analysis of this type of mismatch in the U.K.
16The small contribution of net mobility is also present when considering transitions only
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This echoes the findings for the U.S. of Jovanovic and Moffit (1990), Kambourov
and Manovskii (2008) and Auray et. al (2014), who show that net mobility accounts
for only a small proportion of gross mobility across industries and occupations.
2.3.2 Cyclical fluctuations
Whether recession are times of accelerated or of relatively slow reallocation in the
labour market can, of course, not be gleaned from the long-run averages we reported
so far. To answer this question we now present evidence on the fluctuations, in
deviation from these averages, in the extent and probabilities of career changes
over our sample period.
The evidence on the extent of career changes is depicted in Figure 2.3.17 It
plots the six types of hires of workers with ongoing careers. The bottom three
shaded areas are the career movers coming from unemployment, UE(m), employ-
ment, EE(m), and inactivity, IE(m), respectively. The top three shaded areas plot
the same flows but then for career stayers instead. The solid line in the middle is
the number of career movers in the quarter, while the dashed line on top is the
sum of career movers and stayers.
The first thing to take away from this figure is that overall turnover for workers
with previous work experience is procyclical. This can be seen from the fact that
the dashed line in the figure follows almost exactly the reverse pattern as the
unemployment rate in Figure 2.1. The procyclicality of turnover in our data is
mainly driven by people who move directly from one employer to another employer,
i.e. by EE(m) and EE(s). As can be seen from Figure 2.3, the bulk of the hires of
workers with an ongoing career are EE hires. This is consistent with the turnover
through unemployment or only through employment. For the former case, the average net mo-
bility rates are 17% for occupations and 20% for industries; while for the latter the rates are 12%
for occupations and 15% for industries.
17Throughout we show time series that are 5-quarter centered moving averages. Though this
allows for symmetric centering, it could induce residual seasonality in our time series. However,
tests for such seasonality do not reject the null hypothesis of its absence.
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Figure 2.3: Hires of workers with ongoing careers, by career movers and stayers.
Source: U.K. LFS and authors calculations. Recession-shading are U.K. recession dates from
ECRI. Quarterly series, centered 5-quarter moving averages.
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estimates for the U.K. in Hobijn and S¸ahin (2013) and for the United States.18
The solid line in Figure 2.3 reveals that, just like overall turnover, the number
of career changes is procyclical. Employer-to-employer transitions, EE(m), also
make up the majority of career changes. The main driving force behind the in-
cidence of career changes over the business cycle is that the number of workers
that change employers to pursue a different career declines substantially when the
unemployment rate spikes.
This force is partly offset by the fact that the number of workers that change
careers after a spell of unemployment increases during and in the wake of recessions.
However, in the aftermath of the Great Recession this uptick in career changes after
unemployment, UE(m), was rather small. It pales in comparison to the decline
in EE(m) flows during the same period and thus contributed very little to the
fluctuations in reallocation in the labour market over the last business cycle.
Moreover, if one compares the number of UE(m) and UE(s) transitions in Figure
2.3, one can see that the number of workers that find a job after being unemployed
and remain in the same career, increases more during recessions than the number
of unemployed that end up taking a job in a different industry or occupation. This
suggests that the probability of a career change for those workers hired out of
unemployment actually declines rather than increases during the recession.
This is shown to be the case in Figure 2.4. It plots the time series of the un-
conditional probability of a career change for hires with previous work experience,
H(m), as well as this probability conditional on what labour market state they
were hired from, i.e. HS(m) for S ∈ {U,E, I}. The bold line in the figure shows
that H(m) declined during the recession for both occupation and industry changes.
This decline is starker for changes across industries, shown in panel (b), than for
changes across occupations, in panel (a). The short-dashed line is the probability
that a hire out of unemployment changes careers. This probability also declined
18See Lazear and Spletzer (2012) for evidence for the United States, for example.
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substantially during the Great Recession.
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Figure 2.4: Probability of career change: Hm, and HSm for S ∈ {U,E, I}.
Source: U.K. LFS and authors calculations. Recession-shading are U.K. recession dates from
ECRI. Quarterly series, centered 5-quarter moving averages.
Above, we have focused on comparing the Great Recession with the previous
episodes in the data. The procyclicality of the level and probability of career
changes that we documented, however, is also robust to other ways of business
cycle accounting. For example, it also shows up if one uses the Hodrick-Prescott
(1997) filter to distinguish between trend and cycle in the unemployment rate and
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the time series plotted in Figures 2.3 and 2.4.19
One possible explanation for the procyclicality of the propensity to change
careers out of unemployment is the increased incidence of workers being recalled to
their previous job during downturns. For example, Fujita and Moscarini (2012) find
that, in the U.S., those workers that become unemployed after being permanently
separated from their previous jobs are much more likely to make an occupational
change than those that were on layoff and recalled within 3 months. However, in
the UK such recall practice is minimal and, hence, is thus not likely to affect the
results presented here.
What could be more pertinent is that, on the supply side, those workers who
get laid off in recessions would first look for a job that is similar to the one they lost
and only slowly broaden their search.20 However, as Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers
(2014) argue, workers take into account that they may be less likely to start a
particularly successful career path during a recession, which reduces their incentives
to change careers at any duration.
On the labour demand side, because of the increased size of the pool of un-
employed workers in recessions, employers would be more likely to find candidates
that more closely match the career profile they are looking for. Some studies, like
Ravenna and Walsh (2012) and Sedla´c˘ek (2014), suggest that employers also get
more selective in their hiring practices during downturns. Such an increase in the
pickiness of employers about who they hire in downturns also affects the oppor-
tunities of those who are employed and are looking to change jobs and pursue a
different career. These effects could result in a decline in the fraction of EE tran-
sitions that result in a switch in industry or occupation during recessions, as can
be seen from the long-dashed line in Figure 2.4.
Another way to gauge the relative importance of these effects is to look at
19It also shows up when regressing the log of these series with respect to a constant, the log
of output per worker or of the unemployment rate and a time trend.
20Indeed, the number of unemployed workers who found a job after an unemployment spell of
less than 6 months and changed careers actually decreased during the Great Recession.
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the fluctuations in net mobility, NM , over the business cycle. Net mobility for
both occupations and industries is plotted in Figure 2.5. If recessions had a major
“cleansing” effect that resulted in a substantial shift in workers from occupations
and industries in secular decline to those for which demand is booming, then net
mobility would increase during the recession as well during the subsequent recovery.
This is because during the recovery workers would, gradually perhaps, find jobs
in careers different from those that they were in before. It is exactly this slow
adjustment during the recovery that is often pointed to as a source of the jobless
recoveries from the last three recessions in the U.S. (Groshen and Potter, 2003, and
Jaimovich and Siu, 2014)
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Figure 2.5: Net mobility, NMt, for career changes to different occupations and
industries.
However, as Figure 2.5 shows, there is no such persistent spike in net mobility.
Net mobility briefly went up at the onset of the Great Recession, but then declined
to levels rather lower than typical values in the period 2001-2008Q1. While the
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early rise coincided with the wave of layoffs described by Elsby and Smith (2010), by
the end of the recession net mobility rate had fallen deeply, however. From this low
level, net sectoral mobility started to increase again during the 2010-2011 recession,
only reaching pre-recession levels at the end of the second recession. The increase
in net mobility in 2010 and 2011 is mainly due to workers flowing towards services
sectors. The main contributors to this increase are all in the service sector (in order
of importance): (i) Real estate, renting and business activities; (ii) Health and
social work; (iii) Education; (iv) Wholesale and Retail Trade including Repairs;
and (v) Transport, storage and distribution.
This evidence on net mobility, together with that on the level and probability
of career changes presented above, is in line with Barlevy’s (2002) interpretation
of the role of business cycle for labour market dynamics, here for career changes,
rather than job changes. He argues that, because labour turnover is higher during
expansions than during downturns, the reallocation of labour market resources is
procyclical rather than countercyclical.
Our interpretation of the above results is that, in terms of worker realloca-
tion across occupations and industries, recessions do not appear to be times of
accelerated labour market reallocation which is prevented from happening during
expansions due to frictions. Instead, in a recession, workers seem to stay put in
their respective occupations and industries when labour market opportunities for
them dry up during downturns.
2.4 Career Changes: Why, Who, Where, and at
What Wage Gains?
In this section we dive into the details underlying these aggregates and use addi-
tional information from the U.K. LFS to analyse the reasons for the career changes,
who changes careers, what they do before and after the career change, and how
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the change affects their wages. This turns out to yield further evidence supportive
of the “sullying effect” of recessions through the lenses of career changes.
2.4.1 Reasons for career change
Unfortunately, the U.K. LFS survey does not directly ask respondents who take
jobs in a different occupation or industry about the specific reason for their career
change. However, some of the questions asked allow us to indirectly infer some of
the potential reasons. In particular, we revisit the questions we first focused on
in Table 2.3. That is, for those who move directly from one employer to another
we consider whether this move was voluntary and whether or not they had been
actively searching for a job before they switched. For those who were unemployed
in the quarter before they started their new job, we consider the duration of their
unemployment spell in that quarter.
Because EE flows account for the bulk of the turnover in Figure 2.3, we focus
on the evidence for this switchers first. Figure 2.6 divides up the EE flows into
movers and stayers and classifies them by whether or not they made a voluntary
EE switch, panels (a) and (c), and by whether they were actively searching on the
job before they made the switch, panels (b) and (d).
The first thing that stands out from the figure is that the bulk of EE transitions
are voluntary. Moreover, the vast majority of EE transitions is not the result of
the worker actively searching for another job but rather of the worker getting a job
offer without searching. We interpret these two facts as suggesting that a lot of
job changes are voluntary quits that could occur as result of employers contacting
workers. Recent evidence for the U.S. also shows that many workers get hired
without ever reporting to be actively looking for a job (see Topa et al., 2014, and
Carrillo-Tudela et al., 2015, for example).
It is the procyclicality of this type of hires that makes labour turnover move with
the business cycle. This is also the type of hire that accounts for the procyclicality
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Figure 2.6: Composition of EE by movers, stayers, and whether job transition was
voluntary or result of active search.
of EE(m) flows. This can be seen from the fluctuations in the numbers of voluntary
movers, in panels (a) and (c), and of movers that did not actively search for a job,
in panels (b) and (d). Thus, Figure 2.3 and 2.6 jointly point to voluntary EE
career changes due to workers being recruited for rather than finding a new job as
the main driving force behind the procyclicality of career changes.
This type of voluntary job and career switches occurs side by side to those
that are the result of workers being displaced and changing careers after a spell
of unemployment. Figure 2.7 splits up the probability of a career change for hires
out of unemployment, HU (m) plotted as the short-dashed line in Figure 2.4, by
whether the worker was unemployed for less or more than 2-quarters before finding
a new job. These two series are denoted by ≤ 2Q and > 2Q respectively.
Comparing the≤ 2Q and> 2Q probabilities in the figure for the entire period, it
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quarters.
Source: U.K. LFS and authors calculations. Recession-shading are U.K. recession dates from
ECRI. Quarterly series, centered 5-quarter moving averages.
is clear that those whose are unemployed for longer change careers more frequently.
This is consistent with the finding of Faberman and Kudlyak (2012), who, using
data from an on-line job-search website, find that workers apply more to vacancies
outside their usual occupational field as their spell duration increases.
What is surprising is that the decline in HU (m) in Figure 2.4 is not only because
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those who find a job after a short unemployment spell in the recession are more
likely to find a job similar to the one they had before. Even the probability of a
career change for those with unemployment spells longer than two quarters declined
during the Great Recession.21
This contrasts with the common perception, as expressed in Jaimovich and Siu
(2014), that recessions are times of accelerated involuntary structural transforma-
tion. During such times a large number of workers supposedly gets displaced from
jobs that will never come back and thus are forced to look for and take jobs in
sectors and occupations different from those they worked in before.
One possible explanation for why the incidence of career changes among hires
out of unemployment does not spike in the recession is that workers that get dis-
placed from jobs that are in secular decline might decide to drop out of the labour
force rather than to switch careers. This is especially a concern in the United
States, where the labour force participation rate dropped by more than 3 percent-
age points in the five years after the start of the Great Recession.22 Such flows to
inactivity, however, are not likely to be important in the U.K. where the labour
force participation rate actually increased between 2007 and 2012.
2.4.2 Who changes careers?
Of course, the discussion in the previous subsection focuses on the Great Recession
versus the rest of the sample. In addition, the evidence presented does not condition
on other factors that might be correlated with the variables used to proxy for
different reasons for a career change. Here we show that the procyclicality of
21At the beginning of the recession, looking at occupations, there is a temporary increase in
the probability of an career change among those workers who, at that point, found a job after
being unemployed for more than 2 quarters. Note that at this early moment in the recession,
only few workers are covered by this statistic, and (or because) a large part of them have entered
unemployed before the start of the recession. Instead, for the typical long-term unemployed of
the Great Recession, who will only find a job after the second quarter of 2008, the probability of
a career change is decreased substantially relative to its average value.
22See Daly et al. (2012), for example, for discussion of the decline of the U.S. labour force
participation rate.
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the probability of career changes, shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.7, is statistically
significant even if one considers the whole sample and also corrects for factors that
affect the probability of a career switch.
We do so by presenting Probit estimates derived from a model where the depen-
dent variable is whether or not the hire of a worker with previous work experience
results in a career change. The explanatory variables include a set of worker char-
acteristics, properties of the job the worker is hired in, and variables that proxy
for the potential reasons for why the worker changed careers or not. Because the
availability of some of the variables related to the reasons for the career change
depends on the labour market status of the worker before he or she accepted the
new job, we present the Probit estimates not only for all hires but also condition
them on what labour market status the worker had in the quarter before starting
the new job. The estimation results are presented in Table 2.4.23
In terms of the effects of human capital on the probability of a career change, we
find that age decreases the probability of a career change, suggesting the importance
of on-the-job human capital accumulation. Educational attainment, however, af-
fects occupations and industries differently. Across occupations, high and medium
skilled workers have a higher probability of a career change than low skilled workers
(our reference category). Across industries, we find that low skilled workers have a
higher probability of a career change than medium and high skilled workers. These
results seem to arise from differences in the impact of skill levels by employment
status. Across occupations, it is only the unemployed for which high and medium
skilled workers have a higher probability of a career change. Across industries,
low skilled workers have a higher probability of changing career when mobility is
through employment or inactivity, but not through unemployment.
Table 2.4 also shows the effects of different types of job characteristics on the
probability of a career change. This probability increases if the worker obtains
23Details about the definitions of the explanatory variables are provided in the Appendix.
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Table 2.4: Probit estimates for Hm.
Dependent variable Hire results in career change, Yi = 1, or not, Yi = 0.
Occupations 1993-2010 Industries 1994-2012
All E U I All E U I
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
1. agg urate -0.59∗∗∗ -1.10∗∗∗ -0.79∗∗ -0.24 -1.38∗∗∗ -1.83∗∗∗ -1.64∗∗∗ -0.44
2. reg-agg urate -0.59∗∗∗ -0.53 -1.10∗∗ -0.27 -0.41∗ -0.51 -0.57 0.23
3. age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
4. age2 0.06∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
5. mar/cohab -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗
6. nchild −0.00 −0.01∗ −0.01 0.00 −0.00 0.002 −0.01 −0.00
7. spell dur -0.002 0.03∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
8. female 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.01 0.002 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
9. high skilled 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.05∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.04∗∗
10. med skilled 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗
11. ft job -0.04∗∗∗ -0.01∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
12. temporary 0.02∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.04∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ -0.01 0.01
13. unemployed 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
14. inactive -0.01∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
15. invol -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗
16. other -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
17. job centre 0.02 0.09∗∗∗
18. ads 0.07∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.02∗
19. direct app 0.03∗ -0.03∗∗ 0.02 -0.08∗∗∗
20. family/friend 0.04∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.07∗∗∗
21. other method 0.04∗∗ -0.01 0.02 -0.04∗∗
22. want a job 0.03∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
23. no. of obs. 77303 34272 19619 14298 83995 37210 21458 15103
24. pseudo-R2 0.023 0.040 0.023 0.034 0.035 0.051 0.031 0.040
Note: Sample includes all hires of workers with a previous career in our sample. Regional and
previous occ/ind dummies included in all specifications. Coefficients reported are marginal
probabilities and the one for age2 is multiplied by 1000. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
a part-time versus a full-time job or if the worker obtains a temporary versus a
permanent job.24 Women have a higher probability of a career change than men.
Furthermore, the larger the household someone is part of, the less likely a person is
to change careers. That is, Hm is lower for persons who are married or cohabitate.
24The exception is that for unemployed workers obtaining a permanent job increases the prob-
ability of a career change.
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It also decreases, although not significantly, in the number of children.
The Probit estimates also reaffirm the results found in Table 2.3 and Figures 2.3,
2.6, and 2.7. We find that for employed workers, career changes are more likely
among those employed workers that made voluntary EE transitions and among
those that were actively searching for a job (our baseline category with respect
to all the search channels). Unemployed workers are more likely to make career
changes than employed (our baseline category) or inactive workers, while a career
change through unemployment is more likely to occur at longer unemployment
spells.
Using individual-level data in the Probit regression allows us to shine a more
detailed light on search method workers employed to find their new jobs and how
it affects their chance of changing careers. In particular, the explanatory variables
listed in Rows 18 through 21 get at this.25 We find that those workers who find
jobs responding to ads are more likely to change careers than those who find jobs
through other means.
Conditioning on the worker-, job-, and search- characteristics does not erase the
significance of the procyclicality of career changes. This suggests that the business
cycle movements in occupational and industry mobility of workers are not the result
of the composition of the group of workers with a previous career that gets hired
changing with the cycle.
As can be seen from the marginal probability estimates reported in Row 1 and
columns I and V of Table 2.4, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate reduces H(m) by 0.6 percentage points for occupations and 1.4 percentage
points for industries.26 Contrary to the discussion above, these results are based
on the whole sample period and not only on comparing the Great Recession and
its aftermath with the preceding episodes in the data.
25The baseline category “direct application to employers”.
26Because these are marginal probability estimates, this interpretation is for the “average”
hire in terms of the covariates in our sample.
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The higher sensitivity of occupational switches compared to industry switches
to the aggregate unemployment rate is offset by the higher sensitivity of occupa-
tional mobility with respect to the regional component of the unemployment rate,
reported in Row 2 of Table 2.4. Taking the results of Rows 1 and 2 of Table 2.4
together both occupational as well as industry mobility comove very significantly
with labour market conditions.
2.4.3 Origins and Destinations
Another way to gauge the reasons for career switches is to consider what type of
job in which industry and occupation workers come from and what type of job they
end up in. This is what we explore in this subsection. We focus on three aspects
of the origins and destinations of career changers in our data. The first is whether
the jobs are full- or part-time. The second is what industry and occupation career
changers come from and which ones they go to. Finally, we refine the occupation
analysis by considering whether the occupations are routine or non-routine.
Full- versus part-time jobs So far, we have documented that most career
changes result from voluntary labour turnover and that the share of career changes
that is voluntary is procyclical. That is, during downturns a higher fraction of
career changes is involuntary (see Figure 2.6). This cyclical behaviour of voluntary
career changes is mirrored by the extent to which occupational mobility results in
full- or part-time jobs.
Career changes turn out to be an important mechanism through which work-
ers move between part-time and full-time jobs and, on net, contribute positively
to part-time and to full-time job flows.27 On average 65% of hires resulted in a
full-time job and 35% of hires resulted in a part-time job during the 1993-2007 pe-
27For recent investigations of cyclical fluctuations in full/part-time jobs, see e.g Borowczyk-
Martins and Lale (2015), and Singleton (2015).
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riod. These hires are disproportionately people who change occupations.28 Career
movers on average get a full-time job in 60% and a part-time job in 40% of the
time.
For those that switch directly between employers we know both their full-time
status before and after they get hired and can thus infer whether their full-time
status changed when switching jobs. Using these data, we find that on average
13% workers making an EE transition move from part-time into full-time employ-
ment, while 7% move from full-time to part-time employment during the 1993-2007
period. The bulk of changes in the full-time nature of work, in either direction,
involves a career change. Of those who moved from part-time into full-time em-
ployment, 66% changed careers; while from those that moved from full-time to
part-time employment 59% changed careers.
During the Great Recession, however, the incidence of part-time work increased.
On average 37% of hires now resulted in a part-time job, while 63% of hires resulted
in a full-time job. Consistent with this, the net contribution of career changes to
part-time-to-full-time flows declined during the same period.29
Thus, if we would consider part-time jobs to be typically less desirable than full-
time jobs, then the shift in the full-time/part-time composition of career movers’
new jobs during the recession reflects a relative worsening of outcomes associated
with changing careers in downturns and thus a deceleration of the pace with which
workers move to higher quality jobs during those periods. Note, however, that the
shift in the full-time/part-time composition is much less pronounced than the shift
in terms of voluntary versus involuntary turnover, depicted in Figure 2.6.
Industries and occupations Above, we suggested that transitions from part-
time to full-time jobs are generally considered a step up the job ladder while the
28In our analysis of full- versus part-time jobs we limit ourselves to career moves that involve
a change in occupation.
29In the exposition here we contrast the Great Recession with the period before. Unreported
regression results show that the cyclicality of the incidence of part-time employment we discuss
here is present over our whole sample period.
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reverse are considered a step down. To paint a more detailed picture of the job
ladders that career changers are on, we consider the origins and destinations of their
career moves here in terms of industry and occupation. We do so, by constructing
industry and occupation transition matrices for workers’ career changes. These
matrices provide useful information on the mobility patterns of workers as they
shed light on the potential importance of individual occupations or industries in
driving overall mobility.
Table 2.5 shows the transition matrix for workers changing careers across occu-
pations.30
Table 2.5: Transition Matrix: Occupations
High Skill Medium Skill Low Skill Misc.
To Managers Professional Asscociate Clerical/Admin Sales Personal Serv. Craft/Skilled Plant and Elementary/
Occupations Professional Secretarial Occupations Occupations Trade Machine Other
Technical Occ Occ Related Occ Operatives Occupations
From 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
1. Managers Total 0.46 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05
EE 0.53 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04
UE 0.38 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.07
IE 0.38 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.07
2. Professional Total 0.07 0.68 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
Occupations EE 0.09 0.71 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
UE 0.07 0.60 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
IE 0.04 0.68 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03
3. Asscociate Total 0.09 0.09 0.50 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05
Professional EE 0.10 0.09 0.54 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04
Technical Occ UE 0.07 0.09 0.44 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07
IE 0.05 0.07 0.50 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.06
4. Clerical/Admin Total 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.54 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.07
Secretarial Occ EE 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.58 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05
UE 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.50 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.09
IE 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.50 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.10
5. Sales Total 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.39 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.14
Occupations EE 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.37 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.12
UE 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.41 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.16
IE 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.12 0.44 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.16
6. Personal Serv Total 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.51 0.02 0.04 0.11
Occupations EE 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.50 0.02 0.05 0.10
UE 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.50 0.03 0.05 0.13
IE 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.55 0.02 0.02 0.13
7. Craft/Skilled Total 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.60 0.11 0.12
Trade & related EE 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.63 0.11 0.10
Occ UE 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.58 0.12 0.14
IE 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.56 0.07 0.14
8. Plant and Total 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.49 0.18
Machine EE 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.51 0.16
Operatives UE 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.47 0.21
IE 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.44 0.20
9. Elementary/ Total 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.48
Other EE 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.42
Occupations UE 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.52
IE 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.57
30To construct the transition matrix for occupations we have combined the SOC 1990 and
SOC 2000 occupation classifications. We do this as our results hardly change when considering a
separate transition matrix for each classification. Furthermore, we present the results for the entire
period of study and not before and during the Great Recession, as the transitions matrices for the
Great Recession period have the same characteristics as those for the pre-recession period. For
the sake of brevity, we limit ourselves to the discussion of origins and destinations for occupations
here.
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This matrix shows that all occupations exhibit a high degree of mobility. The
dark-shaded cells list the fraction of hires that get hired in the same major occupa-
tion as they were working in before. Looking at the numbers for all hires, labeled as
“Total”, the probability of a career change ranges from 61% for sales occupations
to 32% for professional occupations.
Across occupations, however, we observe some clustering by skill level. To show
this, we group together those occupations that require similar skill levels. This
results in three groups of high-, medium, and low skilled occupations. The first two
groups consist of three major occupation codes and the last group consists of two
major occupation codes. Career changes within each of these groups are highlighted
in light grey as the block diagonal in the transition matrix. As can be seen, the
transition probabilities in the grey cells tend to be higher than those in the other
cells. There are two destination occupations that are notable exceptions to this
pattern. First, a substantial number of career changes out of high-skill occupations
result in jobs in “Clerical and administrative” jobs. Second, the miscellaneous ninth
category absorbs a large number of career switchers from middle-skilled jobs.31
Although we observe similar non-diagonal probabilities between rows in the
transition matrix, we also observe that workers are more likely to stay within their
skill category or move to the highest skill category after an EE transition and more
likely to move to a lower skill category through a UE or IE transition.32 These
patterns suggest that workers tend to move more often to occupations that demand
skills closer to the ones they can supply. However, conditional on moving to a dif-
ferent skill category, workers are more likely to make career changes that involve an
upgrade in the skill level through direct EE transitions, while career changes that
31These patterns for occupational transitions are remarkably similar to those documented in
Hobijn (2012) for the U.S.
32When making a career change outside a given skill category, workers in high skill occupations
are more likely to move to an occupation in the medium skill category; workers in the medium
skill category are more likely to move to an occupation in the low skill category. However, workers
in the low skill category are more likely to move to an occupation in the medium skill category.
The exception are those workers in the clerical/admin and secretarial occupations, who are more
likely to move to an occupation in the high skill category conditional on a career change.
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involve a lower skill level are more likely through spells of non-employment. This
evidence reinforces the view that occupational mobility through EE transitions are
more likely to be voluntary career changes in which workers mostly pursue upward
career moves, while occupational mobility through non-employment are more likely
to be involuntary career changes.
Routine and non-routine occupations One particular type of occupational
mobility that has been emphasized in the recent literature is that between occupa-
tions that involve routine and those that involve non-routine tasks. The distinction
between these two types of occupations is relevant for the “Polarization” hypothe-
sis (See Autor (2003), Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Autor and Dorn (2013), among
others). This hypothesis is that, over the last decades, job tasks that can be cap-
tured easily by a set of explicit of simple instructions or rules, i.e. ‘routine tasks’,
have been increasingly taken over by computers and machines. As a result, em-
ployment in those occupations in which workers are mainly executing routine tasks,
summarily called ‘routine occupations’, has declined. In its place, employment has
risen at the bottom of the wage distribution, in occupations that require physical
labour, yet with tasks that cannot easily be captured in routines to be automated.
This includes simple service jobs that require physical eye-hand coordination and
physical navigation, typically under the heading ‘non-routine manual’ jobs. Em-
ployment has also risen higher in the wage distribution, where tasks require knowl-
edge acquisition and creative thinking, with jobs put under the ‘non-routine cog-
nitive’ header.33 Jaimovich and Siu (2014) argue that this secular process of job
polarization accelerates during recessions when many routine jobs are permanently
destroyed and workers in those jobs are forced to pursue other careers. In this way,
they claim, the cycle is actually the trend, since this type of job polarization during
33With routine jobs in these occupations mostly located in the middle segment of the wage
distribution, employment gains at the low end of the wage distribution, in non-cognitive manual
and at the high end of the wage distribution, in cognitive non-routine job imply a ‘hollowing out’
of the middle, which is often referred to as ‘job polarization’.
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recessions is not reversed during expansions.
To consider whether job polarization is happening in the U.K. labour market
and to what extent it is reflected in workers switching from careers in routine to
non-routine occupations, we split up the post-2000 data by occupation into routine
and non-routine occupations, following Acemoglu and Autor (2011). The second
column of Table 2.1 contains a marker that signifies which SOC 2000 occupations
are classified in which category.
Figure 2.8 shows employment in routine occupations as both a share of the
working age population as well as of total employment. The figure shows that the
share of employment in ‘routine occupations’ has steadily declined in the U.K.,
similar to that in the U.S. (Jaimovich and Siu, 2014). However, there was no
acceleration in this trend during the Great Recession, as the “trend-is-the-cycle”
hypothesis would suggest. In fact, using more formal regression-based techniques
we find no significant cyclical component in the routine share series plotted in
Figure 2.8. This is in line with the evidence for the U.S. in Foote and Ryan (2014).
Figure 2.9 shows the time series of career changes that result in a switch between
routine and non-routine occupations. The first thing that stands out from this
figure is the excess churning we already saw in terms of the net mobility measure
in Figure 2.5. The net change in routine employment induced by these career
switches is negative and contributes to the trend decline shown in Figure 2.8. Just
like in the U.S. (Cortes et al., 2014) IE and UE flows contribute the bulk of this net
decline. Most importantly, however, is the observation that the share of routine
to non-routine career switches does not increase significantly during the recession,
indicating that, in terms of career switches, there is no evidence that the long-run
downward trend in the share of routine employment accelerates during recessions.
In fact, the overall turnover between these two categories of occupations seems to
have declined in the recession.
Of course, the data in Figure 2.9 only includes workers who have been employed
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Figure 2.8: Shares of working age population and total employment working in
routine occupations.
before at some point, and are hired again. This means that adjustment in the
overall level of routine employment could also come about by a diminishing inflow
into routine occupations by labour market entrants, and by an increased outflow of
retirees from these occupations is not visible in our statistics. Cortes et al. (2014),
for example, emphasize that such a cohort effect is an important driver behind the
trend decline in routine employment in the United States. However, the lack of a
cyclical pattern in Figure 2.9 suggests that this cohort effect most likely also does
not fluctuate a lot over the business cycle.
Thus, our analysis for the U.K. is supportive of the same conclusion that Al-
banesi et al. (2013) draw for the U.S.; weakness in the labor market in the Great
Recession was shared by non-routine and routine occupations alike, did not dispro-
portionately affect routine occupations, nor did it accelerate the secular decline in
routine jobs.
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2.4.4 Wage gains
Thus far, we have shown that career switches make up a substantial fraction labour
market turnover, and of voluntary turnover in particular. Recent theoretical (Hage-
dorn and Manovskii, 2013) and empirical (Daly, Hobijn, and Wiles, 2012) studies
have emphasized the importance of voluntary turnover and employer-to-employer
transitions for understanding the cyclical behaviour of wage growth. Our data
suggest that distinguishing between career switchers and stayers would refine our
understanding of wage growth over the business cycle even more.
To see why, consider Tables 2.6 and 2.7, which summarize the distribution of
percent real wage changes for job switchers, conditional on moving careers or stay-
ing in the same career, for the whole sample as well as for the three main periods in
our sample.34 Because we are interested in wage changes, our analysis only includes
34Recall that these wages are self-reported gross weakly earnings, deflated using the CPI.
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hires for which we have data in waves 1 and 5 of the survey, depicted in Figure
2.2. In particular, that means that for workers who flow through unemployment,
we only have wage changes for those with an unemployment spell shorter than 4
quarters.
Table 2.6: Probability of positive real wage growth by percentile of wage in previous
job
Quartile of the Occupations Industries
wage before Movers Stayers Movers Stayers
changing jobs I II III IV
1. 0th-25th Total 78.5 67.0 79.9 65.5
EE 80.3 71.8 81.1 69.7
EUE 80.7 69.2 78.8 67.6
2. 25th-50th Total 56.9 51.1 57.5 51.1
EE 56.7 48.7 57.9 49.4
EUE 55.1 55.3 62.3 50.9
3. 50th-75th Total 37.6 46.1 36.1 46.3
EE 35.8 44.3 34.7 44.5
EUE 40.1 40.8 34.5 47.0
4. 75th-100th Total 27.0 35.8 26.4 37.2
EE 27.2 35.2 26.4 36.5
EUE 23.6 34.3 23.4 34.5
Note: Percent of workers that receive a wage increase after changing jobs for all job changes in
the sample.
Long-run perspective Table 2.6 shows the probability that the hire of a worker
with previous work experience results in a wage gain. The table lists this probability
conditional on whether the hire involves a change in career and on the level of the
wage earned in the previous job, measured in terms of the percentile of the wage
Given that the LFS only provides wage information on its 5 quarter sample and only for a
worker’s Q1 and Q5 interview wave, we are not able to subdivide the analysis by demographic
or job characteristics or by the other stratifications we used in the previous sections without
running into small sample problems. We also focus our attention to those workers that made EE
or UE transitions given the small sample of those workers making IE transitions for which we
have wage information. Further information about Q1 and Q5 wages is only available as from
1996. Further, we also checked whether the cyclicality of our Hm rates is robust if we changed
to the 5-quarter sample. Across occupations and industries we find that Hm, HEm and HUm
are procyclical; while HIm is acyclical.
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distribution. The probability of a positive wage gain is much higher for workers
who earned a low wage in their previous jobs. More importantly, for those workers
this probability is also higher when they change careers than when they did not.
For workers making an above-median wage, however, the probability of obtaining a
positive wage growth when changing employer is closer to 30% but now is higher for
those who do not change careers. This suggests that a large part of the voluntary
career mobility through employer-to-employer moves that we document is workers
moving up the job ladder to progress their careers.35
Where Table 2.6 provides information about the sign of the wage change, the
columns for the “Whole sample” in Table 2.7 show the distribution of the magni-
tude of wage changes.36 The first takeaway from this table is the large degree of
dispersion in wage growth that results from a change in employers. Below the 50th
percentile of each distribution, workers can experience large negative wage losses
when moving employers, while above the 50th percentile workers experience large
wage gains.37
The most striking feature of the distributions shown in Table 2.7 is that the
dispersion of wage gains is larger for career movers than for career stayers. This also
holds true when we condition on whether the worker changed employers through an
intervening spell of unemployment or not. Relative to stayers those who changed
careers have higher wage growth at and above the 50th percentile of the wage
growth distribution; while the opposite happens below the 50th percentile. This
35Indeed, when adding the quartile of the wage earned in the previous job as an explanatory
variable to the Probit analysis reported in subsection 4.2, we find that the probability of a career
change through an EE transition deceases with the wage earned in the previous job.
36Note that these tables convey different information than the one presented in Longhi and
Taylor (2013). For occupational movers, they compare the average wage in the worker’s previ-
ous occupation with the average wage in the worker’s new occupation. Using this information
they distinguish between upward or downward occupational mobility by workers’ employment
status. In contrast, we compute the difference in the wages the individual obtains from changing
occupation. This allows us to understand the relative gains for the individual of a career change.
37These numbers are consistent with the large set of evidence that finds re-employment wage
loses for displaced workers (see Jacobson, et al. 1993) and wage gains for workers that undergo
direct EE transitions (see Topel and Ward, 1992). The actual wage losses due to displacement
are likely underestimated in our data since our sample only contains unemployment spells that
lasted shorter than 4 quarters.
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evidence again supports our interpretation that workers typically change careers
for wage gains bigger than for those that stayed in the same occupation. It might
seem counterintuitive that career changes through unemployment do tend to lead
to positive wage gains that are larger than those obtained by unemployed workers
who will stay in the same career. However, this evidence is not inconsistent with
a theory in which these potentially larger wage gains can only be obtained after a
costly reallocation process which only becomes worthwhile after job prospects in
the original career have deteriorated sufficiently (see, for example, Carrillo-Tudela
and Visschers, 2014).
Table 2.7: Distribution of real wage changes for hires: 1997-end of sample
Whole sample 1997-2000 2001-2007 2008-end
Percentile Movers Stayers Movers Stayers Movers Stayers Movers Stayers
(a) Occupations
25th Total -16.4 -13.0 -13.0 -9.6 -16.0 -11.3 -24.0 -22.1
EUE -32.4 -22.9 -32.5 -18.7 -27.4 -21.6 -48.9 -29.5
EE -10.9 -8.2 -7.4 -5.1 -12.2 -6.6 -12.8 -16.7
50th Total 10.7 6.8 16.8 10.8 9.7 6.0 2.6 2.0
EUE -2.1 -3.0 1.3 1.8 1.1 -3.4 -19.6 -10.5
EE 13.4 9.6 19.1 13.4 11.7 8.8 8.5 4.9
75th Total 54.8 33.6 71.8 40.5 49.1 30.9 42.0 29.9
EUE 48.3 28.7 59.0 33.4 54.9 26.6 6.5 27.2
EE 56.8 34.6 75.5 41.1 50.1 32.4 44.3 29.8
(b) Industries
25th Total -17.0 -12.5 -12.5 -9.3 -16.3 -12.3 -22.4 -15.8
EUE -29.7 -24.7 -30.1 -19.9 -27.2 -23.2 -33.7 -31.6
EE -11.7 -7.1 -7.7 -4.5 -12.0 -7.5 -14.8 -8.9
50th Total 9.8 6.7 15.2 11.1 8.6 6.6 6.9 2.8
EUE -2.1 -2.7 2.4 4.8 0.5 -2.4 -10.6 -10.4
EE 12.4 9.2 17.7 13.4 11.2 8.7 9.5 6.0
75th Total 54.3 32.1 69.0 40.7 48.3 30.3 50.5 26.9
EUE 42.4 27.6 46.8 41.6 49.7 26.8 26.0 15.9
EE 55.0 32.5 66.3 40.6 49.8 31.0 53.2 27.7
Note: Percentile of the distribution percent wage changes. Reported are averages of the
quarterly time series of percentiles over the sample periods listed. Wage data only available
after 2007.
Cyclical patterns The last six columns of Table 2.7 show how the distribution of
wage changes varies over different business cycle episodes in the U.K. labour market.
Across occupations and industries the wage growth distribution of those workers
that change careers through unemployment shifts down during the recession. The
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decrease is stronger across occupations than industries. Further, the shift in the
wage growth distribution of those who changed occupations through unemployment
is sufficiently big that their wage gains are now below the wage gains of career
stayers even at the 75th percentile of the wage growth distribution. In contrast,
the wage growth distribution of workers that changed employers directly through
an EE transitions or those that changed employers through unemployment but did
not undertake a career change, do not seem to respond as much to business cycle
conditions.38
The evidence presented suggests that career changers have a higher probability
of a substantially large wage increase than career stayers. However, during the
recession the wage gains of occupational changers decrease to the point that, for
unemployed workers, these have become smaller than the wage gains from changing
employer in the same occupation. As argued, for example, in Carrillo-Tudela and
Visschers (2014), the decrease in the gains of reallocation can help explain the drop
in the probability of a career change during the recession, documented in subsection
3.2.
Thus, the procyclicality of the incidence of career changes and the associated
wage gains that we document suggest that adding a career change margin to our
models of labour market fluctuations will help improve our understanding of the,
not well-understood, link between unemployment, labour turnover, and aggregate
wage growth.39
38These observations are also confirmed when regressing the wage growth of workers on output
per worker and a time trend, showing that these patterns are not particular to the Great Recession.
39Of course, some of aggregate wage growth is drive by a composition effect (Solon, Barsky,
and Parker, 1994, and Daly, Hobijn, and Wiles, 2012). This is the same composition effect that
partially drives the procyclicality of career changes. For our understanding of aggregate time
series it is important to have theoretical models that capture the main sources of (self-)selection
that drives this composition effect.
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Overall, the patterns in the UK LFS suggest that in good times career changes im-
ply a chance to improve a worker’s position in the labour market. In downturns the
gains associated with career changes appear to diminish. From a theory perspective
one can build on Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2014) and Wiczer (2013) to rec-
oncile these patterns using a framework that incorporates heterogeneity in labour
market conditions, costly mobility choices between labour markets (career changes)
and business cycle shocks. In such a framework, fluctuations in the expected net
returns to a career change induce workers to adjust their mobility choices. In down-
turns, when net returns are low, workers decide to stay in their careers and wait
for conditions to improve instead of changing to a new occupation or industry.
In such a framework two motives for job mobility can arise: (i) workers may
move to other jobs because their current employment conditions worsen while out-
side opportunities stay the same; (ii) workers may move because outside opportu-
nities improve while current employment conditions are unaffected. Although both
reasons may be at work, they are not necessarily two sides of the same coin. Aggre-
gate conditions may interact differently with the idiosyncratic shocks to workers’
current employment, than with the stochastic arrival of new employment opportu-
nities in different occupations or industries.
In these models, adverse shocks to current employment could then generate ‘in-
voluntary’ transitions, through which workers try to recover the loss of prospects in
their current job. Increased opportunities elsewhere could draw workers to ‘volun-
tarily’ change their jobs and careers. The ‘pull’ of the latter kind of opportunities
can be especially strong in booms, in line with the evidence presented in this paper;
while the mobility ‘push’ associated with the shocks behind ‘involuntary’ transi-
tions could be especially relevant in recessions.
Taken together, career changes are different from other hires in terms of their
cyclicality, their associated (wage) gains and the cyclical variations in these gains.
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Incorporating a career-mobility dimension in equilibrium business cycle models of
the labor market can be a promising direction to contribute to our understanding of
the overall behaviour of labour turnover and wage growth over the business cycle,
and could help guide better policy responses to business cycle fluctuations.
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Appendix
In this appendix we supplement the description of the U.K. Quarterly Labour
Force Survey provided in the main text. In particular, we describe how we con-
structed the different categories we used to described workers’ search activities,
unemployment durations and the variables used in the probit regressions.
Search Activity In the U.K. LFS employed workers are asked whether they were
actively searching for a job or not and which search channels did they use. We cat-
egorise workers as using a “job centre” when they declared that their main method
of search was “visit a job centre, job market or jobs and benefit centres”, “visit
a job club”, “have your name on the books of a private employment agency”, or
“visit a careers office”. Workers in the category “ads” were those that declared that
their main method of search was “advertise for jobs in newspapers and journals”,
“answer advertisements in newspapers and journals”, “study situations vacant in
newspapers or journals”. Workers in the category “direct applications” were those
whose main method was “apply directly to employers”. Workers in the category
“ask a friend or relative” correspond to those that declared their main method of
search to be “ask friends, relatives, colleagues or trade unions about jobs”. The
last category “do anything else” includes those who responded “wait for the results
of an application for a job”, “look for premises or equipment”, “seek any kind of
permit”, “try to get a loan or other financial backing for a job or business”, and
“do anything else to find work”. Among the employed, 77% of workers that made
an employer-to-employer transition declared they were not actively searching for a
job and the reminder 33% did.
Workers who declared themselves as non-participants in the labour market were
considered to “want a job” if they were seeking but unavailable because they were a
student, looking after family, temporarily sick or injured, long-term sick or disabled
or due to other reasons or no reasons given. In addition we categorise as wanting
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a job those non-participants that are not seeking, but would like to work and are
waiting for results of job applications, believe no jobs are available, have not looked,
are a student, looking after family, temporarily sick or injured, long-term sick or
disabled, or no reason given. Those who “do not want a job” are those workers
that declared they are not seeking, would not want to work and are waiting for
results of job applications, do not need or want a job, are a student, looking after
family, temporarily sick or injured, long-term sick or disabled, retired or or due to
other reasons or no reasons given. Although there are many reasons why a worker
declares him or herself out of the labour force, for those that want or do not want
a job, there are three main reasons: being either a student, looking after family or
long-term sick.40
Unemployment Duration To construct the category of unemployed workers
that found a job within the first 2 quarters of their unemployment spell and the
category of those that found a job after that, we use the following categorical
variable for the duration of unemployment: (1) Less than 3 months, (2) 3 months
but less that 6 months, (3) 6 months but less than 12 months, (4) 1 year but less
than 2 years, (5) 2 years but less than 3 years, (6) 3 years but less than 4 years,
(7) 4 years but less than 5 years, (8) 5 years or more. We label workers in (1) and
(2) as “less than or equal to 2 quarters” and the rest as “more than 2 quarters”.
Probit Analysis To further analyse the workers’ likelihood of a career change,
we use the latent variable model
Pij = x
′
iβj + εij, (2.5)
40In particular, 75% of workers who wanted a job are in these three categories, while 82% of
those that did not want a job are in these categories. Among the inactive, those that want a job
represent on average 30% of the non-participants, and those that do not want a job the remainder
70%.
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where Pij is the latent variable that measures the probability of an occupational
or industry change, εij is i.i.d and follows a multivariate normal distribution, i
represent individuals and j outcomes. For all those workers that changed employers
(through employment or non-employment), the dependent variable takes the value
of zero if the worker did not change occupation or industry and one if the worker
did.
The vector xi describes the explanatory variables. It includes variables which
capture the effects of aggregate and local economic conditions through the aggre-
gate unemployment rate, and the deviations of the regional unemployment rates
from the aggregate unemployment rate in each quarter. The effects of workers’
human capital through a quadratic on age, different skill categories and the dura-
tion of the job or unemployment spell. The skill categories are dummy variables
that take the value of one if the worker has the corresponding skill level and zero
otherwise. The high skilled category groups all those workers that have post school
degrees, ranging from teaching qualifications to graduate studies. The medium
skilled category groups all workers that achieved between a O-level or GCSE qual-
ification to an A-level or equivalent qualification. The low skilled category groups
all individuals with an educational attainment below O-levels or GCSE. For un-
employed workers, the spell duration indicates the duration of unemployment and
includes the eight categories mentioned above. For employed workers, this variable
denotes the duration of employment with current employer in months. We also
include a set of variables that measure further demographics such as a dummy for
marital status,41 the number of children, and a dummy for gender. We also con-
41The classification of marital status before 2006Q2 has five options: (1) Single, never married,
(2) Married, living with husband/wife, (3) Married, separated from husband/wife, (4) Divorced,
and (5) Widowed. We set the value of this variable is one if the respondents marital status is
(2), otherwise the value of this variable is zero. The classification of marital status after 2006Q2
has nine options. The first five options are identical to the previous classification. The additional
options are (6) A civil partner in a legally-recognised Civil Partnership, (7) In a legally-recognised
Civil Partnership and separated from his/her civil partner, (8) Formerly a civil partner, the Civil
Partnership now legally dissolved, and (9) A surviving civil partner: his/her partner having since
died. Under the classification of marital status after 2006Q2, we set the value of “mar/cohab” to
one if a respondent whose marital status is (2) or (6), and zero otherwise.
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sider dummies for full-time jobs and whether the job was temporary or permanent.
We include dummies for employment status and whether the change of employer
was for involuntary or for other reasons, where we take voluntary reasons as our
baseline category. Finally, we include dummies for the methods of job search and
whether non-participants declared they wanted a job or not. All dummies take the
value of one if the respective worker-, job-, and search- characteristic is equal to
the label of the dummy. Otherwise, the dummy takes the value of zero.
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Chapter 3
Are the occupational and
industrial mobility overestimated?
An evidence from BHPS.
3.1 Introduction
The mechanism of the labour market is an important topic for a labour economist.
Over the past two decades, researchers in this field have widely debated the impact
of unemployment on reallocation. There are two major effects discussed: the sul-
lying effect and cleansing effect. 1 During a recession, the reallocation speeds up
because new jobs in the expanding sector are opening and the existing jobs in the
decreasing sector are closing. The force that pushes people from the decreasing sec-
tor to the expanding sector is called the cleansing effect. The process of reallocation
could be between occupations and industries, and hence the measurement of reallo-
cation becomes an important issue that needs to be considered. The occupational
and industrial mobility is not uniquely defined. Researchers use different formulas
to calculate it. Here, we use the number of occupational (industrial) movers divided
by the summation of occupational (industrial) mover and stayer as occupational
(industrial) mobility. 2 In order to measure the process of reallocation, we assume
that the data is correctly and accurately collected and transformed. However, this
assumption may not be true. Some factors lead to wrongly collected data, such as
misunderstandings between interviewers and participants.
Pearles (2004) suggested that dependent interviewing can detect how wrong
we were in the measurement of occupational mobility. However, the independent
interviewing was applied in earlier surveys of BHPS. This interviewing method
works as respondents answer the questionnaire without any information fed for-
ward. Respondents have to answer each question even though their circumstances
did not change at all. For example, respondents provide the description of their
occupations in a wave. In the following wave, these respondents still need to re-
peat the description of occupation and relevant questions, even though they did
not change their job. Since the survey interview runs once a year, some participant
1See Barlevy (2002) and Caballero and Hammour (1994).
2Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2016) and Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013) use the same method
to calculate occupational (industrial) mobility.
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were unable to provide exactly the same description as the one in the previous
wave. Therefore, independent interviewing may prolong the time of interview, and
potentially contain measurement errors.
A modified design of questioning method is introduced: dependent interview-
ing is designed to shorten the interview time and increase the accuracy of the data
collected. In some circumstances, respondents were provided the information they
answered in the previous wave. If the respondents have not changed their circum-
stances since the last wave, then the information provided in the previous wave is
used as the answer in the current wave. This questioning method is called depen-
dent interviewing as the participant’s answer depends on the circumstances of the
previous wave. Since the answers from the previous wave were directly transfered,
this design can shorten the interview time and avoid boring the interviewee. The
interviewer can also avoid the measurement error due to the consistent description
if the respondent did not change job.
The change of questioning method is a very important issue for researchers’
analysis. If the questioning method considerably influences the feature of market
reallocation, researchers should exclude this factor and modify the argument. How-
ever, the effect of changing questioning method on the reallocation is still poorly
understood, and ignorance of this effect would result in a misleading conclusion.
In order to address this problem, I apply a dummy variable indicating the period
of dependent interviewing. Given the Probit model has been provided in the last
chapter, I include this dummy variable into the estimation in order to discover its
role regarding the occupational and industrial mobility. Since workers may change
their job via different channels of transition, the effect of changing questioning
method may vary differently depending on the channels. In this chapter, I will
also examine the cases of job changers, employer-to-employer transition, and non-
employment transition in order to obtain a complete understanding.
This study is the first paper to document the effect of dependent interviewing
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on the occupational and industrial reallocation. Whether the change of questioning
method affects the measurement of reallocation will be discussed in a later part of
this research.
The aim of this research is to test whether the questioning method affects the
measurement of reallocation. Since the independent interviewing was applied in the
period 1991-2005 and the dependent interviewing was used in the period 2006-2014,
I can detect if the level of reallocation was disturbed by the change of questioning
method. I also investigate whether the procyclicality of occupational and industrial
mobility is still robust considering the change of questioning method.
This study is organized as follows. The relevant literature is discussed in sec-
tion 3.2. In section 3.3, a description of BHPS and UKHLS can be found, and
the occupational and industrial classification. In section 3.4, I demonstrate the
design of dependent interviewing, and discuss why dependent interviewing is used.
In Section 3.5, I apply Probit models to examine the reallocations considering the
change of questioning method. I firstly provide the estimation of occupational and
industrial reallocation by considering workers who were employed in two consecu-
tive waves in order to obtain a general view of the effect of dependent interview-
ing. I then focus on the cases of all workers who experienced job change, workers
who experience employer-to-employer transition and workers who experience non-
employment transition to analyse whether the reallocation behaviors are different
across the jobs finding channels . I am especially interested in the effect of aa
change of question method on the reallocation measurement, as the significance of
this effect can help us to detect the robustness of the reallocation measurement as
well. Finally, Section 6 summarises and concludes our findings.
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3.2 Literature review
Approximately 930,000 thousands workers move into employment, and 877,000
workers move out of employment in the UK each quarter (Gomes, 2012). When
workers change their job, they have to face the issue of whether they need to switch
their occupation or industry. A sector may become less competitive or productive,
and fewer workers may be needed within this sector. This forces workers to look
for job opportunities in different occupations or industries. For example, the sector
of agriculture is not as important as before, and the service sector has become the
most important sector in the current economy. This change of economic structure
reflects the development of the economy. After acknowledging the importance of
sectoral adjustment, researchers can properly understand workers’ difficulties of
seeking job and career adjustment, and confirm whether the career adjustment is
properly analyzed with the survey answers collected.
How occupational and industrial data are collected in surveys is an elementary
point here. Respondents are asked to describe their work, and their verbal answers
are coded by a coder or a computer program to be assigned into a occupational (in-
dustrial) unit of standard occupational (industrial) classification. However, such a
process may result in measurement errors from a number of sources. For example,
respondents may provide incomplete descriptions, and interviewers keep inaccurate
records (Laurie and Moon, 2003; Lynn and Sala, 2006; Moscarini and Thomsson,
2007). Also, different coders may subjectively allocate one description into a differ-
ent occupational or industrial unit. To solve this conflict, the inter-coder reliability
is introduced: examine the consistence of the assigned coding unit from different
coders in terms of the same occupational and industrial description, and calculate
the agreement rate. However, the agreement rates for occupational data between
two different coders are at a far from acceptable level (Laurie and Moon, 2003).
Annette, Laurie and Uhrig (2007) suggest that, the measurement error are
probably due to the independent interviewing and the coders’ misclassification. To
66
assess the effects of measurement error on the mobility rates, we must examine,
in detail, the questioning design that has been used to collect the participant’s
responses.
We use an inherent longitudinal dimension survey which allows us to examine
the reason why people switch the type of work they do, and how people climb the
career ladder during their life (Bukodi and Dex, 2010; Evans, 1999; Harper, 1995).
However, the complexities inherent in the process of occupational and industrial
data collection make the data quality worse. Typically, respondents report their
description of occupation and industry each year, and their answers are coded into
an occupational and industrial unit. According to the process of coding mentioned
above, the occupational and industrial coding may be erroneous in any given wave.
The erroneous coding that occurs in any wave will further decrease the accurance of
mobility measurement that is based on two-consecutive-wave data (Sullivan, 2009).
Perales (2014) has shown that independent interviewing causes measurement
error. All respondents have to answer each question independently each wave, and
provide the description of their occupation. Since respondents may not remember
the exact description of their occupation provided in the last wave, they may pro-
vide a slightly different description of the occupation despite not having changed
their job. This measurement error has been identified as the primary reason for
erroneous analysis.
Occupational and industrial structure are considered as indications of economic
development. The change of occupational structure is a reflection of social commu-
nity change, and the change of employment among industries is the modification
of economic structure. Changing occupation or industry is a costly and risky pro-
cess for workers because they not only lose their human capital but also pay the
opportunity cost. Workers only switch career if they will gain higher utility from
the new career compared with all the costs, including search cost and economy
cost, associated with this change. In empirical literature, the wage growth is thus
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usually considered as a useful proxy.
Empirically, a comparison of the occupational and industrial codes assigned
between different survey waves is used to distinguish mobility from stability. The
empirical evidence from the US and the UK shows that workers frequently change
their career. Parrado, Caner and Wolff (2007) and Kambourov and Manovskii
(2008) report that the occupational mobility rate is between 10 % and 20 % each
year in the US, and the more disaggregated the classification used is, the higher
the mobility rate is. Moscarini and Thomsson (2007) find that the occupational
mobility rate is even higher, at 35 % per month in the US. Carrillo-Tudela and
Visschers (2013) provide the latest finding that the occupational mobility rate has
reached 40 % in the US. While Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) report that
industrial mobility was 10 % annually in the period 1969-1997 in the US, and
Greenaway, Upward and Wright (2000) report that the industrial mobility rate is
between 6 % -10 % annually in the UK. However, Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2016)
report that the industrial mobility is considerably higher - 40 % in the UK..
For the reason outlined above, the implementation of dependent interviewing
might reduces the level of measurement error. Annette, Laurie and Uhrig (2007)
claim that dependent interviewing significantly reduce the level of measurement
error, and they use the feature of dependent interviewing to confirm if the data are
reliable and robust.
Generally, researchers assume that respondents perfectly remember their actual
employment history, and the information provided by them is not affected by the
questioning method. However, such a questionable assumption can not be sup-
ported by the findings from Perales (2014). He shows that the questioning method
affects the measurement error. Most research neglect the impact of measurement
error on the mobility measurements. Such unawareness is common to most re-
searchers, therefore understanding its effects on the consistency of longitudinal
surveys enables us to improve our knowledge and therefore improve the accuracy
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of data collection. Instead of intentionally avoiding the measurement error, this
issue should be examined more carefully. It is also advantageous to investigate
whether changing the questioning method affects each mobility measurement or
not as this examination can be seen as a gauge when we review the existing liter-
ature.
This study aims to provide an examination of career change with the change
of questioning method. It would be helpful to have a better and more profound
understand of the validity and robustness of different mobility measurements in
future studies.
3.3 Data and mobility measurements
3.3.1 BHPS and UKHLS
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a multi-purpose study which cov-
ers the period from 1991 to 2008. It interviews people annually, therefore it has
provided 18 waves of datasets. The BHPS is a UK-wide survey: it consisted of
around 5,500 households and 10,000 individuals from Great Britain in the earlier
stage. 3,000 households from both Scotland and Wales has been added into the
sample since 1999, and another 1,900 households from Northern Ireland were added
in since 2001.
Participants of the BHPS in 2008 were asked if they would consider joining a
new and wider-range survey, the UK Households Longitudinal Study (UKHLS),
conducted by the Understanding Society. Around 80% participants of the BHPS
participants jointed the UKHLS, and this extension is useful for researchers to
investigate participants’ short-term and long-term behavior.
The UKHLS, the main survey of the Understanding Society, began in 2009
and is a multi-topic household survey. It collects a wide range of information on
many topics, such as employment history, healthy condition, education, lifestyle,
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etc. This survey is considered as a successor of the BHPS, and its sample size is
bigger. The UKHLS consists of around 40,000 households and 100,000 individuals.
When the UKHLS began, the BHPS participants in the 18th wave had only
completed their interviews for a few months. Since two interviews within a short
period may cause an extra burden on the participant, the samples of the BHPS are
integrated into the UKHLS, after 2010 which is the UKHLS Wave 2.
For the UKHLS, the particpants are interviewed annually, but the data collec-
tion period of each wave is two years. From UKHLS wave 2 onwards, given that the
data collection period of the BHPS is one year, BHPS samples are interviewed in
the first year of each wave for the UKHLS and non-BHPS samples are interviewed
in the second year of each wave. The timing of UKHLS and BHPS integration
is shown in Table 3.6. To link the UKHLS with the BHPS, given that the latest
UKHLS is updated to 2014, researchers could track the samples of the BHPS over
more than two decades. In the UKHLS, each wave is collected every 24 months.
The participants are interviewed around the same time each year, but the collec-
tion period of each wave overlapps. For example, the first wave of UKHLS was
collected between January 2009 and January 2011, and then the second wave was
collected between January 2010 and January 2012, and so on.
3.3.2 Standard occupational classification
The BHPS provides the codes of worker’s jobs in terms of Standard Occupational
Classification 1990 (SOC 1990) from 1991 to 2008, and the codes in terms of Stan-
dard Occupational Classification 2000 (SOC2000) from 2001 to 2008. The codes of
occupational classification are given according to how the job is performed and what
skill is required. In SOC 1990, there are 9 major groups with 1-digit codes, 77 mi-
nor groups with 2-digit codes and 371 unit groups with 3-digit codes. In SOC2000,
there are 9 major groups with 1-digit codes, 81 minor groups with 2-digit codes
and 353 unit groups with 3-digit codes. Comparing SOC1990 and SOC2000, the
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number of major groups, minor groups and unit groups are similar.
3.3.3 Standard industrial classification
The information of the firms that participants work for is used to identify the
industry classification of a worker’s job. According to these firms’ productivity
categories, the codes of industrial classification will be given in terms of Standard
Industrial Classification. The classification scheme has been modified regularly,
as industry and commerce has changed considerably over the past few decades.
In the BHPS, the worker’s code based on Standard Industrial Classification 1980
(SIC1980) is available from 1991 to 2001, and the code based on Standard Indus-
trial Classification 1992 (SIC1992) is available from 2001 to 2008. In the UKHLS,
Standard Industrial Classification 2007 (SIC2007) is adopted to classify the indus-
try of the worker’s job at the beginning of the survey (2009), and information of
SIC1992 is not provided afterwards. There are 10 divisions (1-digit level) and 60
classes (2-digit) in SIC 1980. SIC 1992 changes the names of the hierarchy levels
and includes 17 sections (1-digit level) and 60 divisions (2-digit level). SIC 2007 is
divided into 21 sections (1-digit level) and 88 divisions (2-digit level). The 1-digit
level of the industrial classifications for SIC 1980, 1992 and 2007 are shown in Table
3.7.
3.3.4 Dependent interviewing
Dependent interviewing is a different questioning method from independent in-
terviewing. Participants were provided with their responses from the previous
interview before answering the questions. If their circumstance has not changed,
the answer from the previous wave will be transfered to the current wave.
For the respondents, it can be tedious and redundant to repeat their answer
if their situation has not changed since the previous wave, which is required in
the independent interviewing. In the longitudinal survey, the respondents become
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bored if they spend hours in the interview repeating the same answers as the
previous wave. The participants therefore may refuse to join future interviews.
This repetitiveness of answering leads the participants to believe that the survey
is not listening to them.
Dependent interviewing is designed to reduce the coding and reporting errors
by using previous information. For example, participants use different words to
describe the same occupation and industry at different waves, because they can’t
remember precisely how they answered before, and they might be referring to differ-
ent occupations and industries across interviews. Errors that arise from different
descriptions of the same job leads to inconsistencies across waves and results in
biases in the estimation.
The design of dependent interviewing also provides a way to check the partici-
pant’s answers. In some cases, the interviewer made the key-in error. For example,
the interviewer may key in an additional zero for the respondent’s earnings. In
terms of the process of dependent interviewing, respondents were given the previ-
ous information of their earnings to confirm if it is still true. This process allows
the interviewer or respondents to capture key-in errors.
The important feature of dependent interviewing is to remind the respondent
what their previous information is. This reminder could effectively reduce the mis-
reporting in their answer. The previous information can efficiently help participants
recall what they have done in the previous year because it provides a step-by-step
method to refresh the participant’s memory .
Dependent interviewing was implemented in wave 16 of the BHPS (year 2006)
and all waves of the UKHLS. It was used in the current employment section and
employment history section. This provides valuable data for labour economists,
especially for researchers comparing the data across waves. The consistency of
information and measurement is an important issue when researchers work on a
longitudinal study and can be helpful to guarantee the reliability of the research
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. The implementation of dependent interviewing not only improves the quality of
data, but also saves precious time for both interviewer and respondents.
3.3.5 Measurements of mobilities
I use three measurements to discuss the career mobility. CEmt is the number of
workers who have a different occupational or industrial code between a given survey
wave t and the previous wave t−1, and CEst is the number of workers who have the
same occupational or industrial code. Therefore, Cmt is inferred as the percentage
of workers who have a different occupational or industrial code given that workers
are continuously employed in two adjacent waves.
Cmt =
CEmt
CEmt + CE
s
t
(3.1)
JCmt represents the number of workers who change their job and have a different
occupational or industrial code, and JCst is the number of job changers who have
the same occupational or industrial codes. Kmt incorporates information on job
changes and indicates the percentage of job changers who switch their career over
the employment. Jmt is the proportion of job changers who have different codes;
this is the one that most researchers use to measure career mobility.
Kmt =
JCmt
CEmt + CE
s
t
(3.2)
Jmt =
JCmt
JCmt + JC
s
t
(3.3)
Figure 3.1 shows the percentage of workers who were continuously employed
in two adjacent years and have a different occupational code between 1992-2014
with SOC 1990. Each line shows the results for a different level of aggregation of
the SOC 1990 classification. A solid line is for a 1-digit level of classification, a
long-dash line for a 2-digit level of classification, and the short-dash line is for the
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3-digit level of classification.
There are many interesting points according to the figure. Firstly, the occupa-
tional change is obviously high. 40 % of all workers have changed occupations in
terms of 3-digit level occupational classification between 1999 and 2005. Secondly,
there is a small increase in Cm, around 5 % from 1992 to 2005. Thirdly, the more
the applied classification is disaggregated, the higher rates of occupational change
observed, such that the 3-digit level has higher rates of occupational change.
Around 40 % of workers are found to be changing occupations in terms of 3-
digit level of classification each year, but only 20 % of workers change occupation
in terms of 1-digit level classification. Furthermore and most importantly, the
introduction of dependent interviewing dramatically reduces the percentage of oc-
cupational change. For example, the rates of occupational change at the 3-digit
level, which were 40 % - 45 %, drop to 15 %. This also appears in 2-digit and
1-digit level classification, where they drop to 10 % and 12 % respectively.
The slump associated with the introduction of dependent interviewing shown
above is not only related to with SOC 1990. Figure 3.2 suggests the slump in 2007
is still significant when using SOC 2000. The ratios of occupational change with
SOC2000 from 2002-2005 is around 20 %, 30% and 35 % for 1-digit, 2-digit and
3-digit classification respectively. After introducing dependent interviewing from
2006, the ratios of occupational change drop to around 10 %, which is a similar
level to the ratios with SOC 1990. These ratios are slightly smaller than the ratios
with SOC 1990. After 2010, the ratios of occupational change become very stable
at 10 %, and the difference between 1-digit and 3-digit codes is within 2 %.
Results in Figure 3.3 show the percentage of industrial change, and consists of
SIC1980, SIC1992 and SIC2007. A solid line indicates the percentage of industrial
change with 1-digit level of industrial classification, and the long dash line indicates
the mobility rate using 2-digit level classification. Around 15 % of workers changed
their industry in terms of 1-digit level industrial classification between 1992 and
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20005, and 25 % of workers changed their industries in terms of 2-digit level.
When the dependent interviewing is introduced, the percentage of industrial change
drops dramatically to less than 10 % and becomes stable at around 5 %. The
difference of the ratios between 1-digit and 2-digit coding is around 10 % when
the independent interviewing is applied, but this difference is significantly reduced
to 1% after introducing dependent interviewing. We also find that the ratio of
industrial change is smaller than occupational change. Figure 3.3 also suggests that
the introduction of dependent interviewing significantly reduces the percentage of
industrial change for the workers who were employed in consecutive waves with a
different industrial classification (1-digit level and 2-digit level).
Figure 3.1: Time series of Cm with SOC1990
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Figure 3.2: Time series of Cm with SOC2000
Figure 3.3: Time series of Cm for industry
Unexpectedly, the reduction in the percentage of occupational and industrial
change in Figure 3.1 - 3.3 demonstrates an interesting effect: the rates reduce only
slightly in 2006, considerably slump in 2007 and then become stable after 2008.
Perales (2014) provides the reasons why the application of dependent interviewing
in 2006 did not cause an immediate drop in the percentage of occupational change.
76
Firstly, many workers did not have valid occupational or industrial descriptions to
be fed forward from 2005 for dependent interviewing in 2006. Since the longitudi-
nal consistency is poor, this increases the rate of occupational or industrial change
in 2006. That is to say, the impact of dependent interviewing on the rate of career
change can not be completely displayed given that the linkage of the information
between 2005 and 2006 is not sufficient. Secondly, a number of workers were as-
signed different occupational codes in 2006, even though they have confirmed that
their occupation was the same as in 2005 via dependent interviewing. Thirdly,
during dependent interviewing in 2006, the BHPS undertook work to improve the
efficiency of the verbatim occupational descriptions provided in 2005. This might
lead some respondents to erroneously report an occupational change. The BHPS
has to confirm the job title and occupational description provided by workers be-
cause the descriptions may be unreadable, misspelled, or too long. The BHPS may
have to edit the description in order to classify the worker’s occupation. For ex-
ample, respondents may provide a long description of their job, and the BHPS will
shorten this description and use the key feature of it to classify the respondent’s
occupation. The trend of occupational mobility rate in 2006 may be prettified by
the errors associated with the complex transition from independent interviewing.
2006 is a transition period for dependent interviewing because there is much infor-
mation from the previous wave that was not well recorded, which may increase the
suspicious occupational change in 2006. Given the descriptions will not need to be
checked unless new information has been updated, during the editing process, many
editing errors occur. However, from 2007, the information collected by dependent
interviewing is built up well and organized. The percentage of occupational and
industrial change (career change) becomes stable after this point. Therefore, the
unexpected slump in occupational rate occurs in 2007 and becomes stable after
2008.
Now, I turn my attention to Km by using the definition of career change that
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incorporates information on job changes. The rate of career change in Figure 3.4
- Figure 3.6 is defined as the following: the number of workers who experienced
job change with different occupations divided by the number of workers who were
employed in consecutive two waves. This ratio can help us to understand whether
mobility rate defined by job changers over whole employment is affected by the
dependent interviewing. A few interesting findings need to be pointed out. Firstly,
compared with Figure 3.1 - 3.3, the rates are almost half in Figure 3.4 - Figure
3.6 within the period of independent interviewing, while they are at a similar level
within the period of dependent interviewing. Secondly, the slump also appears
when the dependent interviewing was introduced. The level of the drop is not as
remarkable as Figure 3.1 - 3.3, but it is still observable. Thirdly, rates of career
change are comparable to those in Figure 3.1 - 3.3. This suggests that, within the
independent interviewing period, using job change information could fractionally
correct the spurious career change due to measurement errors as we can observe
that the range of the slump is smaller.
Figure 3.4: Time series of Km with SOC1990
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Figure 3.5: Time series of Km with SOC2000
Figure 3.6: Time series of Km for industry
The occupational and industrial mobility trend for the job changers will now
be discussed. Here, the mobility rate is defined as the number of job changers who
experience occupational or industrial change (career change) divided by the total
number of job changers. The lines in Figure 3.7 - Figure 3.9 indicate that there is
no significant slump when the dependent interviewing is introduced. The mobility
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rate increases in 2006, decreases in 2007, and then slightly increases again in 2008.
The stable trend that it appears the dependent interviewing captured in Figure 3.1
- Figure 3.6 is not evident in in Figure 3.7 - Figure 3.9.
The lines in Figure 3.7 - Figure 3.9 suggest that the occupational and industrial
mobility are quite high, more than 40 % in terms of 1-digit classification. The more
disaggregated the classification used, the higher the mobility rate is. The mobility
rate using SOC 1990 is around 60 % for the 3-digit level, and around 55 % for
the 2-digit level. The mobility rate using SOC2000 is between 55 % -60 % for the
3-digit level before 2008, and between 50 % -55 % after 2010. The mobility rate
using the 2-digit level SOC2000 is between 50 % - 55 % before 2008, and 45 %
- 50% after 2010. The mobility rate using the 2-digit level of SOC 2000 is 5 %
higher than the mobility rate using the 1-digit level of SOC 2000. The industrial
mobility rate is between 40 % - 45 % for the 2-digit level, and around 35 % for the
1-digit level. The industrial mobility is smaller than occupational mobility. The
greater the detail of classification used, the higher the mobility rate is. The differ-
ence of occupational mobility between 1-digit and 3-digit classification is around 20
%, and this difference is not dramatically reduced when the dependent interview-
ing is applied. For industrial mobility, the difference between 1-digit and 2-digit
classification narrows from 1992 to 2002, and maintains around 10% afterwards.
These strongly suggest that using different measurements obtains quite differ-
ent results. Using the proportion of job changers who experience career change
(occupational and industrial change) to calculate the mobility rate is not affected
by the change of questioning method. Figure 3.1 - Figure 3.6 provide interest-
ing evidence to show that the dependent interviewing reduces the mobility rate
dramatically, which suggests that the literature may overestimate the occupational
mobility. However, I found that this is not the case when using the proportion of job
changers who experience career change as a measurement. This raises a question:
which measurement is more appropriate to represent the essence of career mobil-
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ity? Compared with the first measurement of mobility rate Eq 3.1, the second
measurement Eq 3.2 may correct measurement errors caused by the independent
interviewing, and make the mobility rate within the dependent interviewing period
more comparable. This suggests that the questioning mechanism of dependent
interviewing can detect whether workers really change their occupations or indus-
tries. However, the second measurement Eq 3.2 still does not give us an idea of
mobility rate. The proportion of job changers who switch occupations or industries
is the essence of the career mobility rate. Therefore, I examine the third measure-
ment Eq 3.3 and find that the change of questioning method no longer breaks the
trend of occupational and industrial mobility. The third measurement calculates
the proportion of job changers who switch their career, which demonstrates the
essence of the mobility rate that most researchers used.
The first and second measurements adopt workers who were employed in two
consecutive waves which also contains workers who do not change their job at
all. However, this type of worker should not be included into the sample that we
adopted to calculate the mobility rate. Information about job change can eliminate
the measurement errors, from the first measurement to the second. From the second
measurement to the third measurement, the proportion of job changers who switch
their career allows us to observe the real behavior of workers who were changing
their job, and reflects the process of workers’ decisions on career switching.
In the following section, I will use an econometric model to investigate the
robustness of the results provided in chapter 2. I use a Probit model to examine
whether the change of questioning method changes the workers’ occupations and
industries. I use two types of sample to investigate the effect of the change in
questioning method. One uses the samples who were employed in two consecutive
waves, and the other uses the samples who experience job change. A job changer
could change his job within the same employer. For example, he can be promoted
to another position with the same employer. However, I exclude the workers who
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change jobs with the same employer in the next section because I would like to use
a more restricted definition of changing job to understand the estimated feature.
Using the sample of changing jobs across different employers is also helpful to
compare the results in Chapter 2. In addition, I will divide the job-changers into two
groups in terms of the channel in which workers found their next job. The first one
is the employer-to-employer transition, and the second one is the non-employment
transition. Workers who obtain their next job without any spell of unemployment
or inactivity are classified as belonging to the former category, while workers who
find their next job with a spell of employment or inactivity are categorised in the
latter category. This division allows us to understand the incentive of career change
for these two types of workers.
Figure 3.7: Time series of Jm with SOC1990
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Figure 3.8: Time series of Jm with SOC2000
Figure 3.9: Time series of Jm for industry
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3.3.6 Placebo regression with LFS
From the figures mentioned above, we observe the slump that occurs in 2007 from
Figure 3.1 - Figure 3.6. The main reason for this is the change of interviewing
method from 2007 in the BHPS. In order to confirm the change of interviewing
method causing this slump, I use the same period of LFS data to examine whether
the same slump occurs as well. If the slump is observed in the LFS, we have to re-
consider whether there is another factor causing the slump which is coincidentally
simultaneous to the change of interviewing method in 2007. I adopt a simple econo-
metric model to examine whether the measures of mobility dramatically decrease
after 2007 with the LFS. In Table 3.1, I use three variables to measure cyclical
business: gross domestic production(GDP), output per worker (Opw) and unem-
ployment rate (Urate). A dummy variable, Break, equals 1 if the time is after 2006
quarter 4, otherwise 0. Since there is no change of interviewing method in the LFS,
the coefficient of Break should be insignificant. I regress the three measures of mo-
bility on the measurements of business cycle, Break and time trend (Time trend).
Columns 1-3 in Table 3.1 shows that the coefficient of Break is statistically insignif-
icant when I use GDP as the performance measure of the business cycle. There is
no significant effect affecting any of the occupational mobility measurements (Cm,
Km and Jm) from 2007, and this implies that the slump of Cm and Km with BHPS
data does not occur with LFS data. If there is a factor generally affecting Cm and
Km, the effect could be observed in both of the LFS and the BHPS. If this factor is
observed from the BHPs, but not observed in the LFS, then it should be a specific
factor for the BHPS. According to the figures above, the change of interviewing
method is the reason for this. Columns 4-6 in Table 3.1 are the results using out-
put per worker as the measurement of business cycles, and Columns 7-9 are the
results using unemployment rate as the measurement of cyclical business. The
effects of Break from Columns 4-9 are all insignificant which confirms the finding
of Columns 1-3. There is no dramatic change of occupational mobility (Cm, Km,
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and Jm) between the period before and after 2007 as there was no change in the
interview method in the LFS. The same results are obtained when the estimations
with the information of industrial mobility are applied. Furthermore, this paper
adds the Break dummy into the Probit model in Chapter 2 to understand whether
the insignificance of Break could be observed in terms of the individual level. The
coefficients of Break are all insignificant for the sample of continuously employed
in consecutive two quarters, the sample of job changers, the sample of employed-
to-employed transition, the sample of unemployed-to-employed transition and the
sample of inactive-to-employed transition, no matter if it is occupational or indus-
trial movement.
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Table 3.1: Estimates for Cm, Km, Jm with Labour Force survey
Occupation
Cm Km Jm Cm Km Jm Cm Km Jm
GDP 0.182* 0.0982** 0.697**
(1.98) (2.04) (2.48)
Opw 0.000774* 0.000534** 0.00309**
(1.76) (2.34) (2.29)
Urate -0.00136* -0.00138*** -0.00438*
(-1.82) (-3.77) (-1.89)
Break 0.00200 -0.00159 -0.00209 0.00165 -0.00142 -0.00304 0.00376 0.00148 0.00194
(0.69) (-1.05) (-0.24) (0.57) (-0.95) (-0.34) (1.06) (0.85) (0.18)
Time trend 0.000353 -0.000245** -0.00100 0.000415* -0.000264** -0.000821 0.000646*** -0.000145*** 0.000196
(1.63) (-2.14) (-1.51) (1.99) (-2.44) (-1.28) (7.51) (-3.45) (0.73)
N 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
R2 0.874 0.243 0.264 0.873 0.258 0.254 0.873 0.342 0.236
pseudo R2
Log llik. 248.5 291.5 173.5 248.1 292.2 173.0 248.2 296.2 172.2
Industry
Cm Km Jm Cm Km Jm Cm Km Jm
GDP 0.192* 0.0962*** 1.373***
(1.78) (3.13) (7.74)
Opw 0.000562* 0.000454*** 0.00610***
(1.69) (2.91) (6.84)
Urate -0.00292 -0.00129*** -0.0125***
(-1.65) (-4.84) (-7.31)
Break 0.0121 -0.00183 -0.00866 0.0106 -0.00189 -0.0110 0.0186 0.000830 0.00883
(1.17) (-1.33) (-1.14) (1.19) (-1.39) (-1.44) (1.26) (0.56) (0.92)
Time trend -0.000386 -0.000313*** -0.00318*** -0.000212 -0.000299*** -0.00283*** -0.000175 -0.000195*** -0.00110***
(-1.39) (-4.45) (-7.66) (-1.31) (-4.21) (-6.85) (-0.99) (-6.16) (-5.81)
N 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
R2 0.068 0.633 0.704 0.060 0.634 0.679 0.086 0.675 0.686
pseudo R2
Log llik. 192.7 325.4 200.2 192.4 325.4 197.2 193.5 329.9 198.0
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, t statistics in parentheses
86
3.4 Empirical Evidence
3.4.1 Models
This section contains the main empirical results of the research. In particular, I doc-
ument the robustness test of occupational and industrial mobility in the UK using
the data from the BHPS between 1991-2008 and the UKHLS between 2009-2014.
The discontinuity data collection from independent interviewing to dependent in-
terviewing allows us to check the robustness of the measurement.
As discussed above, the level of occupational mobility before 2006 obtained from
independent interviewing is substantially higher than the one obtained from the
dependent interviewing after 2006. As suggested by Figure 3.1 - 3.6, the presence of
a mobility slump in 2007 is caused by the implementation of dependent interviewing
and the coding error that occurs during transition from independent interviewing
to dependent interviewing. Thus, in order to investigate the effects of the change
in the questioning method after 2007, I propose the following model:
yi = Xiβj + ij
where the variable yi indicates whether the worker changes occupation or industry,
and the vector X describes the explanatory variables. ij is i.i.d and follows a
multivariate normal distribution, i represents individuals and j outcomes. yi is a
binary variable which is assigned the value of one if the individual i switches his
occupation/industry in time t and is zero otherwise.
yi =
 1 if the worker changes his occupation/industry0 if the worker remains in his occupation/industry
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and
Xiβj = β0 +β1agg urate+ β2reg agg urate+ β3age+ β4age sq
+ β5Break + β6mar cohab+ β7num child+ β8ft job
+ β9female+ β10temporary + β11E2E + β12Non emp
+ β13H edu+ β14M edu (3.4)
I model an individual’s occupational or industrial switch depending on a set
of individual characteristics, properties of the job the worker is hired for and the
macroeconomic situation, etc. Since the significant impact caused by the change
of questioning method on the occupational/ industrial mobility occurs in 2007,
I include the dummy variable Break, which is assigned the value of one if the
time span covers the period 2007-2014, and zero otherwise. This dummy variable
actually captures the change of questioning method. Furthermore, the individual’s
last occupation/industry and his/her resident area are controlled within this model.
3
The complete list of variables is shown in Table 3.8. Workers who possess
a higher education degree or equivalent qualification are classified as high-skilled
workers. Middle-skilled workers indicates the workers who have a O-level or equiv-
alent qualification. Workers whose educational qualification are below O-level are
defined as low-skilled.
3.4.2 Continuously employed in two adjacent waves
The estimation result in Table 3.2 is for the workers who were continuously em-
ployed in the adjacent survey waves. The first column uses the 1-digit level of
occupational classification to identify whether the worker’s occupation at time t is
3The areas of individual’s resident are shown as the following: North West, North East,
Yorkershire & Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South East,
South West, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
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different from his occupation at time t−1. The second column uses the 2-digit level
of occupational information to identify the switcher, and the third column uses the
3-digit level of occupational information. For defining the industrial change, the
fourth column uses 1-digit industrial classification and the fifth column uses 2-digit
classification.
The main result tells us that the interview method of questioning has a signif-
icant impact on the career change. Since a majority part of the samples do not
experience job change, the significance of Break indicates the measurement error
exists, as Break captures the change of questioning method. The negative sign of
Break is consistent with the findings suggested by Figure 3.1 - Figure 3.6. It shows
that change of questioning method reduces occupational and industrial mobility.
The number of occupational and industrial switchers dramatically falls during the
period in which dependent interviewing applied. This implies that the applica-
tion of dependent interviewing has a considerable impact on the measurement of
occupational and industrial change.
In Table 3.2, a change of questioning method is associated with a 16-25 %
decrease in the occupational changing probability. The probability of 1-digit oc-
cupational change decreases around 16%, 2-digit level decrease 21%, and 3-digit
level decreases 24 %. The more detailed the level is, the higher the coefficient of
Break becomes. These results are consistent with the discussion above, and show
that the dependent interviewing is a major factor that affects occupational data. I
also found that the marginal effect of Break for occupational change is larger than
industrial mobility, which is consistent with the discussions of Figure 3.1 - 3.6.
The results in Table 3.2 show that employer-to-employer transition significantly
increases the probability of occupational and industrial switch. Transition through
non-employment also has a significant effect on the career change (occupational
and industrial change). Compared with staying in the same job, transition through
employer-to-employer or through non-employment statistically increases the pos-
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sibility of moving to another occupation or industry. This also motivates me to
investigate career mobility transition through employer-to-employer and the cases
of transition through non-employment.
3.4.3 Job changer
In the results from Table 3.3, occupational mobility is captured by changes in
occupational codes for job changers. In order to compared this with the results
of Chapter 2, the job changers here refers to workers who experience transition
through employer-to-employer, or through non-employment. Therefore, workers
who change job within the same employer are excluded to avoid confusion caused
from the sample selection.
Here, Table 3.3 shows the most important results of this research: a change of
questioning method, the variable of Break, has no statistically significant impact
on occupational and industrial mobility. The questioning method does not affect
the occupational and industrial mobility when we consider the workers who expe-
rience job change as a sample. This result provides a robust examination of the
research question we were asking in this study. 4 It shows that the measurement
of occupational and industrial mobility we were using is not affected by dependent
interviewing. This is a vigorous support of the argument made in Chapter 2.
The results in Table 3.3 also show the aggregate unemployed rate has a signifi-
cant impact on occupational mobility, which strengthens the argument about the
pro-cyclicality of occupational mobility. The regional component of the unemploy-
ment is significant in industrial mobility rather than in occupational mobility. The
effects of the business cycle are statistically significant through all levels (1-digit
level, 2-digit level and 3-digit level). The more detailed the level of occupational
coding is , less stronger the impact of cyclical business becomes. This tells us
that the business cycle is more important for workers when a major occupational
4Question: which measurement is more appropriate to represent the essence of career mobil-
ity?
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Table 3.2: Probit model for the workers who were continuously employed in two
adjacent waves (with and without job change)
Occupation Industry
1dgt 2dgt 3dgt 1dgt 2dgt
agg urate -0.00402** -0.00176 -0.00197 -0.00322***0.000584
(-2.20) (-1.06) (-1.57) (-2.73) (0.36)
reg agg urate 0.00140 -0.0000471 0.00298 -0.00285* -0.00213
(0.58) (-0.02) (0.89) (-1.73) (-0.93)
age 2 -0.00334*** -0.00411*** -0.00331** -0.00285*** -0.00213**
(-3.71) (-3.69) (-2.26) (-3.62) (-1.97)
age sq 0.0000249** 0.0000299** 0.0000197 0.0000251**0.0000162
(2.21) (2.16) (1.11) (2.55) (1.26)
Break (d) -0.161*** -0.210*** -0.242*** -0.104*** -0.178***
(-23.61) (-15.96) (-10.32) (-14.87) (-14.49)
mar cohab (d) -0.00538 -0.00382 -0.00594 -0.00601** -0.00680***
(-1.46) (-0.84) (-1.23) (-2.52) (-2.62)
num child -0.000221 0.000471 0.00174 -0.00218* -0.00234**
(-0.14) (0.24) (0.76) (-1.95) (-2.14)
female (d) -0.0247*** -0.0157*** -0.0114*** -0.0104*** -0.00390
(-4.82) (-4.16) (-3.40) (-4.23) (-1.39)
ft job (d) 0.00864** 0.00526 0.00732 -0.0168*** -0.0272***
(2.29) (1.32) (1.52) (-3.46) (-6.49)
temporary (d) 0.0210*** 0.0380*** 0.0399*** 0.0287*** 0.0438***
(3.67) (4.83) (4.23) (6.59) (7.15)
E2E (d) 0.343*** 0.409*** 0.459*** 0.333*** 0.412***
(8.26) (9.33) (9.89) (12.14) (13.12)
Non emp (d) 0.293*** 0.349*** 0.396*** 0.364*** 0.439***
(8.18) (8.90) (8.73) (8.47) (8.76)
H edu (d) 0.00874* 0.00832 0.0129** -0.0138*** -0.0124***
(1.73) (1.56) (2.17) (-6.30) (-4.03)
M edu (d) 0.0156*** 0.0143** 0.0161** -0.00252 -0.000803
(3.53) (2.56) (2.23) (-0.88) (-0.20)
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Last OCC/IND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 84317 84317 84200 81709 81659
pseudo R2 0.168 0.228 0.258 0.226 0.266
Log llik. -29637.9 -31828.7 -32891.6 -21228.1 -25003.4
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
t statistics in parentheses
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change applies rather than when a minor occupational change applies. During the
economic boom period, people have more courage to step into another occupation
which is highly distinctive from their current occupation. The impact of the busi-
ness cycle on occupational mobility is due to the difficulty of workers’ job seeking.
If it is during the economic recession period, it is harder for workers to be re-
employed. This difficulty forces workers to widely seek jobs from other occupation
in order to find a job sooner.
Comparing with a part-time job, a full-time job statistically decreases the prob-
ability of occupational and industrial mobility. A temporary job has a statistical
impact on increasing industrial mobility, but it has no impact on occupational mo-
bility. I also find that age decreases the probability of occupational and industrial
change. This suggests the importance of human capital accumulation on occupa-
tional and industrial change. Also, women do not have a higher probability of
career changing than men.
3.4.4 Employer-to-employer transition
According to the results in Table 3.2, the transition channel increases the probabil-
ity of occupational and industrial change. Here, I decompose the previous sample,
and only use workers who experience employer-to-employer transition as a sample.
This sample selection can help us to understand the behavior of career change for
the workers who were searching on the job, and allows us to compare with the
results provided in Chapter 2. Table 3.4 provides similar results of Probit estima-
tion with the results in Table 3.3. The procyclicality of occupational is still found
to be significant for the employer-to-employer transition, and the procyclicality of
industrial mobility mainly relies on the regional component of unemployment. The
variable of Break, the change of questioning method, does not play a significant
role in the occupational and industrial mobility.
The marginal effect of aggregate unemployment on occupational mobility is
92
Table 3.3: Probit model for job changers
Occupation Industry
1dgt 2dgt 3dgt 1dgt 2dgt
agg urate -0.01553*** -0.01444*** -0.01297***-0.00423 -0.00042
(-5.67) (-4.25) (-3.23) (-0.58) (-0.08)
reg agg urate -0.01543 -0.01698 -0.01003 -0.02332**-0.02704**
(-0.92) (-1.25) (-0.74) (-1.96) (-2.16)
age 2 -0.01381*** -0.02043*** -0.01824***-0.01159***-0.01243**
(-2.95) (-3.93) (-4.42) (-2.59) (-2.09)
age sq 0.00014** 0.00022*** 0.00019***0.00012* 0.00012
(2.35) (3.29) (3.65) (1.93) (1.57)
Break (d) -0.00321 -0.01416 -0.01346 0.03222 -0.04078
(-0.25) (-0.87) (-0.74) (1.03) (-1.38)
mar cohab (d) -0.01815 -0.00610 -0.00352 -0.04584**-0.03032
(-0.89) (-0.33) (-0.20) (-2.46) (-1.62)
num child -0.00232 0.00595 0.00515 -0.00640 -0.00720
(-0.24) (0.57) (0.51) (-1.02) (-1.03)
ft job (d) -0.04580*** -0.04103*** -0.03159* -0.07246***-0.07715***
(-2.97) (-2.67) (-1.76) (-5.16) (-6.06)
female (d) -0.01288 0.01533 0.00787 0.01337 0.03813*
(-0.87) (0.95) (0.48) (0.64) (1.79)
temporary (d) 0.00633 0.03323 0.02036 0.04953***0.06004***
(0.32) (1.36) (0.95) (3.17) (3.03)
Non emp (d) 0.00342 -0.01090 -0.00085 -0.00114 -0.00157
(0.30) (-1.04) (-0.06) (-0.09) (-0.11)
H edu (d) 0.02208 0.02435 0.02924 -0.09806***-0.09124***
(1.01) (1.08) (1.16) (-7.10) (-4.63)
M edu (d) 0.04663** 0.04361** 0.04569* 0.00413 0.00833
(2.36) (2.02) (1.72) (0.25) (0.41)
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Last OCC/IND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8065 8060 7828 7775 7769
pseudo R2 0.031 0.076 0.028 0.042 0.072
Log llik. -5367.92 -5148.73 -5189.56 -5147.37 -4926.72
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
t statistics in parentheses
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stronger for 1-digit classification than for 2-digit and 3-digit classification. When
workers experience major occupational change, the business cycle plays a more
important role in the major group (1-digit level) than the minor group (2-digit
level), and unit (3-digit level) occupational change. This reminds us that workers’
considerations depend on how far they move their career, and what occupation and
industry they move to: more considerations are needed.
The marginal effect of aggregate unemployment (business cycle) on occupa-
tional mobility for EE transition is larger than the marginal effect for job chang-
ers. Workers who experience EE transition are more sensitive than job changers.
Job changers consist of the number of EE transitions and the number of non-
employment transition. Given that the marginal effect for EE transition is larger
than for job changers, it is worth knowing the marginal effect of the business cycle
for non-employment transition as well.
A full-time job makes workers statistically less likely to attempt occupational
and industrial change. Workers who experience on-the-job transition have a low
possibility to change their major (1-digit level) and minor occupational group (2-
digit level) if the workers’ previous job was full-time. However, a full-time job does
not affect workers’ decisions on unit occupational change (3-digit level). Elder
workers have less attempts to change their occupational and industrial attach-
ment. A temporary job enhances workers’ occupational change in the minor and
unit group (2-digit and 3-digit level). Marriage only decreases the probability of
major industrial changing, and there is no significant effect of marriage on occupa-
tional mobility. The number of children does not affect career adjustment, which
is consistent with the findings from the LFS.
However, education attainment affects occupational and industrial change dif-
ferently. Across occupations, medium-level skilled workers have a higher probability
to become switchers than low-level skilled workers as our reference category. For
the industries, low skilled workers have a higher probability to become industrial
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switchers than high skilled workers.
3.4.5 Non-employment transition
Let’s focus on the workers who experience non-employment transition. The sample
size of transition through unemployment and the sample size of transition through
inactivity are not sufficiently large enough to have a proper investigation. A small
sample size may lead to a biased result and conclusion. Therefore, I include the
transition through unemployment and inactivity together to analyze the estima-
tion. In 3.5, the procyclicality of occupational and industrial mobility can still be
observed, and the change of questioning method does not affect the probability of
occupational and industrial change. For the occupational mobility, the marginal
effect of aggregate unemployment (business cycle) is bigger for the more detailed
occupational classification, and the opposite is true for EE transition. The business
cycle increases the probability of changing occupation within unit groups (3 digit
level), rather than major groups (1-digit level). For the industrial mobility, the
aggregate non-employment becomes significant for unemployed workers when they
experience major industrial change, and the regional component of unemployment
no longer has an effect on industrial change any more.
Educational attainment, however, affects occupational and industrial mobility
differently. Across occupations, high and medium skilled workers do not have a
higher probability than low skilled workers of changing occupation. Across indus-
tries, higher skilled workers have a lower probability of changing industry than low
skilled workers. These results are different from the results of on-the-job searching
workers, and also show that education attachment has a different effect on career
change according to different channels of transition.
The effect of temporary jobs on career change disappears for non-employed
workers while this effect is positively significant for EE transition. Full-time jobs
only increase the probability of major occupational change, and do not affect the
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Table 3.4: Probit model for EE transition
Occupation Industry
1dgt 2dgt 3dgt 1dgt 2dgt
agg urate -0.0184*** -0.0158*** -0.0151** 0.00326 0.00700
(-5.19) (-3.94) (-2.38) (0.37) (0.96)
reg agg urate -0.0109 -0.0180 -0.0121 -0.0238* -0.0276*
(-0.56) (-1.01) (-0.80) (-1.80) (-1.79)
age 2 -0.0184*** -0.0251*** -0.0204*** -0.0165*** -0.0199***
(-3.20) (-4.50) (-3.90) (-3.04) (-3.05)
age sq 0.000206*** 0.000282*** 0.000229***0.000184***0.000222***
(2.83) (4.00) (3.41) (2.63) (2.64)
Break (d) -0.00207 -0.00649 -0.0123 0.0194 -0.0552
(-0.14) (-0.36) (-0.48) (0.58) (-1.53)
mar cohab (d) -0.00271 0.00996 0.00961 -0.0412* -0.0234
(-0.12) (0.55) (0.48) (-1.96) (-1.14)
num child -0.00286 0.00503 0.00507 -0.00887 -0.00968
(-0.27) (0.42) (0.40) (-1.29) (-1.27)
female (d) -0.0119 0.0238 0.0181 0.00939 0.0397
(-0.74) (1.33) (0.89) (0.39) (1.53)
ft job (d) -0.0380* -0.0666*** -0.0574*** -0.129*** -0.128***
(-1.80) (-3.70) (-2.81) (-7.51) (-10.10)
temporary (d) 0.0400 0.0541* 0.0433* 0.0502*** 0.0420**
(1.62) (1.83) (1.72) (2.70) (2.45)
H edu (d) 0.0171 0.00480 0.0173 -0.0727*** -0.0825***
(0.59) (0.18) (0.60) (-4.57) (-4.30)
M edu (d) 0.0585** 0.0485** 0.0577* 0.0310 0.0177
(2.48) (2.04) (1.88) (1.53) (0.85)
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Last OCC/IND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5663 5628 5454 5494 5479
pseudo R2 0.039 0.080 0.116 0.053 0.090
Log llik. -3730.3 -3586.7 -3307.1 -3589.6 -3423.3
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
t statistics in parentheses
96
industrial mobility for unemployed workers. The effect of workers’ age on the prob-
ability of occupational and industrial change disappears for non-employed workers.
Female workers do not have a significantly higher probability of occupational and
industrial change than male workers. After observing and analyzing the results
which correspond to all the independent variables, I found that the crucial factors
which influence career change for non-employment workers are aggregate unem-
ployment (business cycle) and education attachment. These findings are also help-
ful to understand the non-employed workers’ career adjustment in the economic
recession.
3.5 Summary and conclusion
Using the sample that was employed in consecutive waves, I found that the occu-
pational and industrial mobility dramatically fall when dependent interviewing is
introduced. This phenomenon is observed in Figure 3.1 - Figure 3.6 , and concrete
results are obtained from the econometric model. There is a huge difference of
occupational mobility rate between the 3-digit and 1-digit level during the period
1992-2006, but this difference has dramatically shrunk over the period 2007-2014
with the size of difference falling from 15 % to 5 %. This phenomenon indicates
that the measurement error does indeed exist. Comparing the coefficients of ques-
tioning method changes, I found that a more disaggregated classification increases
the dependent interviewing impact on occupational and industrial mobility. This
estimation result is consistent with what the features of Figures 3.1 - 3.6 suggested.
I also found that the change of questioning method does not affect the occupa-
tional and industrial mobility if I use the sample who experienced job change, no
matter if it is through employer-to-employer transition or non-unemployment tran-
sition. The impact of dependent interviewing on the probability of career change
occurs only with the sample of workers who were employed in consecutive waves,
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Table 3.5: Probit model for non-employment
Occupation Industry
1dgt 2dgt 3dgt 1dgt 2dgt
agg urate -0.01232*** -0.01464*** -0.01518* -0.01790***-0.01245
(-2.89) (-2.75) (-1.68) (-2.90) (-1.57)
reg agg urate -0.02842 -0.01135 -0.00386 -0.01522 -0.02476
(-1.19) (-0.62) (-0.14) (-0.65) (-1.19)
age 2 -0.00275 -0.00972 -0.01016 0.00080 0.00157
(-0.34) (-1.09) (-1.17) (0.11) (0.17)
age sq -0.00002 0.00007 0.00006 -0.00004 -0.00005
(-0.16) (0.58) (0.51) (-0.43) (-0.38)
Break (d) -0.00292 -0.03591 -0.00439 0.03978 -0.01147
(-0.13) (-1.60) (-0.15) (1.18) (-0.40)
mar cohab (d) -0.04541* -0.03340 -0.02384 -0.04688 -0.04126
(-1.67) (-1.24) (-0.88) (-1.39) (-1.11)
num child 0.00018 0.00419 0.00222 -0.00371 -0.00091
(0.01) (0.26) (0.15) (-0.26) (-0.06)
ft job (d) -0.05679** -0.04321 -0.04693 -0.00366 -0.00543
(-2.00) (-1.57) (-1.37) (-0.14) (-0.18)
female (d) -0.01079 -0.00326 -0.03307 0.00141 0.01774
(-0.40) (-0.09) (-0.89) (0.05) (0.53)
temporary (d) -0.00769 -0.00524 -0.00572 0.02073 0.03028
(-0.26) (-0.17) (-0.22) (0.90) (1.04)
H edu (d) 0.02980 0.05899* 0.04438 -0.12791***-0.11109**
(0.75) (1.91) (1.35) (-4.46) (-2.39)
M edu (d) 0.00701 0.01773 0.00416 -0.04621 -0.02579
(0.18) (0.58) (0.14) (-1.54) (-0.54)
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Last OCC/IND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2390 2363 2147 2267 2241
pseudo R2 0.026 0.088 0.062 0.051 0.080
Log llik. -1605.33 -1482.25 -1366.24 -1490.12 -1391.65
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
t statistics in parentheses
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and most of this sample are workers who did not experience job change. An appro-
priate definition of occupational or industrial mobility should consider the worker
who experiences job change as a sample, otherwise it will misconstrue the meaning
of career ladder and career mobility. The occupational and industrial change for
people who do not experience job change could be considered as a measurement
error, collection error or coding error etc. These errors can be excluded by introduc-
ing of dependent interviewing when we investigate the occupational and industrial
mobility. For the people who experience job change, the occupational and indus-
trial mobility are not affected by the implementation of dependent interviewing.
This proves that the measurement used in Chapter 2 is robust and solid.
The procyclicality of occupational mobility is confirmed by aggregate unemploy-
ment for job changers, while the procyclicality of industrial mobility is confirmed by
the performance of regional unemployment against aggregate unemployment. The
procyclicality of occupational mobility is essentially consistent with the findings
using LFS. The cyclicality of industrial mobility relies more on the performance of
regional unemployment than aggregate unemployment. Although the aim of this
chapter is to investigate the effect of dependent interviewing on the occupational
and industrial measurement, I still find strong support for the procyclicality of
career adjustment. The procyclicality of career mobility is, thus, supported via
estimations using the LFS, BHPS and UKHLS. This also helps us address our
arguments in a sounder manner.
In this study, I examine the robustness of the occupational and industrial mo-
bility measurement in the UK by applying dependent interviewing. This study
evidences that procyclicality of career mobility is solid in the UK. Some surveys
use dependent interviewing as the questioning method in the US and Canada:
the US Current Population Survey (CPS), the US Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) and the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
(SLID). It is also valuable to analyze the occupational and industrial mobility with
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the surveys mentioned above. This will help us to understand the strength of the
measurement and the situation of career change in the US and Canada. Then we
can obtain a wider and more completed view about occupational and industrial
mobility across different counties.
In this study, I combine the transition through unemployment and inactive
together in estimation because the sample size is not sufficient to investigate these
two transition separately. A good way to increase the sample size is to include
every transition within a year. However, this will require higher quality of data.
It’s not easy for participants to remember the details of employment history took
place within a year. Then, the reliability of data collection will be challenged. This
situation also indicates the advantages of using Quarterly LFS to analyze career
mobility. Each move of employment can be recorded easily when respondent’s
memory is still fresh. In addition, the sample size is sufficient to be decomposed
further for more specified analysis.
There are still quite a few topics worth investigating in the future. For exam-
ple, how wage changes depend on career changes is an important topic in labour
economics. I provide evidence that dependent interviewing does not affect the mea-
surement of occupational and industrial mobility when samples via EE transition
and non-employment transition are adopted, and it is also interesting to investigate
if dependent interviewing directly or indirectly affects the wage gains via occupa-
tional or industrial change. Furthermore, researchers also are interested in repeat
mobility. For example, what is a worker’s occupational and industrial choice if he
was an occupational mover in the previous wave and is currently seeking for a new
job? Does an occupational mover have a higher probability of always being an
occupational mover? I leave these topics for future research.
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Table 3.6: Timing of collection
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
BHPS Wave 18
UKHLS Wave 1 Main
BHPS Wave 19
UKHLS Wave 2 Main
BHPS Wave 20
UKHLS Wave 3 Main
BHPS Wave 21
UKHLS Wave 4 Main
BHPS Wave 22
UKHLS Wave 2 Main
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Table 3.7: The classification of SIC 1980, 1992, and 2007 (section tier)
SIC1980 SIC1992 SIC2007
1 Agriculture, forestry & fishing Agriculture, Hunting and
Forestry
Agriculture, forestry and fish-
ing
2 Energy & water supplies Fishing Mining and quarrying
3 Extraction of minerals & ores
other than fuels; manufacture
of metals, mineral products &
chemicals
Mining and Quarrying Manufacturing
4 Metal goods, engineering &
vehicles industries
Manufacturing Electricity, gas, air cond sup-
ply
5 Other manufacturing indus-
tries
Electricity, Gas and Water
Supply
Water supply, sewerage, waste
6 Construction Construction Construction
7 Distribution, hotels & cater-
ing (repairs)
Wholesale and Retail Trade:
Repair of Motor Vehicles, Mo-
torcycles and Personal House-
hold Goods
Wholesale, retail, repair of ve-
hicles
8 Transport & communication Hotels and Restaurants Transport and storage
9 Banking, finance, insurance,
business services & leasing
Transport, Storage and Com-
munication
Accommodation and food ser-
vices
10 Other services Financial Intermediation Information and communica-
tion
11 Real Estate, Renting and
Business Activities
Financial and insurance activ-
ities
12 Public Administration and
Defence: Compulsory Social
Security
Real estate activities
13 Education Prof, scientific, technical ac-
tivities
14 Health and Social Work Admin and support services
15 Other Community, Social and
Personal Service Activities
Public admin and defence
16 Private Households with Em-
ployed Persons
Education
17 Extra-Territorial Organisa-
tions and Bodies
Health and social work
18 Arts, entertainment and
recreation
19 Other service activities
20 Households as employers
21 Extraterritorial organisation
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Table 3.8: The description of variables
Variable Description
agg rate: The aggregate unemployment rate.
reg agg rate: The regional unemployment rate minus the aggregate unemployment rate.
Age: the participant’s age
Age sq: the square of the participant’s age
Mar cohab: Dummy; equals 1 if a respondent is classified as married or cohabitated, else
0
num child: the number of children
Break: Dummy, equals 1 if the dependent interviewing is applied.
female: Dummy; equals 1 if a participant is female, else 0.
H edu: Dummy; equals 1 if a worker has a higher education/qualification.
M edu: Dummy; equals 1 if a worker has a middle education/qualification.
ft job: Dummy; equals 1 if an employed worker’s last job is a full time job. Otherwise
the value of this variable is zero if an employed worker’s last job is part-time
job. ft job equals 1 if a non-employed worker’s current job is a full time job.
Otherwise the value of this variable is zero if a non-employed worker’s current
job is part-time job.
Temporary: Dummy; equals 1 if an employed worker’s last job is a temporary job. Oth-
erwise the value of this variable is zero if an employed worker’s last job is a
permanent job. Temporary equals 1 if a non-employed worker’s current job is
a temporary job. Otherwise the value of this variable is zero if a non-employed
worker’s current job is a permanent job.
E2E: Dummy; equals 1 if the workers change their job via employer-to-employer
transition, else 0
Non emp: Dummy; equals 1 if the worker’s previous employment status is unemployment
or inactive, else 0
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Chapter 4
Sectoral Mobility and
Unemployment with
Heterogeneous Disutility of Work
4.1 Introduction
The Great Recession has attracted economists’ attention to intersectoral mobil-
ity frictions in explaining aggregate unemployment. Some have argued that the
increase of reallocation has contributed to the high and persistent level of unem-
ployment. When workers need to reallocate to other sectors, they have to spend
some time becoming familiar with another labour market. This process is time-
consuming and unemployment might rise as workers accomplish this slow transi-
tion. This hypothesis forms the basis for theories of the natural unemployment
and an explanation for its fluctuations in Lilien (1982) .
This paper constructs a two-sector equilibrium business cycle model, in which
different types of unemployment arise in different labour markets. I use this
model to analyse how unemployed workers’ reallocation decisions change with
individual and aggregate conditions. This model considers a two-sector econ-
omy by introducing aggregate productivity shocks, sectoral productivity shock
and preference shock. This paper distinguishes between ‘search’, ‘reallocation’and
‘rest’unemployment in the labour markets with search frictions, and also studies
how workers’ preferences within a sector affect their reallocation decisions when
unemployed.
This paper shows that rest unemployment is the important driver of aggregate
unemployment fluctuations. For example, in a recession, a large proportion of
workers with a high disutility of work in their sector become rest unemployed, and
face no immediate job prospects. Meanwhile, the existing pool of rest unemployed
workers find the current labour sub-market less profitable and would like to reallo-
cate. This increases the size of aggregate unemployment and decreases the overall
job finding rate.
A key aspect of the model in this paper is the role of workers’ disutility in
the labour market. Workers will decide to discontinue the job if their disutility
is higher than a separation cutoff. Reallocation decisions are also summarised by
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a reallocation cutoff. The cyclical property of the model is determined by the
relative position of the separation and reallocation cutoffs, and these cutoffs vary
with aggregate productivity. Only when the separation cutoff is below the realloca-
tion cutoff, do search, rest and reallocation unemployment coexist within a sector.
Workers whose disutility are above the reallocation cutoff move to another sector
in order to search for better opportunities. The variation of cutoffs with aggregate
productivity then determines the response of the three types of unemployment.
A two-sector search model of labour reallocation which features gross flows and
net flows is developed in this paper. In both sector, firms and workers are matched
according to the same matching technology. Matches are endogenously separated
by a preference shock. The reallocation choice is determined by sectoral job finding
rates and wages, but also by an individual disutility component. If a worker decides
to move to another sector, he spends additional time in unemployment before he
becomes available to the new sector’s labour market. This model distinguishes
between unemployment due to movers and unemployment due to stayers, and helps
us understand if the unemployment is caused by reallocation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the
motivating evidence on sectoral mobility. I provide the discussion of sectoral pref-
erence in Section 4.3 and the related literature in Section 4.4. The proposed model
is discussed and the theory’s implications are developed in section 4.5. A numerical
example is calibrated and provided in section 4.6. Section 4.7 is the conclusion.
Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
4.2 Sectoral mobility through unemployment
A Beveridge curve describes the relationship between the ratio of job vacancy and
unemployed worker in a U-V graph. 1 A Beveridge curve tells us that there is
1Since the U and V axises are using the number of vacancy and unemployed workers divided
by the labour force, a higher value indicates the level of mismatch on the market. For example,
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Figure 4.1: Beveridge Curve in the UK
higher vacancy and lower unemployment during a boom period, and lower vacancy
and higher unemployment during recession. The mismatch will push the Beveridge
curve outward, and an improvement in the matching process will return the curve
to its original position.
The Beveridge curve introduces the importance of mismatch and implies that
the search friction is one of the reasons causing the mismatch. This paper applies
the LFS quarterly dataset from 1994-2012 to draw the Beveridge curve and the
situation of mismatch in the UK is found in Figure 4.1.
Another important reason for mismatch is that workers’ skills are not identi-
cal. For example, different industries needs different skills. Lilien (1982) explains
that different sectors need different types of workers, and this inter-sector match-
if the V is equal to one and no unemployed worker find a job, it means that the number of
vacancies is equal to the number of the laobur force, and it is also called a perfect mismatch. It
says that firms provide many vacancies, but no unemployed workers can get a match or find any
job. This case is also an extreme case which illustrates the concept of seriousness of mismatch
in the market. On the other hand, if the U ratio is equal to 1, then all workers are unemployed
workers and no vacancy is posted, which implies another extreme case of mismatch. Even if the
number of vacancy and unemployed workers are the same and high value, let’s say 0.8, this also
implies there is an incredible high mismatch on the market. We may think about this issue in the
opposite way, what if the ratio of vacancy (V) and unemployed workers (U) are very low, let’s say
0.0001, then this suggests the market is highly efficient and there is a lack of mismatch because
most of the vacancies and unemployed are matched. This efficient match leads to few vacancies
and unemployed workers left in the market.
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ing causes the fluctuation of unemployment. His paper attracts the attention of
economists to understand and discuss the reallocation among the sectors.
Inter-sectoral matching is different from the intra-sectoral matching, as sectoral
shift may push the Beveridge curve outward. 2 Lilien (1982) explains that an in-
crease in the dispersion of sectoral shocks leads to net labor reallocation, then this
process increases unemployment due to frictional inter-sectoral mobility. The sec-
toral shock releases workers from employment to unemployment, and some workers
move to another sector. Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013) assume that inter-
sectoral movers stay in unemployment longer than stayers; the process of inter-
sectoral movement takes time to be reallocated, thus generating unemployment.
This statement claims that inter-sectoral movers result in higher unemployment.
The correlation between the amount of movers (or the proportion of movers who
found jobs through unemployment ) and unemployment is thus expected to be
positive.
Net mobility The sectoral shifts can be measured by net mobility. Lilien
(1982) constructs a proxy to measure sectoral shifts, which is defined as the fol-
lowing formula : Lilienσ = [
N∑
i=1
xit
Xt
(4logxit −4logXt)2] 12 where N is the number
of industries, xit is employment in sector i and Xt is aggregate employment. This
index is also regarded as the proxy for the net flow among sectors. Kambourov
and Manovskii (2008) define the net mobility as one-half of the sum of the absolute
changes in occupational employment shares. I apply the same formula for mea-
suring the net industrial mobility, thus the definition of net mobility is as follows:
KMσ =
1
2
∑
i=1 |si,t − si,t−1| where si,t is the fraction of employment in industry i
in quarter t. The net mobility is captured by Lilienσ and KMσ as portrayed in
Figure 4.2 .
Figure 4.2 indicates that net mobility is significantly high during the recession
2The sectoral shifts indicates that the inter-sectoral matching is more important. Given
that inter-sectoral matching is less efficient than intra-sectoral matching, the aggregate matching
efficiency decreases and pushes the Beveridge curve outwards.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.2: The series of Net mobility defined by Lilien (1982) and Kambourov
and Manovskii (2008)
with the data of the LFS UK. This impression encourages us to adopt an economet-
ric regression examining the cyclicality of net mobility. Generally, there are three
variables to measure business cycle: GDP, output per worker (Opw) and unem-
ployment rate (Urate). This paper regresses the log of net mobility defined above
on the log of measurement of business cycle, time trend and quarter dummies.
The robust result is obtained and shows that net mobility is counter-cyclical (see
Table 4.1 ). An important finding is that higher net mobility comes with higher
unemployment. That is to say, net mobility is counter-cyclical.
Interestingly, one of the major findings of my second and third chapters shows
that gross mobility is pro-cyclical. An interesting phenomenon is found, but rarely
discussed: net mobility is counter-cyclical and gross mobility is pro-cyclical. This
contrast between the cyclicality of net and gross mobility motivates us to investigate
this situation. Additionally, this interesting result is also found in the USA. 3 The
consistency of the findings in the UK and USA greatly increase the research value
and make a contribution to the literature.
3See Lilien (1982), Murphy and Topel (1987), Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) and Carrillo-
Tudela and Visschers (2013).
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Table 4.1: The cyclicality of industrial net mobility
Lilen KM Lilen KM Lilen KM
log GDP -1.432∗ -1.588∗∗
(-1.94) (-2.06)
log Opw -2.288∗∗ -2.530∗∗
(-2.13) (-2.25)
log Urate 0.259∗ 0.258∗
(1.91) (1.81)
Time trend 0.0110∗∗ 0.0114∗∗ 0.0115∗∗ 0.0119∗∗ 0.00274∗ 0.00221
(2.38) (2.36) (2.57) (2.54) (1.97) (1.51)
constant 12.26 13.14 4.420 4.414 -3.730∗∗∗ -4.667∗∗∗
(1.43) (1.46) (1.07) (1.02) (-8.81) (-10.46)
Quarter dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 73 73 73 73 73 73
R2 0.160 0.122 0.168 0.132 0.158 0.110
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Net mobility rate
From now on, I use ‘sector’instead of ‘industry ’in order to maintain the consistency
of the expression in the theoretical model and empirical data. Net mobility can
help us understand how much reallocation is contributed by the sectoral shifts. If
gross flow is equal to net flow, then we can conclude that all the reallocation is due
to sectoral shift. On the other hand, if net mobility can explain little about gross
mobility, for example, inflow to a sector is equal to the outflow from this sector,
then we can conclude that the sectoral shift explains nothing regarding the decision
of workers’ reallocation. 4 I construct a net mobility rate as follows:
nmt =
K∑
i=1
[ |Ii,t −Oi,t|
[Ii,t + Oi,t]
]
wi,t
where K is the number of sectors and Ii,t is the number of inflow to sector i. Oi,t
is the number of outflow from sector i. I weight a sector by wi,t, which is the
employment share of the respective industry or occupation at time t. I find that
net mobility only accounts for 13 percent of gross mobility across sectors. Net
mobility contributes a small part of gross mobility.
The net mobility is driven by the sectoral shifts, but the worker’s mobility
decision is not mainly driven by the sectoral shocks. In fact, the worker’s mobility
is mainly driven by the idiosyncratic factors, which also suggests that gross mobility
is more important. 5
Lilien (1982) tells us that the sectoral shifts happened in the recession, and
4When inflow to a sector is equal to the outflow from this sector, the net flow is zero. Gross
flow is calculated as the number of inflow plus the number of outflow, and captures the behavior
of worker’s reallocation. Net flow of each industry is the measurement of sectoral shift. Therefore,
sectoral shift cannot sufficiently explain the gross flow.
5Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990) and Auray, Lkhagvasuren and Terracol (2014) show that work-
ers’ mobility decisions across industries are not primarily driven by industry-wide shocks. The
importance here is defined as the explanatory ability. Sectoral shock causing net mobility only
explains 13% of gross mobility. So the sectoral shock is not the main factor to motivate workers
changing sector. Given that the net mobility cannot sufficiently explain the work’s flow, we need
to pay more attention to the components of gross mobility. Therefore, gross mobility has a higher
explanatory ability of worker’s flow than net mobility.
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we should expect more inter-sector reallocation in the recession. But when we
examine the data of whole reallocation, which is defined as gross mobility in my
study, the inter-sector reallocation is pro-cyclical, not counter-cyclical as we may
suppose. This introduces the motivation of this chapter. Meanwhile, I also find
the net mobility (flow) can only explain a small part of whole reallocation (gross
mobility). This fact inspires me to think that the worker’s reallocation may not
only be caused by the sectoral shift, but also the other factors, for example, the
idiosyncratic shock, the preference or human capital.
Since net mobility only accounts for a small part of gross mobility, I have been
aware that there is something else that affects workers’ reallocation decisions. If
the unemployment is mainly caused by the time-consuming process of reallocation,
the net mobility should not only explain a small part of gross mobility. There
must be something else to explain the rest part of unemployment. That is why the
preference is introduced to explain the gross mobility.
4.3 Sectoral Preference
Net mobility which is cause by the sectoral shock can only explain 13 % of gross
mobility. The gross worker flows are in excess of net worker flows. Additionally,
workers are moving in and out of sectors, and ‘churning ’around sectors. These
findings tell us that the sectoral shock is not the dominate force to push workers
moving, and there is another reason that makes workers move. Therefore, I find
some information which helps us tackle this issue with the LFS. Employed workers
provide the reason why they look for another job. There are several options here
for this multiple question: 1. Present job may come to an end, 2. Present job
is to fill in time before finding another job, 3. Pay unsatisfactory in present job,
4. Journey to work unsatisfactory in present job, 5. Respondent wants to work
longer hours than in present job, 6. Respondent wants to work shorter hours than in
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present job, 7. Other aspects of present job unsatisfactory, 8. Respondent wants to
change occupation/sector, 9. Other reasons. I find that around 18% of employed
workers who are looking for a job prefer to change their occupation or sector.
27% of employed job seekers are ending their present job or filling in time before
finding a better job. 45% of employed job seekers were looking for a job because of
unsatisfaction with the present job, and the main unsatisfactory factor is the pay
in the present job, which is 14%. From these statistics, I find that the number of
job seekers due to the preference of occupation/sector is larger than the number
of job seekers due to the unsatisfactory pay. This surprising finding, especially in
the UK labour market, motivates this paper to introduce the preference shock into
the model. Moreover, Pilossoph (2012) uses ‘taste shock ’which is sector-specific
to discuss the intersectional reallocation. She interpreted taste shock as anything
that might keep workers in a sector that is not related to the wage or ease of finding
a job. Essentially, Pilossoph (2012) introduced the concept of ‘sectoral preference
’into her model. This paper also adopts sectoral preference to analyse the sectoral
reallocation, especially to explain the cyclical feature of net mobility which was not
fully discussed in Pilossoph (2012).
4.4 Literature
The model in this chapter is based on three key pieces of literature: Lucas and
Prescott (1974), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Carrillo-Tudela and Vissch-
ers (2013). Lucas and Prescott (1974) propose a framework where workers seek
jobs among different ‘islands ’. Each island could be represented as an industry,
an occupation, or a city. When shocks are realized on each island, workers within
each island have to decide whether to stay or move to another island. If they
decide to leave, then they mush spend some time on the move. Workers transfer
from a declining sector to an expanding sector and search for job opportunities.
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This transition period is regarded as the cause of unemployment. Since the is-
land model successfully captures the feature of the workers’ transition behavior,
there has been a huge body of literature relating to this model over the past two
decades. Rogerson (2005), as a simple extension of Lucas and Prescott (1974), uses
a two-sector model to investigate sectoral mobility. He assumes that workers leave
a declining sector and simply become non-employed, which is different from Lucas
and Prescott (1974).
The model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), an MP model, is a classic search
and matching model. An MP model simulates the occurrence of the matching
process between individual job vacancies and unemployed workers. In order to
consider the endogenous separation, an idiosyncratic component is introduced to
investigate the labour market after the shock arrival. If a serious negative shock
comes to the market, firms would destroy some job opportunities since those jobs
are non-profitable. Contrarily, a positive shock increases the possibility for firms
to open more vacancy opportunities. By setting up a reservation productivity, an
MP model can endogenize separation, thus contribute to the theory of unemploy-
ment. An MP model also considers the bilateral bargain to examine the effect of
bargaining power in the labour market.
Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013) do not only consider the idiosyncratic
shock to worker’s occupation (referred to as worker-occupation specific productiv-
ity), but also the aggregate productivity shocks to the economy. They extend the
model of Lucas and Prescott (1974) and include search and matching frictions as
in Pissarides (2000). Comparing the random search method in the MP model,
Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013) apply a tractable direct-search model, where
the equilibrium has a block recursive structure and the equilibrium of mobility
decision only depends on the aggregate states. In their model, they assume that
unemployed workers who leave their original occupation are randomly assigned
to a new island, and this means that the decision to leave only depends on the
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expectation value of new draw from a different occupation.
I model the sectoral mobility based on these models mentioned above. This
combination is helpful to understand the feature of inter-sectoral labour mobility
frictions in unemployment. 6 In particular, this paper can be considered as an
expansion of Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013), but I focus on the cyclicality of
sectoral mobility instead of only focusing on a single sector.
Moen (1997) provides a framework of directed search (also called competitive
search). He assumes that all firms publicly provide the full information of their
job offers. Higher productivity firms offer a higher wage and attract more workers.
After firms have posted wage offers in the sub-market, unemployed workers can
choose a specific sub-market to visit. Therefore, this setting can lead the unem-
ployed worker’s search towards the most suitable job or preferred job.
There are several pieces of literature that examine how workers’ specific occu-
pational/sectoral knowledge affects the reallocation decisions over a business cycle.
Pilossoph (2012) develops a multi-sector search model of intersectoral labour
reallocation and capture the features of both gross and net mobility. She models
the worker’s sectoral switching decision by taking advantage of the Type I Extreme
Value Distributions. In her model, the idiosyncratic shocks are considered as ‘taste
shocks ’. Since she assumes that the taste shocks follow Type I Extreme Value
Distributions, she can integrate out the future taste shocks. Consequently, all
value functions are independent of workers’ future taste shocks, thus obtaining a
simplified model.
Dvorkin (2013) uses a dynamic discrete choice model with random utility to
investigate the reallocation decisions during the business cycle. 7 He proposes a
multi-sectoral business cycle model of labour reallocation and unemployment to
investigate whether sectoral shocks are caused by business cycles. An island model
6This paper is a combination by Lucas and Prescott (1974), Pissarides (2000) and Carrillo-
Tudela and Visschers (2013).
7Dvorkin (2013) also assume idiosyncratic shock is distributed as the Type I Extreme Value
Distributions.
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with aggregation and sectoral shocks is adopted in his analysis. He found that
an aggregate shock explains a substantial part of cyclical movement in GDP and
unemployment.
Chang (2011) adopts a similar strategy which is to differentiate the effects of
aggregate shock and sectoral shock on the economy, but she introduces intra-firm
wage bargaining, instead of bilateral bargaining, into the Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides model. Chang (2011) also finds that a structural change has limited
impact on the aggregate unemployment.
4.5 Model
4.5.1 Framework and assumptions
The model is specified in discrete time, and time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . There are two
sectors and these are indexed by j = {0, 1}. The sectoral productivity is denoted as
zj and zj ∈ [z, z]. In this model, there is a continuum of infinitely lived risk-neutral
workers within each sector. At any time t workers within a sector j are different in
terms of worker’s preference on the sector. This preference regarded as disutility
is denoted by x in Trigari (2009), Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011) and Cole
and Rogerson (1999). Higher disutility decreases the worker’s expected value of
employment and unemployment.
According to the setting of the model, workers are randomly given their sectoral
disutility x, and preference is sector-specified. Once the disutility is given, workers
retain it until he/her enter the process of reallocation. That is to say, workers retain
their disutility, no matter if they are employed or unemployed before reallocation.
The disutility x is consistent through the whole period of employment, where x ∈
[x, x] . The preference shock, x follows an iid distribution F (x) with the possibility
(1 − γ). Worker’s preference x evolves over time following a common first-order
stationary Markov process, where F (xt+1|xt) denotes its transition law with xt
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and xt+1 ∈ [x, x] , x > 0 and x < ∞. Every unemployed worker receives the
benefit b each period. All agents discount the future using the same discount
factor β. All firms use only labour as the input and operate under a constant
return to scale technology. All firms are identical within a sector, but the workers
are heterogeneous with individual disutility.
The production function consists of two components, the aggregate productiv-
ity pt and the sectoral-specific productivity, zj. I assume pt follows a first-order
stationary Markov process with pt ∈ [p, p] , p > 0 and p < ∞ in this chapter, the
same as Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013). I also assume zt follows a first-order
stationary Markov process with zt ∈ [z, z] , z > 0 and z < ∞. The production
function is given by y(pt, zjt) = pt zjt. Furthermore, the production function is a
continuous differentiable and strictly increasing in p and z.
Posting and matching
Following Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013), I assume that workers with differ-
ent pairs(zj, x) do not congest each other in the matching process. Each pair of
(zj, x) indicates a sub-market. In each submarket, firms post contracts to which
they are committed. Unemployed workers and advertising firms then match with
frictions as in Moen (1997). This framework is called a directed search model.
A matching function, which is a constant return to scale, manages the matches
between unemployed workers and vacancies within each sector. Each sub-market
has the same matching technology. All firms can freely enter the market and post
a vacancy with cost k each period.
Given the above, I assume that all labour markets have the same matching
function, m(v, u) with the particular form: m(v, u) = vηu1−η , where (1−η) ∈ (0, 1)
is the elasticity of the matching function. u is the number of workers searching
within a submarket and v the number of firms who have posted a contract in the
submarket. Let θ = v
u
denote the labour submarket tightness, the probability that
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vacancies within a submarket turn into jobs is given by q(θ) = m(v,u)
v
= θη−1, and
the probability that job seekers find jobs within a submarket is given by λ(θ) =
m(v,u)
u
.
Reallocation
After the shock is realized, a worker may discontinue his relationship with the firm,
and he becomes unemployed. The unemployed worker can stay unemployed and
search for a job in his current sector. Instead of searching for jobs in the current
sector, unemployed workers also can decide to pay a cost c and start to search for
a job in another sector. This behavior is called the reallocation process. 8 Only
unemployed workers can be reallocated into different sectors in this model. Workers
must spend time and resources to discover the condition of another sector. When
an unemployed worker decides to reallocate, his preference in the new sector is
drawn from distribution F (x). According to Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013),
F (x) is assumed ex-ante and the same for all sectors. After a worker receives his
new preference, he has to stay in one period of unemployment before deciding to
reallocate once again or to start searching for a job in the new sector. A worker
can not recall his disutility x once he has left his sector.
The timing of events is described as follows. At the beginning of a period, the
new values of p, z and x are realized. The period can be separated into four stages:
separation, reallocation, search and matching and production. Given the above
narratives, Figure 4.3 summarises the timing of the events within a period for a
given sector.
8Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013)
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t shocks arrived
separation
reallocation
search and matching
production t+ 1
Figure 4.3: Timing of events
4.5.2 Agents’ decisions
Worker’s problem
Consider an employed worker currently characterized by the sector-specific pro-
ductivity z with the disutility φex generated from working, and φe is the scale
of disutility while workers are employed, and is a positive parameter. x refers to
disutility as mentioned in section 4.5.1. A worker in a job with sector-specified
productivity zj enjoys the expected value of employment, W
E(p, zj, x), given the
worker’s wage w, is described by :
WE(p, zj, x) = w(p, zj, x)− φex+ (4.1)
β Ep′,z′j ,x′
[
max
ρ
E
{(1− ρ
E
(p′, z′j, x
′))WU(p, z′j, x
′) + ρ
E
(p′, z′j, x
′)WE(p′, z′j, x
′)}
]
where ρ
E
is the job separation decision parameter, it takes the value of δ when
WE(p, z′j, x
′) ≥ WU(p, z′j, x′) and the value of zero otherwise. 9 When a preference
shock arrives, the worker’s disutility moves from its initial value x to a new value
x′. Eq(4.1) shows that if the new disutility is in the range x ≤ x′ ≤ xs, (xs is the
job separation level of the disutility) ,the worker remains employed. If x′ is higher
than the separation level of the disutility xs, he discontinues his job and becomes
unemployed with an expected return WU .
Now consider an unemployed worker currently characterized by a sector-specified
productivity zj with the disutility φux. φu is the scale of disutility while workers
are unemployed, and 0 < φu, 0 < φe . The value function of this worker is given
9Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013), δ ∈ (0, 1)
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by:
WU(p, zj, x) = b− φux+ (4.2)
β Ep′,z′j ,x′
[
max
ρ
U
{(1− ρ
U
(p′, z′j, x
′))WˆU(p′, z′j, x˜), ρU (p
′, z′j, x
′)R(p′, z′1−j)} dF (x˜)
]
WˆU(p, zj, x) = λ(θ(p, zj, x))W
E(p, zj, x) + (1− λ(θ(p, zj, x)))WU(p, zj, x)
R(p) = −c+
∫ x
x
WˆU(p, z1−j, x˜) dF (x˜)
Unemployed workers can decide to start a reallocation process towards another
sector by paying a cost c. ρU is the reallocation decision variable. If workers decide
to reallocate, then ρU is one, otherwise zero. If unemployed workers’ expected
value is higher than the value of reallocation, they will stay with the current sector.
Otherwise, they will exit the current sector and jump into another sector. Once
workers decide to be reallocated, they will stay in the current sector until the end
of the period.
In Eq(4.2), the value of unemployment consists with the flow utility of unem-
ployment b − φux, plus the discounted expected value of the next period which
is the reallocation stage. The term −c + ∫ x
x
WˆU(p, z1−j, x) dF (x) denotes the ex-
pected net utility of reallocation that samples a new preference x in a different
sector 1 − j. The unemployed worker has the value of λ(θ(p, zj, x))WE(p, zj, x) +
(1−λ(θ(p, zj, x)))WU(p, zj, x) as his expected gain if he stays in his current sector.
4.5.3 Firm’s problem
Consider a firm in sector j, currently employing a worker within sectoral produc-
tivity zj. The firm’s expected lifetime discount profit can therefore be expressed
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as the following:
J(p, zj, x) = [y(p, zj)− w(p, zj, x)] (4.3)
+βEp′,z′j ,x′
[
max
ρ
J
{[(1− ρ
J
(p′, z′j, x
′))J(p′, z′j, x
′) + ρ
J
(p′, z′j, x
′)V (p′, z′j, x
′)]}
]
where ρ
J
takes the value of zero when J(p′, z′j, x
′) ≥ V (p′, z′j, x′), otherwise
one. When the worker’s preference shock arrives, the firm continue to produce
if J(p, zj, x) ≥ V (p, zj, x), or destroy the job with a zero return otherwise. Now
consider a firm posting a vacancy in labor market sector j at the start of the search
and matching stage. The expected value of a vacancy is described by:
V (p, zj, x) = −k + q(θ(p, zj, x))J(p, zj, x) + (1− q(θ(p, zj, x)))V (p, zj, x)
(4.4)
4.5.4 Wages determination
I apply the assumption that wages are determined by Nash Bargaining according
to Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013). The wage which is derived from the Nash
bargaining solution is to maximise the weighted product of the worker’s and the
firm’s net return from the job match. Nash Bargaining implies that the wage,
w(p, zj, x), results in
(1− α)[WE(p, zj, x)−WU(p, zj, x)] = αJ(p, zj, x) (4.5)
where α ∈ [0, 1] denotes the worker’s exogenous bargaining power. In what
follows, the Hosios condition applies here, such that 1−α = η, where η denotes to
the elasticity of the job finding probability with respect to labour market tightness.
This guarantees that firms post efficient number of vacancies in labour markets.
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4.5.5 Worker flows
The evolution of the number of workers is a result of optimal vacancy posting,
separation and reallocation decisions. I define xrj ≡ xr(zj) and j = {0, 1} as
abbreviate notation. The number of unemployed workers in the market (zj, x) at
the beginning of next next period is given by
ut+1(zj, x)dx =
∫ x
x
(1− λ(θ(p, zj, x˜)))(1− ρU (p, zj, x˜))uj(x˜) dF (x|x˜)dx˜
+
∫ x
x
ρ
E
ej(x˜) dF (x|x˜)dx˜+
∫ x
x
ρ
U
(z1−j, x˜)u1−j(x˜) dx˜ dF (x) (4.6)
where ej is the number of employment in sector j. The first term on the
right hand side of Eq 4.6 is the number of unemployed workers who do not reallocate
to a different sector and do not find a job. The second term represents the number
of employed workers who separate from the unemployment. The third term is the
unemployment from outside of sector j when reallocating.
The number of employed workers characterized by (z, x) at the beginning of the
next period is given by
et+1(zj, x) =
∫ x
x
λ(θ(p, zj, x˜)(1− ρU (p, zj, x˜))uj(x˜) dF (x|x˜)dx˜ (4.7)
+
∫ x
x
(1− ρ
E
)ej(p, x˜) dF (x|x˜)dx˜
The first term on the right hand side of Eq 4.7 is the number of unemployed workers
who find a job. The second term is the number of employed workers who are still
employed.
4.5.6 Equilibrium
I focus on the equilibrium in which the value functions, and decisions of workers
and firms in both sectors only depend on {pt, zjt} and the worker’s employment
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status.
Definition: A Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) is structured by a set of value
functions WU(p, z, x), WE(p, z, x) J(p, z, x), ρ
U
, ρ
E
, ρ
J
(resp. workers’ realloca-
tion, separation decisions and firms’ layoff decision), submarket tightness θ(p, z, x),
wages w(p, z, x), laws of motion of p, z and x for both sectors, and laws of motion
for the distribution of unemployed and employed workers in both sectors, such that
• The value functions and decision rules follow the firm’s and worker’s problems
described in Eq(4.1)-Eq(4.4).
• Labour market tightness θ(p, zj, x) is consistent with free entry on each labor
market. If the expected profits determining θ(p, z, x) on labour markets is
negative, then θ(p, z, x) = 0.
• Wages can be solved out according to Eq(4.1) - eq(4.5)
• The flow equations Eq(4.6)-Eq(4.7) are solvable given that the above three
terms have been fulfilled.
Existence and uniqueness
The operator T is a contraction that maps M(p, zj, x) and W
U(p, zj, x) as shown in
Appendix 4.9.1. Given this result and the contraction mapping theorem, a unique
fixed point (M(p, zj, x),W
U(p, zj, x)) exists. The existence of x
s
j can also be estab-
lished. 10 All equilibrium value functions and decision rules can then be derived
from this fixed point. We then see the following: WE(p, zj, x) = M(p, zj, x) −
J(p, zj, x) and J(p, zj, x) = (1 − η)(M(p, zj, x) −WU(p, zj, x)) = kq(θ(p,zj ,x)) . This
implies that WE(p, zj, x), J(p, zj, x) and θ(p, zj, x) can be found from the unique
pattern of M(p, z, x) and WU(p, zj, x). Given the equation of workers flow from
Eq(4.6) and Eq(4.7), the number of unemployed and employed at a steady state
10For the proof, please see Appendix 4.9.1.
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can also be constructed. By completing these steps we prove the existence and
uniqueness of an equilibrium.
4.6 Implications
The strategy of analyzing the cyclicality is similar to that in the literature. 11
Assume that the aggregate productivity is constant and permanently fixed, and also
use the comparative statics of this situation responding to a one-time unexpected
permanent change in aggregate productivity, sectoral productivity, reallocation cost
and unemployment benefit respectively. This is a standard method to capture the
intuition of the responses to a persistent shock process.
4.6.1 Search, rest unemployment and reallocation
This study distinguishes search unemployment, rest unemployment and realloca-
tion in labour markets. Additionally, I find that worker’s disutility affects their
reallocation decisions differently when they are unemployed, by considering an
economy with two sectors.
There is much literature discussing the search unemployment, rest unemploy-
ment or reallocation. It could be helpful to briefly introduce the concept of search
and rest unemployment in my model before I convey the main content. The pro-
cess of seeking a job is costly, and a successful job match takes time in the labour
market. This is called the search friction in the labour market. The unemployment
caused by the search friction is defined as search unemployment in this paper.
The relative position of the cutoff functions indicates the composition of employ-
ment status in a sector. Figure 4.4 depicts the features corresponding to different
cases. I will show that xr is decreasing and xs is increasing with p in a later sec-
tion of this study. If workers’ disutility x is lower than xs and xr, workers want
11Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013)
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Figure 4.4: The relative positions of the reallocation and separation cutoff
to remain in the sector, and have the opportunity to be employed. In this case,
search-friction unemployment occurs because the process of search and matching is
time costly. If worker’s disutility is in the range xs < x < xr, workers are counted
as rest unemployed. This implies that workers are willing to break existing job
matches, and the unemployed workers would like to stay in their current sector. If
worker’s disutility x is in the range of xr < x < xs, employed workers will stay in
their job and current sector, but unemployed workers will move to another sector.
If worker’s disutility x is higher than the separation xs and reallocation cutoff xr,
employed workers will stay in their job and unemployed workers will reallocate. 12
The separation cutoff function xs characterizes endogenous separations. How-
ever, the x refers to worker’s disutility in a sector, rather than to a match-specific
idiosyncratic productivity with a firm. This difference implies that when the worker
becomes unemployed, his disutility x is not lost and is not reset when re-entering
12If (δ + λ(θ)) ≤ 1, for all p, z in equilibrium, there exists a unique cutoff function xs(p, zj)
that depends on p and zj . such that ρE = ρJ = 1 if and only if xj < x
s
j , and ρE = ρJ = 0
otherwise. For the proof, please see in Appendix 4.9.2
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employment in the same sector. The worker’s disutility x continues to shape his
outcomes in unemployment as well.
Reallocation cutoff
A worker decides to reallocate when the expected value of staying unemployed in his
current sector falls below the expected value of reallocation. Assumption 1 guaran-
tees thatWU(p, zj, x) from eq(4.2) is decreasing in x, and max{λ(θ(p, zj, x))(WE(p, zj, x)−
WU(p, zj, x)), 0} is decreasing in x as well. Given that Rj(p, z1−j) is constant with
x, there exists a reallocation cutoff function zr(p) such that workers will reallocate
if and only if x > xr(p, zj) for every p and zj, where x
r
j(p, zj) satisfies
WU(p, zj, x
r)+ max {λ(θ(p, zj, xr))(WE(p, zj, xr)−WU(p, zj, xr)), 0} (4.8)
= −c+
∫ x
x
WU(p, z1−j, x) dF (x) ≡ Rj(p, z1−j)
4.6.2 Reservation cutoffs for separations and reallocation
cyclicality of reallocation
Now consider the impact of search frictions on the slope of xr. I now focus on a
more general case of xr > xs.
Lemma 4.6.1. Consider a stationary economy, where there is no sectoral and
preference shock. Given an unexpected, permanent increase in p, then
dxrj
dp
=
−1
1− (1− F (xrj))(1− F (xr1−j))
× (4.9)
βk
1− η
η
[
(1− F (xr1−j))
∫ xrj
x
dθ(p, zj, x)
dp
dF (x) + [
∫ xr1−j
x
dθ(p, z1−j, x)
dp
dF (x)]
]
where
dθ(p,zj ,x)
dp
and
dθ(p,z1−j ,x)
dp
is positive.
• For β is small enough to 0 or η is close to 1, the reallocation is independent
from aggregate productivity shock.
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• If the discount factor β is not small enough, then dxr
dp
< 0 indicates that the
reallocation is procyclical.
For the detail of proof, please see Appendix 4.9.4
Cyclicality of job separation
Lemma 4.6.2. Consider an economy where is no sectoral and preference shock. If
xs(p) < xr(p), then dx
s(p)
dp
= 1
φe−φuyp(p, zj) > 0. If x
s(p) > xr(p) it holds that
dxsj
dp
=
1
φe
[
yp(p, zj)−
βλ(θ(p, zj, x
r
j))
1− β + βλ(θ(p, zj, xrj))
(
yp(p, zj)− (φe − φu)
dxrj(p)
dp
)
+
dxrj(p)
dp
]
(4.10)
• Given xs(p) > xr(p) and dxrj (p)
dp
< 0, the sign of
dxsj(p)
dp
> 0 depends on dx
s
dp
For the detail of proof, please see Appendix 4.9.5
4.6.3 Sectoral shock and net mobility
Lemma 4.6.3. Consider a stationary economy, where is no aggregate and prefer-
ence shock. Given an unexpected, permanent increase in zj, then
dxrj
dzj
=
1−η
η
k
θ(p,zj ,x
r)
w(p,zj ,xr)−b−(φe−φu)xr
dy(p,zj)
dzj
1−η
η
k
(φe−φu)θ(p,zj ,xr)
w(p,zj ,xr)−b−(φe−φu)xrj + 1
,
dxsj
dzj
> 0 ,
dxr1−j
dzj
= −βk1− η
η
∫ xrj
x
θ(p, zj, x)
w(p, zj, x)− b− (φe − φu)x
dy(p, zj)
dzj
dF (x) < 0
• Given λ(θ(p, zj, xr)) = 0, the reallocation cutoff is independent from the sec-
toral shock in sector j.
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An increase in productivity zj followed by sectoral shock leads to more employed
workers in sector j, and zj does not affect the separation cutoff in sector 1− j. The
proportion of employment in sector j increases with a positive zj. This implies the
net mobility caused by the sectoral shock in terms of the definition of net mobility
outlined by Lilien (1982). On the other hand, an increase in sectoral productivity
in sector j zj decreases the reallocation cutoff in another sector, which implies
that more unemployed workers in sector 1 − j move to sector j. Meanwhile, less
unemployed workers move from sector j to sector 1− j because sector 1− j is less
attractive. This results in net inflow to sector j. For the proof, please see Appendix
4.9.6
4.7 Numerical example
To study aggregate outcomes of unemployment and reallocation, a numerical ex-
ample is provided to illustrate the properties of the model in the case of xr > xs. I
also present simulated numbers of rest unemployment, search unemployment and
reallocation. This is to illustrate the effects of aggregate and sectoral productivity.
The parameters of the model are chosen as follows: The discount factor is 0.99
which implies the quarterly interest rate is 0.01. I obtained and applied several pa-
rameters from Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013). The cost of posting a vacancy
was set as 14.319, and the reallocation cost was set as 3.58. The job destruction
rate is 0.0002, and the bargaining power was set as 0.048. The unemployment
benefit b was set as 0.39 which was obtained from Krause and Lubik (2006). The
scale of sectoral disutility for employees is 1.419, and for unemployed workers it is
0.111 which is obtained from Shimer (2013).
There are two ways in which a worker’s preference could be changed: one is the
arrival of preference shock, and the other is through the process of reallocation.
Assume that there is no aggregate and sectoral shock, then preference shock arrives
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Figure 4.5: The reallocation and separtation cut-off and decomposition of unem-
ployment rate with change of aggregate productivity
with a rate of γ. Given the separation and reallocation cut-off, the only force driving
reallocation between sectors would be the preference shock. Unemployed workers
will move across sectors once the preference shock arrives, and the proportion of
each sectoral employment over the whole employment does not change significantly.
I use the same parameters mentioned above assuming there is no preference
shock all the time in order to capture the trace of the model. This assumption
allows us to observe the simplest and crucial motivation of workers’ reallocation.
In an extreme case where a worker can redraw his preference every period, he is
not willing to be reallocated because he just needs to wait a few periods until he
can redraw a disutility that is low enough to stay in the same sector. On the other
hand, if a worker redraws his disutility only through the process of reallocation, we
can capture the sample whose reallocation is motivated by the condition of labour
market, not the preference shock. The simulated statistic (mean) is drawn from
10000 samples and each sample has 80 quarters span. For the initial condition,
5000 samples were randomly assigned the worker’s preference in both sector j and
1− j. The simulated numbers of employment, unemployment and reallocation are
presented in terms of different cases later.
131
The cyclical feature of reallocation cut-off and separation
cut-off
Figure 4.5 presents the solution of the model in this paper and the comparative
statics of changes in aggregate productivity. The equilibrium value of realloca-
tion cut-off xr for both sectors decreases with higher aggregate productivity. If a
worker’s disutility is higher than the reallocation cut-off, he will move to another
sector next period. This numerical result tells us that a higher aggregate productiv-
ity will decrease reallocation cut-off, therefore raising the number of reallocations.
This result is consistent with the proposition I discussed above. 13 For the sector
j where the sector productivity is lower, the value of reallocation cut-off decreases
from 0.5820 to 0.478, and the value of reallocation cut-off for sector 1 − j is from
0.586 to 0.482. A higher-productivity sector has a higher reallocation cut-off, and
then more workers are willing to stay in the sector.
For separation cut-off, both sectors increases with aggregate productivity, and
this implies that the unemployment rate is decreasing. Unemployed workers whose
disutility is below the separation cut-off xs are search unemployed. Those workers
whose disutility was between separation cut-off xs and reallocation cut-off xr are
rest unemployed, and those workers whose disutility was above reallocation cut-off
are reallocated unemployed. From the simulated results, rest unemployment rep-
resents the majority of aggregate unemployment, and it constitutes around 75.3
% of aggregate unemployment. Search and reallocation unemployment only ac-
counts for 15.7% and 8.9 %, respectively. In the numerical simulation, when the
aggregate productivity or sectoral productivity develops, the reallocation and sep-
aration cut-off change as well. This pushes workers to transit among search, rest
and reallocation unemployment.
Figure 4.5 also shows that the search unemployment rate based on the simulated
model is increasing. In the case of xs < xr, a higher aggregate productivity leads
13Please see Lemma 4.6.1
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Figure 4.6: Proportion of sectoral employment with different aggregate productiv-
ity
to a smaller rest unemployment because reallocation cut-off decreases and separa-
tion cut-off increases with aggregate productivity. The search unemployment even
exceeds the rest unemployment, and it may form the majority of unemployment
after a specific level of aggregate productivity is achieved. The reallocation un-
employment increases with aggregate productivity, and this is consistent with the
empirical findings of Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2016).
Figure 4.6 shows that the proportion of sector j is 0.49 which is smaller than half
because sectoral productivity in sector j is smaller than productivity in sector 1−j.
This also tells us that a higher sectoral-productivity sector has more capability to
employ more workers. Therefore, changes of sectroal productivity may affect the
employment of each sector, and hence drive net mobility among sectors. The
unemployment is not necessarily lower in the sector whose productivity is lower.
Changing reallocation cost c and unemployment benefit b
Changing reallocation cost or unemployment benefit will affect the relative gains
of waiting. The distance between expect value of unemployed WU(xsj) and expect
value of reallocation R increases with reallocation cost and unemployment benefit.
Figure 4.7 presents consistent results. Additionally, the distance between WU(xsj)
and R has an impact on the distance between reallocation cut-off xr and separation
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.7: The distance of WU(xsj)−R with regard to the change of reallocation
cost and unemployment benefit
cut-off xs. These will be discussed as follows.
If the reallocation cost is too high, a worker would prefer to wait until the
preference shock arrives. In Figure 4.8, I found that the difference between the
value of separation cut-off xs and the value of reallocation cut-off xr increases with
the higher reallocation cost. The intuition is that the higher reallocation cost will
increase the reallocation cut-off xr and less unemployed workers are urged to move
to another sector. The rest unemployment increases while the reallocation cost is
high. This situation also occurs in sector 1− j, so the rest unemployment in sector
1− j also increases but the reallocation unemployment is decreasing. In total, we
can observe that the reallocation unemployment is reduced.
Figure 4.9 shows that an increase of unemployment benefit will increase the
value of being unemployed and reduce the match surplus, and this leads to a lower
separation cut-off. The reallocation cut-off increases with higher unemployment
benefit. Figure 4.9 shows that the separation cut-off xs decreases with unemploy-
ment benefit, but the reallocation cut-off xr with unemployment benefit. From the
theoretical view, I find that the movement of separation cut-off is stronger than the
reallocation cut-off. On the other hand, the simulated example presents consistent
results: the difference between the separation and reallocation cut-off is greater
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.8: The reallocation and separtation cut-off and decomposition of unem-
ployment rate with change of reallocation cost
(a) (b)
Figure 4.9: The reallocation and separtation cut-off and decomposition of unem-
ployment rate with change of unemployment benefit
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.10: The reallocation and separtation cut-off and decomposition of unem-
ployment rate with change of sectoral productivity
with higher unemployment benefit, and reallocation unemployment increases as
well. The increasing distance between separation cut-off with reallocation cut-off
and the increasing rest unemployment occurs in sector 1 − j while the unemploy-
ment benefit increases.
Change of Sectoral Productivity
To emphasize the net mobility, the result of sectoral employment is demonstrated
in this subsection. Net mobility is driven by the shift of sectoral productivity. The
shift of secotral productivity attracts more workers from another sector. Meanwhile
workers are more willing to stay because the job offers from another sector are less
attractive. I start with a simulated model with changing sectoral productivity in
sector j from 1 to 1.02, and the sector productivity in sector 1− j is set as 1.001.
Figure 4.10 displays the separation cut-off xs and reallocation cut-off xr in sector j
and sector 1− j. The distance between separation cut-off and reallocation cut-off
in sector j is smaller due to the increase of separation cut-off as higher sectoral
productivity. This is one force to reduce the rest unemployment in sector j. How-
ever, higher sectoral productivity in sector j also decreases the reallocation cut-off
in sector 1− j. This force squeezes the rest unemployed in sector 1− j and drives
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them to move to sector j, which dominates the decrease of rest unemployment that
originally occurs in sector j. As a result, the unemployment in sector j increases.
This explains the reason why the higher productivity sector has a higher unem-
ployment rate, and the lower productivity sector has a lower unemployment rate.
Figure 4.11 illustrates that the higher productivity sector has a higher unemploy-
ment rate as sectoral productivity in sector j increases. The higher productivity
sector has a higher job finding rate in average, so more workers are willing to be
search unemployed in sector j. This result is consistent with the finding in Lkhag-
vasuren and Nitulescu (2013). For example, the labour productivity of the Mining
sector is higher than the labour productivity of the Construction sector in 2009,
and I also find the unemployment rate in the Mining sector is higher than the
Construction sector.
According to Figure 4.12, we can see that sectoral productivity increases the
proportion of sectoral employment in sector j over the whole employment. It shows
that a higher sectoral productivity is associated with a higher share of sectoral
employment. The absolute value of sectoral employment proportion growth in
each sector is used to measure the net reallocation/mobility in the literature. The
raising of sectoral productivity increases the proportion of sectoral employment in
sector j and reduces the proportion of sectoral employment in sector 1−j, thus the
measure of net reallocation increases. From this example, we have a clear picture
that the shift of sectoral productivity drives the net reallocation.
Furthermore, I observe that many unemployed workers are reallocated from
sector 1−j to sector j, but the aggregate unemployment rate increases with higher
sectoral productivity. In the literature, the process of reallocation is time consum-
ing, and promotes the unemployment rate. However, the improvement of sectoral
productivity simultaneously increases the capability of sectoral employment, which
allows more unemployed worker to be employed. In my simulated model, the im-
provement of sectoral productivity does not bring massive unemployment as a
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Figure 4.11: Sectoral unemployment rate
Figure 4.12: Proportion of sectoral em-
ployment
result.
It is valuable to compare the reallocation between the aggregate shock and
the sectoral shock. Aggregate shock affects the productivity in both sectors, but
sectoral shock only directly affects one sector. The raising of aggregate productiv-
ity lowers the reallocation cut-off for both sectors, and generates less reallocation
unemployment. The shift of sectoral productivity in sector j does not affect unem-
ployment workers’ movement to sector 1−j, but attracts more unemployed workers
moving from sector 1− j to sector j. This effect of sectoral shock generates more
unemployed workers’ reallocation than aggregate shock. Higher sectoral produc-
tivity attracts the reallocation unemployment from outside of the sector. Higher
sectoral productivity also increases the sectoral employment due to the capability,
thus the labour force of sector j increases as well.
If sectoral productivity in sector j is extraordinarily big compared to sectoral
productivity in sector 1− j, then we can observe that every unemployed worker in
sector 1− j would like to move to sector j and no workers from sector j are willing
move to sector 1− j.
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Cyclical features of gross and net mobility
I simulate my model with aggregate productivity shock and preference shock to
understand the gross and net mobility. The result in Table 4.2 suggests that the
calibrated model can explain the finding that gross mobility is procyclical and
net mobility is countercyclical in the LFS. Specifically, the correlation coefficient
between the reallocation rate and the unemployment rate is negative -0.594, and
the correlation coefficient between the net mobility, (no matter if measurements
are used from Lilen or KM), and the unemployment rate is positive (0.73 for Lilen
and 0.59 for KM). In order to confirm the robustness of the cyclical property of
gross and net mobility, I regress the gross and net mobility on the unemployment
rate and time trend. The effect of the unemployment rate is significantly negative
on the number of reallocation, and it is significantly positive on the net mobility.
This confirms that gross mobility is procyclical and net mobility is counter-cyclical.
Pilossoph (2012) uses a multisector equilibrium search model with taste shock
to simulate the labour reallocation in the housing boom, but the procyclicality of
gross mobility does not occur in the simulation. Pilossoph (2012) further shows that
aggregate gross reallocation over the entire period is basically unchanged, while
gross reallocation has been lower during the housing boom and slightly higher
in the burst. I use a direct-search model with preference shock to simulate the
behavior of workers’ reallocation. The simulated model produces the result that
the reallocation rate is procyclical and net mobility is countercyclical. Higher
aggregate productivity lowers the reallocation cut-off of disutility, and more workers
are willing to switch their sector. The net mobility uses the growth of sectoral
employment share over whole employment as a measure. I also find that the counter
cyclical nature of net mobility is due to the process of hiring and discharging.
When recession comes, the employed worker whose disutility is higher than the
separation cut-off is discharged immediately because his job is no longer profitable.
Although unemployed workers are still employed with the speed of job finding rate,
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Table 4.2: correlation and estimates with unemployment rate for Lilen and KM
correlation Urate t statistic
Lilen 0.733 0.0000194 8.58
KM 0.59 21.75 5.2
the amount of workers who were discharged dominates the amount of unemployed
workers who find jobs in the recession. Firms hire more unemployed workers in
the boom, and this causes the sectoral adjustment. On the other hand, it takes
time for the unemployed to get employed because unemployed workers need to
spend time seeking jobs. Even though the job finding rate is higher in the boom
period, unemployed workers still take time searching jobs before they are employed.
Therefore, the sectoral adjustment is slower in the boom. Net mobility essentially
is for measuring the sectoral adjustment. To summarise my discussions above, the
fact that employed workers could be discharged immediately in the recession leads
to sectoral adjustment. However, it takes time for unemployed workers to be hired,
no matter if this is in the recession or boom period, so the effect of hiring workers
on sectoral adjustment will not occur immediately. That is why net mobility is
counter-cyclical.
4.8 Conclusion
This study presents a tractable equilibrium framework to investigate how unem-
ployed workers’ reallocation and separation decisions affect the aggregate unem-
ployment rate over the business cycle. In particular, I reaffirm the important role
of rest unemployment as an explanation of the unemployment fluctuation.
Rest unemployment emphasizes the value of waiting for local labour market
conditions when workers make reallocation decisions. This implies that workers
are not eager to be reallocated, even through they face no job prospects. The
reasons behind this scenario are the reallocation friction due to an irreversible cost
and the uncertainty of the net returns of reallocation.
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Through the theoretical section and numerical example, this study shows that
the sectoral shock triggers the net mobility, which implies the structural change of
economy. There is little literature using a direct search framework to investigate
the sectoral mobility, and this method can help us to understand the feature of
sectoral mobility.
This paper also explains that gross mobility is caused by the preference shock.
In an economy where is no aggregate and sectoral shock, the reallocation and sepa-
ration cutoff is consistently permanent. The preference shock can push unemployed
workers moving between sector j and sector 1 − j. The only factor that triggers
unemployed workers moving to another sector is the changing of the worker’s pref-
erence, which is caused by preference shock.
This study also emphasises the model’s implications for career mobility from
several dimensions. It illustrates that a lower disutility make workers more willing
to stay in the current sector because they have a higher possibility of finding a
job. Since the cutoff of reallocation is affected by the aggregate productivity, the
amount of rest unemployment causes the fluctuation of aggregate unemployment
There are still many aspects I can expand on regarding the topic of this paper.
How workers’ career change is always an important topic in labour economics. I
have provided the theoretical work, in which unemployed workers’ preference shock
explains gross mobility and sectoral shock deciphering net mobility, but it is also
interesting to investigate how employed workers respond to aggregate, sectoral and
preference shock. This will be done as part of my future work. From the empirical
result, I find that the employed worker’s occupational and sectoral mobility is
procyclical, so it is valuable to build up a corresponding theoretical body of work
in the future. Furthermore, researchers also are interested in expanding the two-
sector framework to a multiple-sector framework. For example, if workers face
multiple offers from many different sectors, then how will workers choose? Workers
could pick up the highest expected value offer, or randomly pick up one offer from
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them. This paper focuses on unemployed worker’s reallocation decisions, however
unemployed workers may decide to leave the labour market, therefore a threshold
of non-participation could be included into the model, and the cyclicality feature
of the non-participation rate can be investigated as part of any future work.
142
References
Auray, Ste´phane, Damba Lkhagvasuren, and Antoine Terracol. 2014. “A
Dynamic Analysis of Sectoral Mobility, Worker Mismatc and the Wage-Tenure
Profiles.” Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique Working Paper 2014-
12.
Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos, and Ludo Visschers. 2013. “Unemployment and En-
dogenous Reallocation over the Business Cycle.” Institute for the Study of Labor
(IZA) IZA Discussion Paper 7124.
Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos, Bart Hobijn, Powen She, and Ludo Visschers.
2016. “The extent and cyclicality of career changes: Evidence for the U.K.”
European Economic Review, 84: 18–41.
Chang, Briana. 2011. “A Search Theory of Sectoral Reallocation.” Social Science
Research Network SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1748623, Rochester, NY. 00007.
Cole, Harold L., and Richard Rogerson. 1999. “Can the Mortensen-Pissarides
Matching Model Match the Business-Cycle Facts?” International Economic Re-
view, 40(4): 933–959.
Dvorkin, Maximiliano. 2013. “Sectoral Shocks, Reallocation and Unemployment
in Competitive Labor Markets.” 00001.
Hornstein, Andreas, Per Krusell, and Giovanni L. Violante. 2011. “Fric-
tional Wage Dispersion in Search Models: A Quantitative Assessment.” Ameri-
can Economic Review, 101(7): 2873–2898.
Jovanovic, Boyan, and Robert Moffitt. 1990. “An Estimate of a Sectoral
Model of Labor Mobility.” Journal of Political Economy, 98(4): 827–852.
Kambourov, Gueorgui, and Iourii Manovskii. 2008. “Rising Occupational
and Industry Mobility in the United States: 1968-97.” International Economic
143
Review, 49(1): 41–79. ArticleType: research-article / Full publication date: Feb.,
2008 / Copyright c© 2008 Economics Department of the University of Pennsyl-
vania.
Krause, Michael U., and Thomas A. Lubik. 2006. “The cyclical upgrading
of labor and on-the-job search.” Labour Economics, 13(4): 459–477.
Lilien, David M. 1982. “Sectoral Shifts and Cyclical Unemployment.” Journal
of Political Economy, 90(4): 777–93.
Lkhagvasuren, Damba, and Roy Nitulescu. 2013. “Sectoral Mobility and
Unemployment with Heterogeneous Moving Costs.” Journal of Labor Research,
34(3): 339–358.
Lucas, Robert Jr, and Edward C Prescott. 1974. “Equilibrium search and
unemployment.” Journal of Economic Theory, 7(2): 188–209.
Moen, Espen R. 1997. “Competitive Search Equilibrium.” Journal of Political
Economy, 105(2): 385.
Mortensen, Dale T., and Christopher A. Pissarides. 1994. “Job Creation
and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment.” The Review of Economic
Studies, 61(3): 397–415. 02505.
Murphy, Kevin M., and Robert H. Topel. 1987. “The Evolution of Unem-
ployment in the United States: 1968 — 1985.” National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc NBER Chapters.
Pilossoph, Laura. 2012. “A Multisector Equilibrium Search Model of Labor Re-
allocation.” Social Science Research Network SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2214644,
Rochester, NY. 00015.
Pissarides, Christopher A. 2000. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory - 2nd Edi-
tion. . second edition edition ed., Cambridge, Mass:The MIT Press. 00000.
144
Rogerson, Richard. 2005. “Sectoral shocks, human capital, and displaced work-
ers.” Review of Economic Dynamics, 8(1): 89–105.
Shimer, Robert. 2013. “Job Search and Labor Force Participation.” In Ad-
vances in Economics And Econometrics: Theory and Application, Tenth World
Congress. Vol. 2, Chpater 5. Cambridge University Press.
Trigari, Antonella. 2009. “Equilibrium Unemployment, Job Flows, and Inflation
Dynamics.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(1): 1–33.
145
4.9 Appendix
4.9.1 Existence and Uniqueness
Assumption 1: F (x′|x) < F (x′|x˜), for all x,x′ if x > x˜
This assumption allows that lower x today implies (on average) lower x tomorrow.
14 In the proof of existence, I use this assumption to show that the operator T is
a contraction that maps M(p, zj, x) and W
U(p, zj, x) who are decreasing in x into
itself.
Step 1 Proof that the operator T is a contraction function:
Let M(p, z, x) ≡ WE(p, z, x) + J(p, z, x) denote the value of match. And define
the operator T that maps the value function Γ(p, z, x, n) for n = 0, 1 into the same
function space, such that Γ(p, z, x, 0) = M(p, z, x),Γ(p, z, x, 1) = WU(p, z, x), as 15
T (Γ(p, x, 0)) = y(p, z)− φex+ βEp′,z′,x′
[
max{[M(p′, z′, x′),WU (p′, z′, x′)}]
]
(4.11)
T (Γ(p, x, 1)) = b− φux+ (4.12)
βEp′,z′,x′
[
max{
∫
WU (p′, z1−j , x˜) dF (x˜)− c, (ST (p′, z′, x′) +WU (p′, z′, x′))}
]
ST ≡ λ(θ(p′, z′, x))
(
M(p′, z′, x)−WU (p′, z′, x)
)
− θ(p′, z′, x)k.
First we show that the operator T maps continuous functions into continu-
14The case that higher x today leads to higher (on average) tomorrow’s x, if x < x˜, can be
described by the following equation: P (X > x′) > P (Y > x′), where X is random variable given
the previous status is x and Y the random variable given the previous status is x˜. It follows that
: 1− F (x′|x) > 1− F (x′|x˜), then F (x′|x) < F (x′|x˜). The formula of expectation value is given
as E[X] =
∫ x
x
x′f(x′) dx′ = x+
∫ x
x
[1− F (x′|x)] dx′ Similarly, E[Y ] = x+ ∫ x
x
[1− F (x′|x˜)] dx′. It
follows that E[X] > E[Y ] if x > x˜. Therefore, a higher today’s x implies (on average) higher x
tomorrow.
15ST is obtained by the following:
λ(θ)(WE(p, z, x)−WU (p, z, x)) = λ(θ)(WE(p, z, x)−WU (p, z, x)) + λ(θ)J − λ(θ)J
= λ(θ)(WE(p, z, x)−WU (p, z, x)) + λ(θ)J − θk = λ(M(p, z, x)−WU (p, z, x))− θk = ST
From equation above, I also obtain λWE + (1− λ)WU = ST +WU
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ous functions. Since θ ∈ [0, 1] for all p, z, x and WU(p, z, x),M(p, z, x), λ(θ) and
S(p, z, x) are continuous functions. Since max{M(p, z, x),WU(p, z, x)} is also a
continuous function, it follows that T maps continuous functions into continuous
functions. Moreover, since the domain of p, z, x is bounded, the resulting continu-
ous functions are bounded as well.
To show that T defines a contraction, consdier two functions Γ,Γ′, such that
‖Γ − Γ′‖sup < . Then, it follows that ‖M(p, z, x) − M ′(p, z, x)‖sup <  and
‖WU(p, z, x)−WU ′(p, z, x)‖sup < . where WU ,M are part of Γ as defined above.
Since ‖max{a, b} −max{a′, b′}‖ < max{‖a − a′‖, ‖b − b′‖} , as long as the terms
over which to maximize do not change by more than  in absolute value, the max-
imized value does not change by more . It is straightforwardly to obtain that
‖T (Γ(p, x, 0))− T (Γ′(p, x, 0))‖sup < τ. 16 The maximum value of
max{∫ WU(p′, z1−j, x˜) dF (x˜)− c, ST (p′, z′, x′)−WU(p′, z′, x′)} is needed to iden-
tify whether Eq(4.11) is a contraction. The first part can be established readily:
‖ ∫ (WU(p, z1−j, x)−WU ′(p, z1−j, x)) dF (x)‖sup < .
Next step is to show that the value of ‖S(p, z, x) +WU (p, z, x)− S′(p, z, x)−WU ′(p, z, x)‖sup
is smaller than  as well. Given ‖M(p, z, x)−M ′(p, z, x)‖sup <  and ‖WU(p, z, x)−
WU
′
(p, z, x)‖sup < , it still is not clear that M(p, z, x) −M ′(p, z, x) is bigger or
smaller than WU(p, z, x) −WU ′(p, z, x). Consider the first case that M −M ′ >
W −W ′,where M stand for M(p, z, x) and W stand for WU(p, z, x), and we also
have  > W ′ −W ≥ M ′ −M > − in hand. Set M ′′ = W ′ + (M −W ) > M ′ and
W ′′ = M ′ − (M −W ) < W ′
Since S(M −W ) = λ(θ)(M −W )− θk, we have that
− < M −M ′ < W −W ′ < 
⇒ − < W ′′ −W < W −W ′ < 
16Since we know ‖max{a, b} − max{a′, b′}‖ < max{‖a − a′‖, ‖b − b′‖}, it follows that
‖max{M,WU} − max{M ′,WU ′}‖ < max{‖M − M ′‖, ‖WU − WU ′‖}. Therefore, I can
obtain ‖T (Γ(p, x, 0)) − T (Γ′(p, x, 0))‖sup = ‖max{M,WU} − max{M ′,WU ′}‖ =  <
 , where 0 < τ < 1
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⇒ − < S(M ′ −W ′′) +W ′′ − S(M −W )−W
≤ S(M ′ −W ′) +W ′ − S(M −W )−W
≤ S(M ′′ −W ′) +W ′ − S(M −W )−W <  (4.13)
where S(M ′ −W ′′) = S(M −W ) = S(M ′′ −W ′).
Note that the outer inequalities follow because M −M ′ > −,W −W ′ < .
Now consider the second case that M ′ −W ′ > M −W ≥ 0.
 > M −M ′ > W −W ′ > −
⇒  > W ′′ −W > W −W ′ > −
 > S(M ′ −W ′′) +W ′′ − S(M −W )−W > S(M ′ −W ′) +W ′ − S(M −W )−W
> S(M ′′ −W ′) +W ′ − S(M −W )−W < 
(4.14)
Both of cases support that
‖S(p, z, x) +WU(p′, z′, x)− S ′(p, z, x)−WU ′(p′, z′, x)‖sup < 
It then follows that ‖T (Γ(p, x, 1)) − T (Γ′(p, x, 1))‖sup < τ, where 0 < τ < 1,
for all p, z, x. Hence, the operator T is a contraction. Now, it is trivial to show
that if M and WU are decreasing in x, T maps them into decreasing function.
This follows since the max{M(p′, z′, x′),WU(p′, z′, x′)} is also a decreasing function.
Assumption 1 is needed so higher x today implies (on average) higher x tomorrow.
Since the value of reallocation is constant in x, a reservation policy for reallocation
follows immediately.
Step 2 Given that T is a contraction, and Banach’s Fixed Point Theorem,a
unique fixed point (M∗(p, z, x),WU
∗
(p, z, x)) of the mapping T exists. 17 From
the fixed point function M∗(p, z, x) and WU
∗
(p, z, x) and free entry condition, we
17The fixed point of (M∗(p, z, x),WU
∗
(p, z, x)) satisfies that M∗(p, z, x) = T (M∗(p, z, x)) and
WU
∗
(p, z, x) = T (WU
∗
(p, z, x))
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can define the function J(p, z, x) = max{(1 − α)[M(p, z, x) − WU(p, z, x)], 0} =
max{k/q(θ(p, z, x)), 0} , and we can obtain θ∗(p, z, x) and J∗(p, z, x) Finally, w∗(p, z, x)
derived using Eq(4.5) given all other functions.
4.9.2 Existence of Separation Cutoff
Consider the same operator T defined in the proof of Proposition 4.9.1, but now
the relevant state space is given by (p, zj, x). I now want to show that the operator
T maps the subspace of functions Γ into itself with M(p, x) decreasing weakly
faster in x than W (p, zj, x). To show this , take M(p, zj, x) and W
U(p, zj, x) such
that M(p, zj, x) −WU(p, zj, x) is decreasing in x and let xs denote a reservation
productivity such that for x > xs a firm-worker match decide to terminate. Using
λ(θ)(M −WU)− θk = λ(θ)(M −WU)−λ′(θ)(M −WU)θ = λ(θ)(1− η)(M −WU),
I can construct the following:
T (Γ(p, zj , x, 0))− T (Γ(p, zj , x, 1)) = (4.15)
y(p, zj)− (φe − φu)x− b+ βEp′,z′j ,x′
[
max{M(p′, z′j , x′)−WU (p′, z′j , x′), 0} −
max
{∫
WU (p′, z1−j , x˜) dF (x˜)− c−WU (p′, z′j , x′), λ(θ)(1− η)(M(p′, z′j , x′)−WU (p′, z′j , x′))
}]
The first part of the proof shows the conditions under which T (Γ(p, zj, x, 0))−
T (Γ(p, zj, x, 1)) is weakly decreasing in x. Because the elements of the relevant
domain are restricted to have WU(p, zj, x) decreasing in x, and M(p, zj, x) −
WU(p, zj, x) is decreasing in x.
Case1 Consider the range of tomorrow’s x′ ∈ [x(p′, z′j), xr(p′, z′j)), where xr(p′, z′j) <
xs(p′). In this case, workers are employed and are not willing to reallocate next
period. the term under the expectation sign in the above equation reduces to (1−
δ)[M(p′, z′j, x
′)−WU(p′, z′j, x′)]−λ(θ(p′, z′j, x′))(1− η)[M(p′, z′j, x′)−WU(p′, z′j, x′)]
149
Take derivative of x, then 18
d (1− δ)[M(p′, z′j, x′)−WU(p′, z′j, x′)]− λ(θ)(1− η)[M(p′, z′j, x′)−WU(p′, z′j, x′)]
dx′
=
d(1− δ)(M −WU)
dx′
− d [λ(θ)(1− η)(M −W
U)]
dx′
=
d(1− δ)(M −WU)
dx′
− d(λ(θ)(1− η)[M −W
U ])
dθ
dθ
d(M −WU)
d(M −WU)
dx′
=
d(1− δ)(M −WU)
dx′
− (1− η)
η
k
η λ(θ)
(1− η)k
d(M −WU)
dx′
= (1− δ − λ(θ))d(M −W
U)
dx′
(4.16)
Given d(M−W
U )
dx′ < 0 and (1 − δ − λ(θ)) ≥ 0, then the derivative of last equation
with respect to x′ is negative.
Case2 Now suppose tomorrow’s x′ ∈ [xr(p′, z′j), xs(p′, z′j)). In this case, work-
ers are employed and willing to reallocate next period. The entire term under the
expectation sign is equal to
(1− δ)[M(p′, z′j, x′)−WU(p′, z′j, x′)]−
∫
WU(p′, z1−j, x˜) dF (x˜) + c+WU(p′, z′j, x
′)
and this term is weakly decreasing in x′, because (M(p′, z′j, x
′) −WU(p′, z′j, x′)) is
weakly decreasing in x′, and so is WU(p′, z′j, x
′).
Case 3 Now suppose tomorrow’s x′ ∈ [xs(p′, z′j), xr(p′, z′j)). The workers are
unemployed and are not willing to reallocate. The term under the expectation sign
becomes zero (as M(p′, z′j, x
′)−WU(p′, z′j, x′) = 0), and is therefore constant in x′.
Case 4 Now suppose tomorrow’s x′ ≥ max{xr(p′, z′j), xs(p′, z′j)}. In this case,
18Given(1 − η)(M(x) − WU (x)) = 1−ηη J = 1−ηη kq(θ) , , I can obtain λ(θ(x))(1 − η)(M(x) −
WU (x)) = 1−ηη kθ, and
dθ
d(M−WU ) =
η
1−η
λ(θ)
k . It follows that
d
d(M(x)−WU (x)) (λ(θ(x))(1−η)(M(x)−
WU (x))) = d(λ(θ(x))(1−η)(M(x)−W
U (x)))
dθ
dθ
d(M−WU ) = λ(θ)
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workers are unemployed and willing to reallocate. The term under the expectation
sign reduces to − ∫ WU(p′, z1−j, x˜) dF (x˜) + c+WU(p′, z′j, x′), which is decreasing
in x′.
Given Assumption 1, the independence of z of p, and that the term under the
expectation sign are decreasing in x′, given any p′ and z′j. Together with the term
of y(p, zj)− b− (φe − φu)x is decreasing in x, given (φe− φu) > 0, it must be that
T (Γ(p, zj, x, 0))−T (Γ(p, z′j, x, 1)) is also decreasing in x. The fixed point difference
M −WU must also be strictly decreasing in x.
4.9.3 Wage equation
λ(p, zj, x)(W
E(p, zj, x)−WU(p, zj, x)) = (1− η)θ(p, zj, x)k
η
(4.17)
The free entry condition holds for all sector, then
V (p, zj, x) = 0⇒ J(p, zj, x) = k
q(θ(p, zj, x))
(4.18)
Pissarides wage equation: Given that an employed worker’s value in steady
state is
WE(p, zj, x) = w(p, zj, x)− φex+ β[WE(p, zj, x)]
then
WE(p, zj , x)−WU (p, zj , x) = [w(p, zj , x)− (φe − φu)x− b]
−βλ(θ(p, zj , x))(WE(p, zj , x)−WU (p, zj , x)) + β(WE(p, zj , x)−WU (p, zj , x))
⇒WE(p, zj , x)−WU (p, z, x) = [w(p, zj , x)− (φe − φu)x− b]
1− β + βλ(θ(p, zj , x)) (4.19)
In terms of Hosios condition, we have
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η(1− η)
[w(p, zj, x)− (φe − φu)x− b]
1− β + βλ(θ(p, zj, x)) =
k
q(θ(p, zj, x))
(4.20)
Additionally, the value of firm in steady state can be rewritten as following
J(p, zj, x) =
y(p, zj)− w(p, zj, x)
1− β =
k
q(θ(p, z, x))
(4.21)
Simultaneously solve the Eq(4.20) and Eq(4.21), we find
w(p, zj, x) = y(p, zj)− k
q(θ(p, zj, x))
(1− β) (4.22)
Substituting Eq(4.22) in Eq(4.20), we find
η(y(p, zj)− b− φux)− k
q(θ(p, zj , x))
(1− β)− βθ(p, zj , x)(1− η)k = 0 (4.23)
If we replace the middle term with y(p, zj) − w(p, zj, x) in Eq(4.22), we can get
the pissarides wage equation
w = (1− η)pzj + ηb+ η(φe − φu)x+ β(1− η)θ(p, zj, x)k (4.24)
4.9.4 Proof of the cyclicality of reallocation
Proof.
Given that R(p) is constant in x, there exists a reallocation cutoff function xr such
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that workers reallocate if and only x < xr(p) for every p, where xr(p) satisfies:
WˆU(p, zj, x
r) = λ(θ(p, zj, x
r))WE(p, zj, x
r)+(1−λ(θ(p, zj, xr)))WU(p, zj, xr) = R(p)
Unemployed workers reallocate if and only if x < xr(p) satisfies WˆU(p, zj, x
r) =
−c+ ∫ x
x
WU(p, z1−j, x˜) dF (x˜)
For the reallocation cutoff, we know that
−c+ ∫ xx WU (p, z1−j , x˜) dF (z˜)
= WˆU (p, zj , x
r) = λ(θ(p, zj , x
r))(WE((p, zj , x
r))−WU ((p, zj , xr)) +WU (p, zj , xr))
SubstitutingWU(p, zj, x) =
1
1−β
(
b−φux+βλ(θ(p, zj, x))(WE(p, zj, x)−WU(p, zj, x))
)
into last equation, I can find
−c+
∫ z
x
max{WU (p, z1−j , x),WU (p, z1−j , xr)}dF (x)
= λ(θ(p, zj , x
r))(WE(p, zj , x
r)−WU (p, zj , xr)) +WU (p, zj , xr) (4.25)
Define θrj = θ(p, zj, x
r) and xr1−j is the reallocation cutoff in sector 1− j
(1− η)kθrj
η
− xrj +
∫ xr1−j
x
x dF (x) + (1− F (xr1−j))xr1−j + (1− β)c+ (4.26)
βk
1− η
η
[
∫ xr1−j
x
θ(p, z1−j, x) dF (x) + (1− F (xr1−j))θ(p, z1−j, xr)] = 0 ≡ RE
Use the implicit function theorem, then I can obtain the following equation:
dxrj
dp
= − 1
(1−η)
η
dθ(p,xrj )
dxrj
k − 1
×
[(1− η)
η
dθ(p, xrj)
dp
k + (1− F (xr1−j)
dxr1−j
dp
(4.27)
−βk1− η
η
[
∫ xr1−j
x
dθ(p, z1−j, x)
dp
dF (x) + (1− F (xr1−j))
dθ(p, xr1−j)
dp
]
]
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Since q(θ(p, zj, x)) =
vη uη
v
= θ(p, zj, x)
η−1, Eq(4.23) can be re-writen as
θ(p, zj , x)
η−1 η[y(p, zj)− b− (φe − φu)x]− β(1− η)θ(p, zj , x)k
1− β − k = 0 (4.28)
Take derivative of Eq(4.28) with respect to p and x, I find
dθ(p, zj, x)
dp
=
θ(p, zj, x)
w(p, zj, x)− b− (φe − φu)x
dy(p, zj)
dp
(4.29)
dθ(p, zj, x)
dx
=
−(φe − φu)θ(p, zj, x)
w(p, zj, x)− b− (φe − φu)x (4.30)
the two equations above imply that θ is increasing in p and decreasing in z.
Note that
lim
x↑w−1(y;p,zj)
θ(p, zj, x)
w(p, zj, x)− b− (φe − φu)x =
λ(θ(p, zj, x))
1− β(1− λ(θ(p, zj, x))) = 0 (4.31)
because θ(p, zj, x) ↓ 0, as w(p, zj, xr) ↑ y(p, zj).
dθ(p, zj, x)
dp
∣∣∣∣
x=xrj
=
θ(p, zj, x
r)
w(p, zj, xr)− b− (φe − φu)xr
dy(p, zj)
dp
= 0 (4.32)
dθ(p, zj, x)
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=xrj
=
−(φe − φu)θ(p, zj, xr)
w(p, zj, xr)− b− (φe − φu)xr = 0 (4.33)
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dxrj
dp
=
[
(1− F (xr1−j)
dxr1−j
dp
− βk1− η
η
[
∫ xr1−j
x
dθ(p, z1−j, x)
dp
dF (x)]
]
(4.34)
dxr1−j
dp
=
[
(1− F (xrj)
dxrj
dp
− βk1− η
η
[
∫ xrj
x
dθ(p, zj, x)
dp
dF (x)]
]
(4.35)
Substitute (4.34) with (4.35), then
dxrj
dp
=
−1
1− (1− F (xrj))(1− F (xr1−j))
× (4.36)
βk
1− η
η
[
(1− F (xr1−j))
∫ xrj
x
dθ(p, zj, x)
dp
dF (x) + [
∫ xr1−j
x
dθ(p, z1−j, x)
dp
dF (x)]
]
And dθ(p,z,x)
dp
is decreasing in x.
4.9.5 Proof of The cyclicality of separation
Case 1 In the case of random z, and a one-time unexpected permanent shock
to p,
If xr > xs,the value of being unemployed does not depend directly on the value
of reallocation, but depends on the island-specific value of unemployment.
And define θs ≡ θ(p, xs) And define θ(p, xsj) ≡ θ(p, zj, xs)
All islands with rest unemployment have the same value of unemployments of
productivity: WU(p, zj, x) =
b−xsj
1−β The value of a match at the cutoff of separation
xs implies that workers are unemployed, thus M(p, xs(p)) = WU(p, xs)
M(p, zj, x
s) = y(p, z)−φexsj +β[M(p, z, xs)]⇒ (1−β)WU(p, z, xs) = y(p, z)−φexs
155
Use the implicit function theory to take derivative of last equation, then we
can obtain
dxs(p)
dp
= 1
φe−φuyp(p, zj) > 0
(4.37)
Separations are countercyclical
Case 2 If xr < xs, implies that workers separate endogenously to reallocate
R(p, z1−j) = WU (p, zj , xr) =
b− φuxrj + βkθ(p, zj , xr) 1−ηη
1− β
Take derivative with respect to p, I find
dR(p, z1−j)
dp
=
βk(1− η)
(1− β)η
θ(p, zj , x
r)
w(p, zj , xr)− b− (φe − φu)xrj
(
yp(p, zj)− (φe − φu)
dxrj(p)
dp
)
)
− 1
1− β
dxrj
dp
(4.38)
we can rewrite the last equation as following
dR(p, z1−j)
dp
=
βλ(θ(p, zj , x
r))
(1− β)(1− β(1− λ(θ(p, zj , xr))))
(
yp(p, zj)− (φe − φu)
dxrj
dp
)
− 1
1− β
dxrj
dp
(4.39)
All unemployed workers would like to reallocate, thusM(p, zj, x
s) = WU(p, zj, x
s) =
WU(p, zj, x
r) = R(p, z1−j).
M(p, zj , x
s) = y(p, zj)− φexsj + β[WU (p, zj , xs)]⇒M(p, xsj) = y(p, zj)− φexsj + β[WU (p, xrj)]
R(p, z1−j) = y(p, zj)− φexsj + βR(p, z1−j)⇒ (1− β)R(p, z1−j) = y(p, zj)− φexsj
(1− β)dR(p, z1−j)
dp
=
(
yp(p, zj)− φe
dxsj(p)
dp
)
(4.40)
Substituting Eq(4.39) into Eq(4.40) and rearranging the result, I can get the
following equation
Take partial derivative with p of last two equation, and rearrange the results ,
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then I can get the following result.
dxsj
dp
=
1
φe
[
yp(p, zj)−
βλ(θ(p, zj , x
r
j))
1− β + βλ(θ(p, zj , xrj))
(
yp(p, zj)− (φe − φu)
dxrj(p)
dp
)
+
dxrj(p)
dp
]
(4.41)
4.9.6 Sectoral shock and net mobility
Case 1 xr > xs
dθ(p, zj, x)
dzj
=
θ(p, zj, x)
w(p, zj, x)− b− (φe − φu)x
dy(p, zj)
dzj
(4.42)
Take derivative of (4.26) with respect to zj, we can obtain :
dxrj
dzj
= −
1−η
η
k
θ(p,zj ,x
r)
w(p,zj ,xr)−b−(φe−φu)xr
dy(p,zj)
dzj
1−η
η
k
−(φe−φu)θ(p,zj ,xr)
w(p,zj ,xr)−b−(φe−φu)xrj − 1
= 0
dxr1−j
dzj
= −
(1− F (xrj))
dxrj
dzj
− βk 1−η
η
[
∫ xrj
x
dθ(p,zj ,x)
dzj
dF (x) + (1− F (xrj))
dθ(p,xrj )
dzj
]
1−η
η
k
−(φe−φu)θ(p,z1−j ,xr)
w(p,z1−j ,xr)−b−(φe−φu)xr1−j − 1
= −βk1− η
η
∫ xrj
x
dθ(p, zj, x)
dzj
dF (x) < 0
= −βk1− η
η
∫ xrj
x
θ(p, zj, x)
w(p, zj, x)− b− (φe − φu)x
dy(p, zj)
dzj
dF (x) < 0 (4.43)
Separation cutoff
M(p, zj, x
s) = y(p, z)−φexsj +β[M(p, z, xs)]⇒ (1−β)WU(p, z, xs) = y(p, z)−φexs
dxsj(p)
dzj
= 1
φe−φuyz(p, zj) > 0
(4.44)
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Case 2 If xr < xs, implies that workers separate endogenously to reallocate
R(p, z1−j) = WU (p, zj , xr) =
b− xrj + βkθ(p, zj , xr) 1−ηη
1− β
Take derivative with respect to p, I find
dR(p, z1−j)
dzj
=
dWU (p, zj , x
r)
dzj
=
βk(1− η)
(1− β)η
θ(p, zj , x
r)
w(p, zj , xr)− b− (φe − φu)xrj
(
yz(p, zj)− (φe − φu)
dxrj(p)
dzj
)
)
− 1
1− β
dxrj
dzj
(4.45)
we can rewrite the last equation as following
dWU (p, zj , x
r)
dzj
=
βλ(θ(p, zj , x
r))
(1− β)(1− β(1− λ(θ(p, zj , xr))))
(
yz(p, zj)− (φe − φu)
dxrj
dzj
)
− 1
1− β
dxrj
dzj
(4.46)
All unemployed workers would like to reallocate, thusM(p, zj, x
s) = WU(p, zj, x
s) =
WU(p, zj, x
r).
M(p, zj , x
s) = y(p, zj)− φexsj + β[WU (p, zj , xs)]⇒M(p, xsj) = y(p, zj)− φexsj + β[WU (p, xrj)]
WU (p, zj , x
r) = y(p, zj)− φexsj + βWU (p, zj , xr))⇒ (1− β)WU (p, zj , xr)) = y(p, zj)− φexsj
(1− β)dW
U (p, zj , x
r)
dzj
=
(
yz(p, zj)− φe
dxsj(p)
dzj
)
(4.47)
Substituting Eq(4.46) into Eq(4.47) and rearranging the result, I can get the
following equation
dxsj
dzj
=
1
φe
[
yz(p, zj)−
βλ(θ(p, zj , x
r
j))
1− β + βλ(θ(p, zj , xrj))
(
yz(p, zj)− (φe − φu)
dxrj(p)
dzj
)
+
dxrj(p)
dzj
]
(4.48)
Given
dxrj
dzj
= 0 and λ(θ(p, zj, x
r)) = 0 , we can obtain
dxsj
dzj
= 1
φ
yz(p, zj) > 0
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
This thesis has focused on career mobility in the labour market in the UK. Chap-
ter 2 use a quarterly LFS dataset to confirm that career mobility is procyclical.
Chapter 3 applied yearly BHPS and UKHLS datasets to confirm the procyclicality
of career mobility while Chapter 4 developed a theoretical model to explore and
understand the reasons behind the evidence of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
5.2 Main findings
Chapter 2 presents the first comprehensive investigation of occupational and indus-
trial mobility in the UK. I recorded that the level of career mobility is surprisingly
high. The evidence shows that the reallocation is churning in the UK labour mar-
ket. In the literature, workers’ career mobility is due to the change of economic
structure. However, the churning of the labour market we observed in the UK
cannot be explained by the change of economic structure; there is another reason
pushing worker’s mobility across occupations and industries. This has motivated
me to develop a theoretical model in order to tackle the complexity of mobility. I
documented the procyclical of career mobility using the LFS, no matter which tran-
sition channel, and confirmed this feature with the econometric model. Employed
workers who voluntarily left their last job have a higher probability to change ca-
reer than those who were involuntarily left their job. Unemployed workers whose
unemployment duration is longer than two quarters have a higher possibility to
change career than those whose duration is shorter than two quarters. Inactive
workers who want a job have a higher possibility to change career than those who
do not want a job. A career changer’s wage increases more than the career stayer
during economic expansion.
Chapter 3 is the first research to detect the effect of interviewing method on
the career mobility. The dataset consists of BHPS and UKHLS, which allows me
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to investigate the career mobility with a long-term viewpoint. The combination
of the BHPS and UKHLS contributes to tracking the individuals’ behaviour for
more than twenty years, and contributes to observing the business cycle. I reas-
sure the procyclicality of career mobility by controlling the change of interviewing
method. This feature is found with 1-digit, 2-digit and 3-digit level occupational
classification, and with 1-digit and 2-digit industrial classification. This implies
the evidence is robust and reliable. This chapter contributes to determining the
effect of changing interview method on the definition of career mobility. Given that
the mobility is defined as the changing of classification, no matter whether workers
have changed job or not,the dependent interviewing significantly reduces the level
of mobility. However, if we define the mobility as the changing of classification
for job changers, then we can conclude that the change of interviewing methods
does not affect the career mobility. This result eliminates the concerns from the
literature. At the same time, the results support the findings in Chapter 2. The
career mobilities are still surprisingly high.
Chapter 4 places the sectoral productivity shock and preference shock into
a direct-search model, which help us to distinguish the net mobility and gross
mobility. The reallocation cutoff is affected by the aggregate productivity, and
this cutoff changes the individual’s attempt to move between sectors. This result
helps us to understand not only the fact of churning gross mobility observed by the
data, but also the change of sectoral employment. The increasing reallocation cost
reduces the individual’s incentive to switch sector and makes them stay in the sector
longer because the waiting cost is lower than before. Higher unemployment benefit
also reduces the worker’s attempts to switch his sector. The rest unemployment is
a major part of total unemployment. Rest-Unemployed workers have a very low
chance of finding a job , but they still prefer to stay in the sector. The reason is
that their expected value of waiting in the sector is higher than moving to another
sector. On the other hand, the increase of a sector productivity will attract more
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inflow into the sector than the outflow. This result helps us to understand the
procyclicality of career mobility in terms of the shift of aggregate productivity. It
also presents the mechanism of net mobility and gross mobility, and provides us
with a framework to review the literature.
5.3 Future studies
In this thesis, the theoretical framework only allows workers to reallocate across
sectors via unemployment. However, according to the empirical evidence, we can
observe many workers moving via employed to employed transition. In Chapter
3, we compare the job information between two consecutive waves to identify the
career mobility. There are some cases in which workers are employed in many other
jobs within two consecutive waves. However, the dataset only captures part of the
job information over the waves; job information within two consecutive wave is
not sufficient to be appropriately analysed. It would also be interesting to include
the inactive concept into the model, for example, a cutoff of worker who quit the
labour market. This would be helpful to understand the intuition of transition
from inactive to employment.
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